Three essays on the economics of human capital development by Gorman, Emma Louise
Three Essays on the Economics of
Human Capital Development
Emma Louise Gorman
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements





Three Essays on the Economics of Human Capital Development
Emma Louise Gorman
A thesis submitted to the University of Lancaster in partial fulfilment of the requirements
of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
December 2018
This thesis is concerned with the role of formal schooling in the production of human
capital over the lifecycle.
While many studies have documented an associated between education and cognitive
outcomes, less is known about the extent this association is causal—or the nature of the
underlying mechanisms driving any effect. Chapter 1 examines the causal effect of addi-
tional secondary schooling on cognitive function in later life, using new methods in causal
mediation analysis to explore the role of occupation choice as a key channel.
The findings reveal robust evidence that basic education leads to improved working
memory, but detect little support for effects on verbal fluency or numeric abilities. Stay-
ing in school for an additional year increases the probability of entering a higher status
occupation, and an analysis of mechanisms finds that up to about one-fifth of schooling’s
effect on cognitive outcomes can be explained by occupation choice. However, the esti-
mates are too imprecise to yield firm conclusions.
Chapters 2 and 3 are situated in the school choice literature. The promise of school
choice is to allow parental preference to influence which school their child attends, weak-
ening the link between residential location and school quality. However, choice is typically
constrained—and markets for schools are no exception. Popular schools tend to be over-
subscribed, and inevitably many families miss out on a place at their preferred school.
Chapter 2 traces the consequences of missing out on a place at a preferred secondary
school in England, focusing on long run outcomes, including high-stakes examination re-
sults. The analyses do not find evidence that failing to gain a place at a preferred school
leads to poorer academic outcomes—but those who miss out are more likely to engage in
risky behaviours, drop out of secondary school, and have poorer mental health in adult-
hood.
Finally, Chapter 3 assesses the effects of missing out on a place at a preferred primary
school, on cognitive and non-cognitive skill development and parental responses. Little
evidence is revealed for a detrimental effect on skill development, but compared with those
who get into their preferred school, parents whose child misses out on a place are more
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This thesis studies formal schooling and human capital development over the lifecycle.
Since Gary Becker’s seminal work in 1964 (Becker, 1964), economists have studied the
production of human capital and skill formation. The remit of this area has now broad-
ened to include investment in health capital and socio-emotional skills—in addition to
traditional measures of cognitive skill. Recent development have highlighted the impor-
tance of a lifecycle perspective: understanding how the efficacy of interventions varies
with age, to inform on the optimal timing of policy intervention. This work focuses on
primary and secondary school periods—stages of life still eminently open to intervention,
with scope for lifetime benefits.
In Chapter 1, I examine the nexus between basic education, occupation choice and
cognitive skills. First, I consider the causal effect of an additional year secondary schooling
on cognitive function in later life (measured at about 60 years). Second, I use newmethods
in causal analysis to test the the role of the “use-it-or-lose-it” hypothesis: does working in
a cognitively demanding occupation preserve cognitive function? Chapters 2 and 3 turn
to focus on school choice: does it matter if children attend the school preferred by their
parents? For what outcomes, and when?
We know that cognitive ability is an important determinant of many social, economic
and health outcomes (Heckman et al. , 2006; Wraw et al. , 2015). Given there are large so-
cioeconomic difference in cognitive outcomes, and trajectories of cognitive development,
how to narrow this gap and intervene to improve life chances is a common policy focus.
Recent studies recognise that the issue is not as simple as “nature vs nurture”, as older
literature would suggest (Herrnstein &Murray, 1994). Rather, measured skills are a prod-
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uct of a complex interplay between genetics, early-life experiences and skill investments
(Heckman, 2006, 1995).
In Chapter 1, I contribute to this area by providing new evidence on whether an addi-
tional year spent in secondary school exerts a causal impact on cognitive outcomes later
in life. I use data from Understanding Society, a large panel dataset following the lives of
over 40,000 households in the United Kingdom (UK). I use a Regression Discontinuity
Design to exploit a change in school leaving laws, building on a growing literature using
policy experiments to credibly inform on the wider returns to schooling (Glymour et al. ,
2008; Banks & Mazzonna, 2012). In line with the findings of other studies, the main re-
sults show that an additional year of schooling leads to improved working memory in later
life, with large effect sizes ranging from about one third to half of a standard deviation.
However, the findings reveal little evidence for causal impacts on verbal fluency or basic
numeracy skills.
A second key question is then about how extra schooling causally could improve cogni-
tive outcomes, and the second contribution of Chapter 1 is to examine the plausibility of a
specific potential channel: occupation choice. Occupation is an commonly studied factor
in preserving our cognitive health—creating resilience to the wear-and-tear on our brain
associated with aging (termed cognitive reserve in the neuroscience literature (Whalley
et al. , 2004)). This motivates the oft-cited “use-it-or-lose-it” hypothesis: continuing to
engage in cognitively stimulated work, or work-like activities, is one way to protect our
cognitive abilities in older ages (Rohwedder & Willis, 2010).
An intervention can exert causal effects through many different mechanisms, and in-
creasingly, economists are recognising the important of understanding not just whether an
intervention works, but also how. Understanding how an intervention works is key for as-
sessing external validity: whether the policy would be effective in a different setting. The
importance of studying mechanisms is highlighted by Angus Deaton in a discussion the
utility of an average treatment effect, denoted θ (Deaton, 2010, p.p. 429):
“[...] there are many possible mechanisms, some of which will work in one
context and not in another. In consequence θ is unlikely to be constant [...] In-
14
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stead, it is precisely the variation in θ that encapsulates the poverty reduction
mechanisms that ought to be the main objects of our enquiry.
One reason the study of mechanisms is relatively scarce is because it is difficult to do
credibly. Studying the role of a post-treatment variable introduces a second endogeneity
problem, in addition to endogeneity of the treatment. A full structural model is one way
to study mechanisms, however this is not without its own stringent data and assumption
requirements. A more common method is to take a data-driven approach and employ an
effect decomposition. Yet, with some exceptions, identification of mechanisms explaining
treatment effects has not received much attention in the literature, as highlighted by Fortin
et al. (2011, p.p. 13) in their review of decomposition methods in economics:
“In econometrics, the standard approach is to first discuss identification [...]
and then introduce estimation procedures to recover the object we want to
identify. In the decomposition literature, most papers jump directly to the
estimation issues (i.e., discuss procedures) without first addressing the iden-
tification problem.”
I confront this concern directly by applying newly developed methods in the causal
mediation analysis literature. This is an area of study which has developed recently, in the
econometrics and statistics literature, to formally disentangle causal mechanisms driving
treatment effects. An important point of difference in this literature is to make explicit
the identification assumptions required to decompose average treatment effects into their
constituent causal channels, and indeed to highlight the inherent difficulty of this task (see
Huber et al. (2016), Keele et al. (2015), Imai et al. (2011) and Huber (2016) for useful
overviews of identification and estimation of direct and indirect treatment effects).
Applied examples of these methods in the economics literature include: Huber (2015),
who uses inverse probability weighting to disentangle the role of occupation choice in ex-
plaining wage gaps; Huber et al. (2017a), who deploy instrumental variables to study the
causal mechanisms driving the education-income gradient; Huber et al. (2017b), who
consider the role of tougher caseworkers as causal mechanism connecting active labour
15
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market programs and increased employment; and Deuchert et al. (2018), who quantify
causal channels shaping the effects of the Vietnam draft in a difference-in-difference set-
ting.
In the Understanding Society data, I observe the occupation chosen both immediately
after leaving school, as well in toward the end of working life. I use two classifications of
occupation type. The first classification splits occupations up from the most routine tasks
up to professional andmanagerial tasks, which tend to offer both more autonomy as well as
safer working environments. Second, I classify the occupations based on how cognitively-
intensive they are—the extent to which they rely on “STEM”-type skills, technical skill,
critical analysis and so on.
I apply the methods for causal mediation analysis developed in Yamamoto (2014);
Keele et al. (2015); Park & Kürüm (2018), which decompose a Local Average Treatment
Effect (LATE) into a direct and indirect effect. This approach exploits the raising of the
school leaving age as an instrument for endogenous schooling. In the absence of a cred-
ible instrument, I rely on a type of conditional independence assumption to handle the
endogeneity of occupation choice. This is paired with a sensitivity analysis to assess the
robustness to deviations from this assumption.
The analyses of mechanisms shows that staying on for an extra year of school increases
the probability of entering a higher status job after leaving school. Second, it shows that
occupation type could explain up to 18% of the total effect of schooling on memory (de-
pending onwhichmeasure is used), a similar figure to that found in other studies. However,
the figures are very imprecisely estimated, and not statistically significant at conventional
levels. Given the imprecision of the estimates, I remain agnostic about the role of occupa-
tion, but conclude that basic education causally improves working memory—an important
component of cognitive function in older ages.
Evidently, quantity of schooling matters for some important outcomes. But what about
school quality? Chapters 2 and 3 assess the effects ofwhich school a child attends. Specifi-
cally, Chapters 2 and 3 trace the consequences of missing out on a place at the school which
16
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is most preferred by parents in England. These chapters contribute to the debate around
“school choice”. School choice policies are policies which allow parental preferences to
influence which school their child will attend (Cantillon, 2017). Despite the innocuous-
sounding definition, school choice has been hotly debated and politicised issue both in
England and internationally. In England, features of parental choice and a “quasi-market”
in compulsory schooling were introduced largely from 1988, in the 1988 School Reform
Act. Indeed many education systems around the world feature some aspect of parental
choice, and today the policy discussion is as much about how to organise school choice
and admissions, as about whether to have parental choice at all.
The central problem in designing a school choice system is allocating pupils to schools,
accounting for parental preferences, school capacities and wider policy objectives (e.g. di-
versity in schools, or social mobility). One motivation for school choice focuses on recog-
nising heterogeneity of parental preferences, by allowing families to express preferences
over a diversity of school types. A second, and perhaps more commonly cited, motivation,
and not necessarily implied by the first, is to induce competition between schools, with the
aim of improving academic standards. Both of these rationales have been referenced by
different UK Governments in relation to school choice policy.
Understanding how parents value schools, and the effects of attending a preferred
school, are important for at least two reasons. First, understanding what parents value
in schools is important for meeting to stated aims of a school choice policy. For example,
if governments value academic performance in schools, but parents value something else
(e.g., proximity to home, anti-bullying policies), a policy of parental choice will not have
the desired effect of raising standards via increased competition on academic performance.
Second, if attending a preferred school matters for life chances, then from an equity per-
spective it matters who gets in. Presently, there is substantial variation in rates of preferred
school attendance by region, by ethnicity and by socio-economic status—understanding
why this variation exists and the possibly heterogeneous consequences is important for
developing policy.
The promise of school choice programs is to break the connection between where
17
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families live and the quality of the school they attend. The limitation of the traditional
approach—allocating children to their local school—amplifies the social stratification as-
sociated with Tiebout sorting: that is, aﬄuent neighborhoods tend to enjoy higher quality
public amenities (Tiebout, 1956). However choice is seldom unconstrained, and schools
are no exception. Schools perceived to be good tend to be oversubscribed, such that not
all pupils can attend their preferred school. Each year, about 16% of families miss out on
a place at their preferred secondary schools, and about 6% miss out on a place at their pre-
ferred primary school. Whilst attracting much ire from the media and dissatisfied parents,
there is little evidence about the consequences of missing out. Hence, Chapters 2 and 3 in
this thesis are specifically concerned with effects of missing out on a place at a preferred
school.
Internationally, various incarnations of school choice policies are common, and a grow-
ing literature aims to characterise the nature of parental preferences over schools and the
consequences of gaining a place at a school preferred by parents (Pop-Eleches & Urquiola,
2013; Cullen et al. , 2006; Dobbie & Fryer, 2014, 2015; Abdulkadiroglu et al. , 2017b,
2014). The research on preferences report much heterogeneity. In the USA, recent re-
search has shown that parents often value peer mix (i.e., wealthy white peers) rather than
school effectiveness (i.e., a causal improvement in test scores) (Abdulkadiroglu et al. ,
2017a).
Indeed, comparisons of the outcomes of pupils who just get into a prestigious school,
with those who just miss out reveal no impact on short run test scores, despite large dis-
continuity in peer mix and school prestige (Abdulkadiroglu et al. , 2014). With some
exceptions, this finding is common across many settings: gaining a place a parents’ pre-
ferred school does not appear to causally influence short run test scores Abdulkadiroglu
et al. (2014); Dobbie & Fryer (2014). There is some evidence of improvements in broader
outcomes, such as risky behaviours and truancy (Dudovitz et al. , 2018), later employment
rates, and timing of childbearing (Jackson & Beuermann, 2018).
In Chapter 2, a jointly authored study with IanWalker, we use data from the Longitudi-
nal Study of Young People in England, (LSYPE), confidentially linked to high quality ad-
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ministrative data on school attributes and educational outcomes (National Pupil Database)
to assess the effects of missing out on a preferred secondary school on a range of high-
stakes outcomes. The central challenge is to compare families who had similar chances
of admission to a school and similar preferences over schools, yet one gains a place and
one misses out. For those who miss out on their preferred school, we do not have data on
the counterfactual school they would have preferred to attend, and this must be estimated
from the data.
We employ a selection-on-observed variables strategy, informed by the nature of the
institutional setting (to account for admissions probability) and literature on parental pref-
erences (to account for preferences) and information on the local population and school
type (to account for variation in choice sets). We use a combination of matching and re-
gression to compare outcomes of children with similar values of the variables shaping ad-
missions probability, similar variables which shape preferences, a similar feasible choice
set of schools, and similar prior ability and socio-economic status.
While preferred schools have higher headline measures of attainment (e.g., GCSE re-
sults), our analysis fails to detect convincing evidence for effects of missing out a preferred
school on test scores and university attendance. However, we do find consistent evidence of
increased high school drop-out after the age of compulsory schooling, and increased uni-
versity drop-out among pupils who miss out on a preferred school. These effects persist
to age 25 years, where we find long-lasting negative effects on mental health and income.
Pupils who miss out show increased patterns of early engagement in risky behaviours,
representing a potential mechanism driving the increased drop-out rates. While we do
not find strong evidence for gender differences, the negative consequences of missing out
are more pronounced in local areas which used a more manipulable mechanism (‘first-
preference first’) for allocating school places. Pupils exposed to the first-preference mech-
anism who miss out end up commuting further to school than their counterparts exposed
to a Deferred Acceptance mechanism, possibly indicating much poorer school matches.
Overall, our findings highlight that which school a child attends can have consequences
for broader outcomes than only test scores, and the way places are allocated matters for
19
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ensuring children attend a school which is right for them.
Chapter 3 moves to look at the consequences of not attending a preferred primary
school, tracing pupil’s cognitive and non-cognitive skill development and the dynamics of
parental behavioural responses. I employ data from the Millennium Cohort Study (MCS),
a cohort study following the lives of around 18,000 children born in during the years 2000
and 2001. Primary school admissions are governed by similar admissions rules to sec-
ondary schools, and I use an analogous identification strategy to that used in Chapter
2—i.e., a selection-on-observed variables strategy implemented using propensity score
matching.
In contrast to the LSYPE, the MCS directly elicits parents’ preferences over schools.
Specifically, it asks about the identity counterfactual school by asking: if your current
school was not your first choice school, which school was your first choice? From this ques-
tion, we can compute the distance from a family’s home address to their current school,
and crucially, the distance to their preferred school (if they were not offered a place at
their first-choice school). As a matching variable, distance to preferred school is espe-
cially informative because it capture both admission probability, as well as preferences—a
family’s willingness-to-travel for a preferred school.
The results do not reveal any effects of missing out on a first choice school on cognitive
development. In terms of parental responses, there are small (but statistically insignificant)
increases in the probability of parental investment activities at ages 7—including helping
with homework and paying for private tuition. At age 11 years, parents of children who
miss out are significantly more likely to pay for extra lessons. This work does not detect
any evidence that attending a non-preferred parental primary school has any lasting effects
on the skill development of children. However, the findings show that parental responses
are important when considering policy impacts.
Taken together, this thesis reports on new research assessing the role of schools in pro-
moting the development of human capital. Using modern methods of policy evaluation,
I explore the consequences of two key aspects of education: (1) how many years a child
spends in secondary school, and (2) which school they attend, and whether this is they
20
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school preferred by parents. Increasingly, education and skills are the key to getting on in
life, in terms of both labour market success and wider life outcomes. In the face of a fun-
damentally changing economy, understanding the role of the school system in promoting
human capital development remains an essential area of study for effective policy design.
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1.1. INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1. SCHOOLING AND COGNITION
1.1 Introduction
Cognitive performance shapes economic, social and health outcomes over the lifecycle
(Heckman et al. , 2006; Wraw et al. , 2015). While the efficacy of early intervention
in improving cognitive performance is well studied, less is known about whether these
outcomes are malleable outside of early childhood (Heckman, 2006). This study assesses
whether secondary schooling has lasting causal effects on cognitive function—measured
four decades after leaving school—and explores the role of occupation type in shaping
these effects.
In later life, cognitive performance becomes an important component of healthy ageing
and continued independent functioning (Beard et al. , 2015). Among healthy individuals—
free of clinical cognitive impairment—age-related reductions in cognitive performance
can impede the ability to carry out daily activities (Tucker-Drob, 2011; Boyle et al. , 2012)
and manage financial planning decisions (Hsu &Willis, 2013). This has important impli-
cations for continued labor market engagement and retirement planning, as state pension
ages rise and supporting continued labour market participation is a central policy focus
(OECD, 2006; Department for Work and Pensions, 2013).
Declining cognitive performance is also a risk factor for morbidity and mortality. One
example is dementia, for which declines in cognitive function, especially memory, are a
precursor. Estimates from 2016 showed that 800,000 people suffered from dementia in
the United Kingdom, with a total cost of 26 billion pounds per year—largely comprising
informal care costs (Prince et al. , 2014). Even after accounting for the observed and
projected reductions in age-specific incidence rates, the prevalence of dementia is forecast
to increase to 1.2million by 2040, representing a vast increase in both human and economic
costs (Ahmadi-Abhari et al. , 2017).
Yet cognitive impairment is not an inevitable consequences of ageing, and a large body
of work has sought to uncover modifiable risk factors across the lifecourse. Basic educa-
tion is one promising candidate in improving cognitive outcomes. Based on observational
evidence, The Lancet’s recent dementia Commission concluded that 8% of dementia cases
could be avoided by increased levels of basic education (Livingston et al. , 2017). In the
24
Human capital formation 1.1. INTRODUCTION
same vein, age-specific rates of incident dementia are falling (Ahmadi-Abhari et al. , 2017),
predominantly among those with at least a high school diploma (Chêne et al. , 2016).
Although causal evidence is sparse, these findings are consistent with the hypothe-
sis that increased population levels of education could reduce the growth in burden of
cognition-related disease, and support economic adjustment to a changing demographic
structure. With this in mind, the objectives of this study are two-fold. First, to provide new
evidence on the extent to which schooling shapes cognitive function in later life. Second,
to conduct a formal analysis exploring the channels driving these effects, paying particular
attention to the role of occupation type and complexity.
Despite extensive observational research demonstrating that schooling is a correlate
of cognitive outcomes throughout the lifecycle (Plassman et al. , 1995), fewer studies are
able to attach a causal to this association or the hypothesised underlying mechanisms.
One approach, leveraged in this paper, is to exploit the substantial investments in pub-
licly provided education occurring over the last century, notably the successive increases
in the minimum age at which students can leave secondary school. These increases in
the minimum schooling leaving age represent plausibly exogenous changes in schooling,
and are widely employed to quantify both pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns to educa-
tion (Harmon & Walker, 1995; Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2011). The cohorts affected by
these reforms are now ageing, providing an opportunity to explore whether the effects of
schooling persist into later life.
The United Kingdom (UK) provides an especially informative laboratory to examine
the causal effects of schooling. Two changes to the secondary school leaving age were
enacted during the 20th century: in 1947 the minimum school leaving age was raised
from 14 years to 15 years, and 1972 it was raised again to 16 years. These changes affected
relatively large shares of the relevant cohorts. For example, the corresponding changes in
the United States exerted a causal effect on only about five percent of the student cohort,
compared with about one half and one third for the 1947 and 1972 reforms in the UK,
respectively. Yet, the evidence base on schooling and cognitive function in the United
Kingdom remains limited, and little is known about the underlying mechanisms driving
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these long-run effects.
For England and Wales, Banks & Mazzonna (2012) established positive effects of an
additional year of schooling on aspects of cognitive function among the cohorts affected
by the 1947 raising of the school leaving age. The findings are large in magnitude, raising
the possibility that increased population education could function as a policy tool in fos-
tering healthy ageing. Given the large total effect size, the protective effect of education
of cognition is unlikely to be wholly a direct effect. More plausibly, education influences
cognition indirectly, through the wider set of opportunities that education affords. How-
ever, the cohorts exposed to the 1947 reform grew up in unstable economic and political
circumstances; their choice set and constraints they faced were vastly different from more
recent cohorts. Whether the channels through which that reform operated are still relevant
in the current policy context, despite the changing nature of the work tasks, labour market
participation, and health technology, remains unclear.
The first contribution of this study is to provide new evidence on the causal effect basic
education on cognitive outcomes, using a FuzzyRegressionDiscontinuity design to exploit
the raising of the secondary school leaving age in 1972. This reform increased the mini-
mum school leaving age from 15 to 16 years in England and Wales. The data employed
is from Understanding Society (U.S.)—the largest household panel study in the United
Kingdom. This data contains granular information on month-year of birth, allowing exact
identification of exposure to the reform. Comparing the outcomes of observationally sim-
ilar individuals exposed and unexposed to the reform—born only months apart—yields
credible estimates of the causal effects of the additional year of schooling.
One threat to the validity of this approach is confounding from secular trends in longevity
and cognition: cohort-specific cognitive performance has been steadily increasing over the
20th-century (Flynn, 1987). This so-called Flynn effect may be influenced not only by in-
vestments in mass education during this time, but the changing nature of job-tasks to be
more cognitively stimulating, improvements in nutrition, and the increasing proportion of
women entering the labour force, which act as confounding factors (Skirbekk et al. , 2013;
Case & Paxson, 2009). To reduce concerns of this type of confounding, this study adjusts
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for birth cohort trends, and uses a small sample window—of just under three years either
side of the reform date—to enhance the comparability of the treatment and control units.
Additionally, sensitivity analyses are conducted using different covariates sets and sample
window choices.
The second contribution is to explore the role of occupation choice as a key mecha-
nism driving the effect of education on cognition. Despite many theories, less is known
empirically about the channels which drive the education-cognition gradient. A number
of hypotheses highlight the role of occupation type, especially with regard to occupational
complexity, and the commonly cited “use-it-or-lose-it” hypothesis. This framework sug-
gests mental stimulation may sustain brain function, supporting the idea that more cogni-
tively stimulating activities stave off cognitive decline (Rohwedder & Willis, 2010). In a
similar vein, proponents of the so-called “cognitive reserve” theories in neuropsychology
have put forward education and occupation as key factors in increasing mental resilience,
reducing the clinical manifestations of brain ageing (Stern, 2002).
This paper applies methods from the causal mediation analysis literature to explore the
role of occupation type as a key mechanism (Keele et al. , 2015). To allow for potential
endogeneity of occupation type—despite the absence of a credible second instrument—
the approach used relies on a type of conditional independence assumption for occupation
choice (Yamamoto, 2014; Park & Kürüm, 2018). While fundamentally untestable, this
assumption is arguably plausible in this application. Sensitivity analyses are conducted to
provide support for this assumption, by relaxing the conditional independence assumption
and assessing how this impacts the findings, and testing the stability of the effects to the
addition of further covariates.
The key findings include a local average treatment effect (LATE) of one additional year of
schooling on working memory, ranging from one- to two-thirds of a standard deviation,
depending on the sample and model specification employed. This effect is significant at at
least the 10% level across a range of reasonable specifications, and is in excess of the Ordi-
nary Least Squares (OLS) estimate of 0.15 standard deviations. While the OLS estimates
shows a positive association between schooling and numeric ability and verbal fluency,
27
1.2. RELATED LITERATURE CHAPTER 1. SCHOOLING AND COGNITION
there is negligible evidence for a causal effect on these outcomes.
Second, the effect size from the analyses of mechanisms indicate occupation type could
explain up to 18% of the total effect of schooling on memory, depending on the measure of
occupation used, and the model specification. However, the figures are very imprecisely
estimated, and not statistically significant at conventional levels. Given the imprecision
of the estimates, I remain agnostic about the role of occupation, but conclude that ba-
sic education causally improves working memory—an important component of cognitive
function in older ages. Increasing population levels of education may be an effective tool
in reducing growth in burden of cognition-related disease, and supporting economic ad-
justment to an ageing population.
1.2 Related literature
A recent empirical literature has used changes in compulsory schooling laws (CSLs) to
examine the lasting health and mortality effects of education, including mortality, self-
assessed health, disability and health behaviours (recent reviews include Lochner (2011)
and Mazumder (2012)). Fewer studies in this area have focused on cognitive outcomes.
The first paper to exploit changes in the minimum school leaving age to explore cogni-
tion and mental outcomes was Glymour et al. (2008), who used state-level variation in
the United States to obtain instrumental variable estimates of the effect of schooling on
working memory and mental status among cohorts born between 1900 and 1947. These
changes in mandated schooling yielded large improvements in performance on memory
tests in old age, although no effects were detected for mental status.
Evidence from England and Wales exploited the 1947 school reform, which increased
the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 15, Banks & Mazzonna (2012) found a pos-
itive effect of an extra year of schooling on the memory and executive function of older
men. A number of studies have exploited both time-series and geographical variation in
school leaving ages across Europe, using the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement
in Europe (SHARE). Schneeweis et al. (2014) found a positive effect of an extra year of
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education on memory, and used the panel aspect to reveal evidence of a protective effect
against declines in verbal fluency with age. In addition to increased memory scores among
older men, Mazzonna (2014) also found reduced probabilities of depression and improved
self-reported health. Analyses of potential mechanisms suggested an important role for
working conditions in explaining these effects. These patterns are not limited to Europe
and the U.S.: Huang et al. (2013) leveraged educational differences in primary school
completion due to China’s Great Famine, during 1959-1961, to assess education effects
on cognitive outcomes in older ages. The results revealed a protective effect of cognition,
especially episodic memory, of up to 20%.
Generally, the results of these studies find Local Average Treatment Effects estimates
in excess of the OLS estimates. Crespo et al. (2014) use the SHARElife data—the third
wave of the SHARE panel study which contains retrospective life history data—to shed
light on the early-life characteristics of those individuals whose behaviour was altered by
the implementations of the CSLs, and who may have different returns to schooling than
the wider population. The authors find larger effects of the reforms on years of education
for those with lower socio-economic status (measured by reports of living in a dwelling
with two or fewer rooms), and those reporting better childhood health status. Overall, their
results show large, positive effects of extra schooling on memory and depression. Strati-
fiying the sample by early-life characteristics revealed some variation in point estimates of
the causal effect of education, although these differences were not statistically significant.
1.2.1 Schooling and cognition: Potential channels
Given the large total effect size found in many studies, the protective effect of education
of cognition is unlikely to be wholly a direct effect. More plausibly, education influences
cognition indirectly, through the wider set of opportunities that education affords. The
set of plausible channels through which protective effects of schooling on later-life func-
tioning could operate. A recent review of empirical studies identified self-reported health,
biomarkers of physiological health (e.g., inflammation), cardiovascular disease and its risk
factors, education and occupational trajectories, among others, as risk factors for age-
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associated cognitive decline (Deary et al. , 2009). Certainly a number of channels are
likely to operate, for instance income effects, health behaviours and social connections.
The empirical evidence for a causal effect of education on health outcomes and behaviours
is mixed; many, but not all, credible studies fail to detect any effect (see Clark & Royer
(2013); Lochner (2011)). Although the present study focuses on occupation and education,
many other factors also play an important role.
This paper aims to test the role of occupation type and labour market engagement.
The “cognitive reserve" is a key framework from the neurological literature (Stern, 2002),
relating education, occupation and cognitive outcomes. Cognitive reserve is a hypothet-
ical construct used to explain how, facing similar neurodegenerative changes, substantial
variation is observed in cognitive ageing, and diagnosed cognitive impairment, across in-
dividuals. In other words, individuals do not experience the same declines in everyday
cognitive functioning for a given decline in brain health. Cognitive reserve is the concept
which is proposed to explain this resilience. Education and occupational complexity are
often cited as important proxies for cognitive reserve, in addition to other “lifestyle factors”
such as dietary habits and physical exercise. The hypothesis suggests that, for individual
with a greater level of cognitive reserve, a greater level of pathology may be required to
result in clinical manifestations of any diagnosable impairment.
Second, in the economics literature, a relevant framework is the dynamic model of
the demand for good health proposed in Grossman (1972). This model describes the life-
cycle accumulation and decumulation of a health stock, and how this relates to choices
of occupation, activity and consumption. The implications of this framework can be ex-
tended more generally to a stock of cognitive capital: cognitive function in older ages is a
component of health, which can be augmented by health investment and cognitive repair
inputs, and depreciates with age. The role for education in the seminal Grossman model is
to increase the efficiency of health production: those with more education enjoy a higher
marginal productivity of a given health input. For example, correct adherance to a med-
ical regimen among more educated individuals. However, evidence for this “productive
efficiency" channel in explaining health inequalities is sparse.
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Extending this framework, Muurinen (1982) and then Case & Deaton (2005) proposed
an augmented model, in which education indirectly reduces the rate of depreciation of
the health stock via (a heavily constrained) choice of occupation, activity and consump-
tion. This explanation is more consistent with the wider epidemiological literature on the
fundamental causes health inequalities, compared with the “reduced health productivity”
argument (Muurinen & Grand, 1985).
In this model, individuals are endowed at birth with stocks of health capital, human
capital and financial capital, which are partially substitutable in producing earnings and
utility. Thosewith less human capital will be restricted—via a constrained optimal choice—
to occupations which rely more on manual effort or repetitive routine tasks, rather than
cognitive skills, to produce earnings. The consequence of this choice is a increased rate of
decline in functioning across the lifecycle. Second, a similar effect can be derived through
consumption choices. Rather than trading health for earnings through the labour market,
one can augment the utility function such that individuals gain utility directly from un-
healthy behaviours, again the price for which is paid for directly through a higher rate of
health depreciation.
One implication of the model is that the correlation between cognition and education
is partly spurious. This framework predicts a higher health stock for a lower rate of time
preference and higher initial stock of cognitive or financial assets. This is consistent with
empirical regularity that at least 50% of variation in cognitive ability in old age (measured
at about 80 years) is explained by cognitive ability in childhood Deary et al. (2009).
This implication highlights the importance of addressing potential endogenity of education
choices.
Focussing specifically on cognitive capital, Mazzonna & Peracchi (2012, 2014) extend
this framework to analyse the age-profile of cognitive performance and how this changes
after retirement. Empirical tests of the theory show cognitive function generally declines
after retirement, as the monetary incentive to invest in this stock is reduced. However this
effect importantly depends on occupation type: those employed in physically demanding
jobs experience a short-run positive effect of retirement on cognitive function. Moreover,
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education is found to shape heterogeneity in both the level and age-related decline of cog-
nitive function. Together these findings highlight the potential for occupation type as a
mechanism in explaining variation in later-life cognitive function.
The characteristics of higher status occupations entered into through education may
not only reduce physical wear and tear, but may also aid in sustaining mental outcomes
and cognitive performance—for example, work tasks may be more cognitively demanding
and have greater autonomy. These frameworks have motivated a large empirical literature
in neuro-epidemiology, exploring associations between many lifestyle factors and cogni-
tive ageing (Deary et al. , 2009). One robust predictor of age-related cognitive decline is
cardiovascular health. Current smoking status and physical activity are also commonly
identified as important predictors—likely through their effects on cardiovascular health.
Smoking may be especially promising, as it has also been identified in the economics liter-
ature as as an outcome which is causally affected by education (de Walque, 2007; Grimard
& Parent, 2007), and as a potential mechanism underlying the education-health gradient
(Brunello et al. , 2015).
1.3 Data and setting
1.3.1 School reforms in England and Wales
Many studies have leveraged the 1972 raising of the school leave to study the returns to
education (e.g., Oreopoulos (2008); Clark & Royer (2013); Dickson et al. (2016)). The
1944 Education Act increased the minimum age pupils can leave secondary school from
14 to 15 years, enacted from April 1st 1947; this Act also conferred powers to raise the
minimum school leaving age again to 16 years. In March 1972, it was decided that the
minimum school leaving age would be raised to 16 years for school cohorts beginning on
the 1st of September 1972 (Woodin et al. , 2012). This change to 16 years affected birth
cohorts of pupils born from the 1st of September, 1957, onward. The 1972 change, aside
from being more recent, was enacted in less unstable times—the cohorts exposed to the
1947 change were were affected by the aftermath of the Great Depression, and effects of
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the World War. The second, 1972, school reform is exploited in this paper. Considering
this more recent reform may shed light on whether the results from previous studies using
the 1947 change are generalisable, given the particularities of the context faced by those
earlier cohorts.
In addition to an extra year of school completed, the 1972 change led to greater rates of
completion of formal qualifications; many more students stayed until the end of their 16th
school year to obtain “O-level" qualifications. This increase in the probability of gaining a
qualification is important. Dickson & Smith (2011) exploit the Easter Leaving Rule—an
institutional rule providing exogenous variation in qualification attainment—confirming
that some of the observed wages returns to an extra year of schooling in 1972 were due to
the increase in qualifications, rather than solely the length of time in school.1
1.3.2 Data sources
The dataset employed is Understanding Society (US), a panel study of households in the
United Kingdom (McFall, 2013b; Institute for Social and Economic Research & Nat-
Cen Social Research, 2015), the successor study to the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS). It commenced in 2009 as a representative probability sample of approximately
40,000 households. Participants are interviewed annually, but each wave of data collection
spans 24 months (therefore the survey waves are overlapping and comprise approximately
two years of data collection). The “total sample” comprises multiple subsample com-
ponents: the main General Population Sample (GPS), continuing BHPS members, and
the Ethnic Minority Boost (EMB) subsample. Wave 3, beginning on 7th January 2011
and ending on the 12th July 2013, included a Cognitive Ability module which measured
self-rated memory, performance on tests of word recall, numeric ability and verbal fluency
measures (McFall, 2013a). Wave 3 has a cross-sectional response rate of 61.3%. Through-
out the analyses the survey weights provided with the data were employed, to allow for the
possibility of endogenous sampling design and response probabilities. The weights ad-
1In this work, I have also endeavoured to exploit the Easter Leaving Rule as an instrument to disentangle
the effect of an additional year of schooling into a sheepskin effect and a human capital effect. However, in
my data the first stage was too weak, resulting in inflated IV estimates.
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just for the complex survey design, and combined probabilities of being selected into the
BHPS, GPS and EMB and continuing to Wave 3 of the survey.
1.3.3 Variable construction
Years of schooling and cognitive outcomes
The measure of schooling employed is the report of years of secondary schooling com-
pleted. This is derived from the schooling question asking “How old were you when you
left school?”. Then years of schooling is constructed as the age the respondent reports
leaving school minus five.
Episodic memory—retrieving memories associated with specific events—was mea-
sured by performance on an immediate and delayed word recall test. Memory is an im-
portant early indicator of potential cognitive impairment, and word recall tests are used in
cognitive impairment screening tests (Kim et al. , 2014). A list of 10 words are read aloud
by the computer, the respondent is to repeat these words in any order and the number cor-
rectly recalled is recorded by the interviewer. This procedure is repeated (about 5 minutes)
later in the module to measure delayed recall. Immediate and delayed word recall scores
are highly correlated with clinical dementia diagnoses (Wu et al. , 2013). The number
of words correctly recalled in each test were summed, to create a variable (Word Recall)
ranging from 0 to 20.
The Serial 7 Subtraction test is a component of clinical screening instruments for cog-
nitive impairment (i.e,., the Mini Mental State Examination (Crum et al. , 1993) and the
CambridgeMental Disorders of the Elderly Examination (Roth et al. , 1986)). In the Serial
7 test, respondents are asked to begin at 100 and subtract 7, five times. After each subtrac-
tion, the respondent is again prompted by the interview to “take 7 away from that?”. The
number of correct answers was summed to create a variable ranging from 0 to 5.
The Verbal Fluency test asked respondents to name as many animals as possible in
one minute. In addition to testing semantic memory, this tests also executive function as,
to perform well, it requires some level of abstract thinking and mental flexibility within a
time limit. The test is from the cognitive assessment component of the Cambridge Mental
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Disorders of the Elderly Examination, an interview procedure for the diagnosis and mea-
surement of dementia in the elderly (Roth et al. , 1986), and has been successfully been
employed in extensions of the MMSE (Kim et al. , 2014). The number of animals listed
ranges from 0 to 71.
The Numeric Ability test assessed ability to solve “every day” numerical problems.
The Numeric Ability test asks the respondent five questions of increasing complexity, for
example, the first question is as follows: “In a sale, a shop is selling all items at half price.
Before the sale, a sofa costs £300. How much will it cost in the sale?". The number of
questions correctly answered was summed to have a range of 0 to 5.
The distributions of the raw scores are presented in Appendix 2.A. The continuous
measures, Word Recall and Verbal Fluency, were standardised by subtracting the sample
mean and dividing by the sample standard deviation, to faciliate interpretation and compa-
rability with previous studies. The Serial 7 Subtraction and the Numeric Ability tests were
dichotomised to create a binary variables. Subtraction takes the value 1 for respondents
with 5 correct answers to the Serial 7 Subtraction, and zero otherwise. Numeracy takes
the value 1 for respondents with 4 or 5 correct answers to the Numeric Ability test, and
zero otherwise.
Occupation variables
The mechanisms underlying the education gradient in cognitive function are inevitably
complex and interacting. This paper aims to test one specific hypothesis suggested by
theory, namely the role of occupation type and labour market participation patterns. in
explaining the effect of schooling on cognitive performance, rather than aiming to exhaus-
tively model all the channels which may be involved.
The first measure employed is the five-class National Statistics Socio-economic Classi-
fication (NS-SEC) occupational classification. The five-class NS-SEC groups occupations
defined by the Standard Occupation Classification into five categories: 1) Semi-routine;
routine; never-worked and long-term unemployed; 2) Lower supervisory and technical oc-
cupations; 3) Small employers and own account workers; 4) Intermediate occupations; 5)
Higher professional; large employers, higher managerial and administrative occupations.
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The NS-SEC is available for both the first job chosen after leaving secondary school,
and the current job (or previous job, if the respondent is currently out of the work). The
chief focus is on the current, or most recent, occupation, which will capture effects associ-
ated with the so-called “use-it-or-lose-it" hypothesis: continuing to engage in a stimulating
occupation maintains cognitive reserve and stave off cognitive decline. As an additional
measure, the first job is of interest as mechanism because the activity chosen immediately
after secondary school is especially amenable to policy intervention. For instance, in the
UK context, a current policy development has increased the minimum “participation age”,
for which young people must remain in education or training, from 16 years to 18 years.
This initial start may have longer run implications for labour market trajectories.
Previous occupation was disproportionately missing among those reporting they were
long-term sick or disabled, or unemployed. For this group, information from the US em-
ployment history module was used to ascertain their activity. Respondents to the US report
an employment history of their economic activity status (e.g., full-time work, part-time,
unemployed, receiving government benefits, etc.) from when they first left full-time edu-
cation until their current spell. For those who did not report a current or previous labour
market status, individuals who also reported being out of the paid work for at least 50%
of their potential working life were coded as NS-SEC category 1 (Semi-routine; routine;
never-worked and long-term unemployed).
In addition to the occupation type of first and current job, a final measure of occupation
type relates directly to the usage of specific skill types, employing occupational skills pro-
files developed by Dickerson et al. (2012). Dickerson et al. (2012) have matched the UK
SOC 2010 codes with the US Occupational Information Network (O*NET), a database
characterising the skills, abilities, work characteristics of occupations. The O*NET ques-
tionnaire is completed by workers and external job analysts. Over 250 questions are asked
about job characteristics, or descriptors, arranged into the following domains: education
and training, knowledge, skills, abilities, work activities, work context and work style. For
each descriptor, both the level and importance of that item are elicited. The individual
responses are averaged within occupations. Therefore, for each individual, they do not
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necessarily reflect the skills actually used in a job.
The literature on occupation, education and cognitive outcomes has raised the hypoth-
esis that especially demanding or complex mental tasks may play an important role in
maintaining cognitive performance (Fisher et al. , 2014). One specific example of these
types of complex skills (chosen partly due to data availability) are those used in what are
commonly characterised as STEM occupations. These roles require substantively com-
plex, technical expertise—involving logic, reasoning and numeracy. Examining the role
of these specific types of skills contributes to the literature assessing the role of skills type
in determining cognitive ageing, and provides a useful complement to the occupation type
measures described above.
The measure of STEM-skill usage, henceforth termed technical skill, uses variables
from the Abilities and Skills from the matched O*NET data (the questions in the Ability
and Skill domains were filled out by external job analysts, rather than the job incumbents
themselves). This measure was matched to the occupation of first job after leaving school.2
The Abilities items used are: deductive reasoning; information ordering; mathematical
reasoning; number facility. The Skills items are: mathematics; science; technology de-
sign; programming. For each item, there is a variable rating the level of each decriptor used
in the job, and its importance. The average of the level and importance variables across the
Skills and Abilities items identified above are used as a simple continuous measure, where
a higher value indicates greater usage of these skills—on average—in an occupation.
Analytical sample
All three subsamples of the US were employed: the General Population Sample, con-
tinuing BHPS participants, and the Ethnic Minority Boost sample. Survey weights were
employed throughout the analyses, which weights adjust for unit non-response—the com-
bined probabilities of being selected into the BHPS, GPS and EMB and continuing to
Wave 3 of the survey—and the complex survey design.
Since the location of school was not available among the cohorts considered, it was not
2At the time of writing, the current occupation variable in the US was coded as SOC2000. Only when
respondents switched to a new job, the new job was coded as SOC2010. Therefore it was not possible to
match the O*NET measure to complete data on current occupation.
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possible to ascertain whether respondents completed their schooling in England or Wales,
rather than Scotland or Northern Ireland. In order to restrict the sample to individuals who
completed their schooling in areas exposed to the reform as best as possible, those who
were born in England orWaleswere selected for analyses. Observationswhich hadmissing
or unavailable information on place of birth were assumed not to be born in England or
Wales.
The preliminary descriptive statistics use a sample of respondents born with a window
of 5 years either side of date determining exposure to the school reform (01, September,
1957). The sample for the OLS and RD estimation uses a smaller window, determined by
an optimal bandwidth-selection procedure.
1.4 Empirical approach
1.4.1 Regression Discontinuity Design
A Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity (FRD) design (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008) was em-
ployed to exploit variation in schooling induced by the reform. RD is predicated on treat-
ment, for individuals i = 1, .., N , being assigned by the value of a continuous covariate,
Ri, falling on either side of a fixed cutoff c. In this application c is the pivotal birth cohort
of 01, September, 1957. This cutoff induces a discontinuity in the conditional probability
of receiving the treatment given Ri—but not necessarily a jump from 0 to 1. Let Zi de-
note exposure to the reform, (Zi = 1[Ri ≥ c]), where 1(.) is the indicator function, and
the treatment is an additional year of schooling. Let Yi(1) and Yi(0) denote the potential
cognitive outcomes experienced in the presence and absence of the treatment respectively.
The FRD estimand of interest is the following:
τFRD =
E [Yi(1) |Ri = c ]− E [Yi(0) |Ri = c ]
E [Di(1) |Ri = c ]− E [Di(0) |Ri = c ] (1.1)
Assuming the reform only changes behaviour in one direction (monotonicity), then the
FRD estimator yields an average treatment effect at the cut-off among the sub-population
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of compliers (i.e., those who were causally induced to take an extra year of schooling,
which otherwise they would not have taken). In this case, the FRD treatment effect is
the ratio of the sharp RD effect and the average effect of the reform on treatment, as in
Equation (1.2) (Hahn et al. , 2001).
τFRD =
limr↓cE [Yi |Ri = c ]− limr↑cE [Yi |Ri = c ]
limr↓cE [Di |Ri = c ]− limr↑cE [Di |Ri = c ] (1.2)
This framework also extends to the case of a multi-valued measure of years of school-
ing, in which the compliers are defined as those induced to take at least d years of schooling
when otherwise they would have taken fewer than d (Angrist & Imbens, 1995)). In that
case, the effects computed are an average of the per-year treatment effects associated with
each additional year of schooling, weighted by the proportions of compliers at each level of
schooling. However, in this application there is little weight placed on the schooling levels
above 16—the treatment effect is mainly informed by differences in outcomes on the 15
to 16 years margin. The main analyses presented in this paper are for a binary treatment,
equal to zero if pupils left school at age 15 years, and one if they left at 16 years of age, and
missing for those who stayed on to 17 years or older. This is also to facilitate the compu-
tation and interpretation of the analyses of mechanisms in the subsequent section, which
is more straightforward with a binary treatment. Results with a continuous treatment are
presented in Appendix 2.E.
Using a uniform kernel, and the same bandwidth h for the outcome and treatment
equations, leads to a numerical equivalence between the FRD estimator and the Two-Stage
Least Squares (2SLS) estimator (Hahn et al. , 2001). Taking this approach, the parameters
of the equations described in Equations (1.3) and (1.4) were estimated using 2SLS. Let Yi
denote the cognitive outcome observed for individual i. f(Ri − c) comprises the centred
running variable, interacted with the reform dummy. The vectorXi includes pre-treatment
covariates, and ui and vi are idiosyncratic errors.
The estimating equations are described as follows:
Yi = ao + a1Dˆi + f(Ri − c) +X ′ia+ ui (1.3)
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Di = γo + γ1Zi + g(Ri − c) +X ′iγ + vi (1.4)
To select a data-driven optimal bandwidth, the implementation of the MSE-optimal
bandwidth developed in Calonico et al. (2016) was employed, which accounts for the
fuzzy design and clustering of the data due to the discrete running variable (Bartalotti &
Brummet, 2016). This was combined with a sensitivity analyses through a consideration
of a range of bandwidths. The running variable is month-year of birth. This allows a
comparison of units very close to the treatment cut-off. However this measurement is still
a discretisation compared, as a more granular measurement of assignment (e.g., day-of-
birth) was not available in the data. The standard errors were clustered by month-year of
birth to account for group-level variation induced by the discrete nature of the running
variable. This relies on a model in which the fitted function, through the discrete running
variable, approximates the true continuous function, and the consequent specification er-
rors are random and identical (Lee & Card, 2008; Cattaneo et al. , 2017a).3
In very small sample windows around the reform date it is more credible that the re-
form, as a local instrumental variable, is plausibly exogenous without conditioning on
further covariates. Other discontinuities exactly coincident with the RoSLA are unlikely.
In this case, the purpose of including the covariates is to increase the precision of the esti-
mates by reducing residual variation. In larger sample windows, the concern remains that
there may be confounding of education level and cognitive function based on unobservable
functions of birth cohort. For example later cohorts, exposed to the reform, may have ex-
perienced more favourable conditions in early childhood, and have more educated parents,
than the earlier pre-reform cohorts. Although these trends are unlikely to be discontinuous
at the treatment cut-off, they may still be picked up in larger sample windows. Therefore,
this concern motivates adjustment for potential confounding variables which may capture
any such effects. The covariates included in the RD models presented in Table 1.3 are:
a quadratic term in age, dummy variables indicating gender, interview month, interview
3I considered examining a wider sample window (5 years either side of the cut-off), in conjunction with a
quadratic trend in the running variable. However, higher order polynomials are less reliable for the estimation
of RD treatment effects—due to over-fitting or biases at boundary points - therefore I restricted attention to
the local linear and quadratic cases (Gelman & Zelizer, 2015; Cattaneo et al. , 2017b,a).
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year (because the US survey waves span approximately two years).
In further sensitivity analyses (Appendix 2.E), month-of-birth dummies were added
as covariates. The rationale for considering month-of-birth is to capture any seasonality
effects: systematic variation in month-of-birth by family background which could also be
related to later education, health and cognitive outcomes (Buckles & Hungerman, 2013;
Crawford et al. , 2011). Additionally, since the implementation of the 1972 reform co-
incides with the start of the school term, exposure to the reform will coincide with any
age-in-grade effects, and therefore be correlated with schooling and, potentially, cognitive
outcomes.
1.5 Unpacking the black box using mediation analysis
Mediation analysis is one way to quantitatively assess the pathways through which a cause
affects an outcome. Mediation analyses offers a principled approach to test economic (and
other social science) theory without employing a full structural model. A key motivation
is to understanding how a policy intervention, or RCT, works (e.g., see Heckman & Pinto
(2015) for an application of mediation to an RT in economics). Although randomised stud-
ies provide an internally valid estimate of the treatment effect, their underlying workings
often remain a black box. Analysis of mechanisms can refine the workings of an inter-
vention. Can we better target the primary mechanism, or eliminate costly and ineffective
components of an intervention? We might also want to understanding why an intervention
failed.
1.5.1 “Traditional” regression-based approach
Mediation analyses has its origins in the early structural economics literature—Haavelmo
(1943) and Goldberger (1972)—however until recently, most studies in the social sciences
followed the approach outlined in a seminal article by Baron & Kenny (1986), who de-
fined mediation analysis as “generative mechanisms through which the focal independent
variable is able to influence the dependent variable of interest".
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The Baron & Kenny (1986) approach can be summarised as follows. Let Di denote
the observed binary treatment status of individual i, Mi the observed mediator value, Yi
the observed outcome. Xi represents one or more covariates which may be thought to
influence the other variables. Di occurs first, then Mi and finally Yi. For now, assume
both the mediator and outcome are continuous random variables, and thatXi are observed
pre-treatment. We are interested in the contribution of mediatorMi to the total effect ofDi
on Yi—the ‘indirect effect’—versus the contribution of all other unmodeled mechanisms
(the ‘direct effect’). Figure 1.1 depicts a stylised form of the pathways of interest. The
dashed lines represent potential unobserved confounding.
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Notes: This figure shows a stylised depiction of the association between schooling, occupation and cognition.
The dashed arrows indicate the potential confounding effects of unobserved variables ν, η, . α, β and γ
denote estimates of the partial effect of schooling on occupation, occupation on cognitive outcomes, and the
direct effect of schooling on cognition, net of occupation, respectively. Zi denotes an instrumental variable
which affects schooling, with no direct effect on occupation or the cognitive outcomes.
Given certain (stringent) assumptions, a linear-regression based approach can be used
to retrieve the direct and indirect effects (Huber et al. , 2016). An estimate of the indirect
(mediated) effect can be obtained using the so-called product of coefficientsmethod, mul-
tiplying together the partial of effect of the treatment on the mediator and the partial effect
of the treatment on the outcome: αˆ× βˆ in Equations 1.5 and 1.6.
E[Mi|Xi, Di] = µ1 + αDi +X ′iφ1 (1.5)
E[Yi|Xi, Di,Mi] = µ2 + γDi + βMi +X ′iφ2 (1.6)
Alternatively, the “difference in coefficients" method first computes the total effect
from a the regression of Yi on Di (Equations 1.7). Second, it adds Mi as a covariate
(Equation 1.6).
E[Yi|Xi, Di] = µo + τDi +X ′iφo (1.7)
The reduction in the effect of the treatment after controlling for a mediator is often
interpreted as the proportion of the treatment explained by the mediator. To see this, note
that the total effect, τi, comprises the sum of the direct and indirect effect, (α × β) + γ.
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Comparing the coefficient on the treatment dummy in Equation 1.7, with the coefficient
on the treatment variable after controlling for the mediator, Equations 1.6, is equivalent
to comparing the difference between the estimate γ and τ . Since τ = (α × β) + γ), the
difference between the γ and τ is α× β: the so-called “explained” or mediated effect.
This framework motivates the commonly used approach of adding post-treatment vari-
ables to a model as “controls”, and observing the extent to which the treatment effect co-
efficient is reduced. An example is the gender wage gap, where a common approach is to
add post-treatment variables, such as occupation, to a regression of wages on gender—to
assess to what extent they “explain” the wage gap. Huber et al. (2016) shows that this type
of decomposition of gender or ethnic wage gaps, into explained and unexplained compo-
nents, is generally invalid—it is equivalent to assuming a overly simple mediation model,
and lacks causal interpretability.
Indeed, the methods described above require strong assumptions to be valid: (i) the er-
rors terms should be uncorrelated across equations, implying no unmeasured confounding
of the treatment, mediator and outcome; (ii) the conditional expectations of the mediator
and outcomes should be linear and additive; (iii) the effects of the mediator cannot interact
with treatment status.
1.5.2 Occupation as a mechanism
The FRD analyses yields a total treatment effect (among compliers). Since any effects
of schooling on cognitive function could operate either directly or indirectly, though sub-
sequent opportunities and choices that schooling affords, this section tests a number of
hypothesised underlying mechanisms.
As described in the previous section, one approach to answering this question is to
employ a so-called mediation analysis. Mediation analysis aims to empirically disentangle
the causal mechanisms through which a treatment exerts its effect on the outcome. A
mediator is a variable which lies on the causal pathway between treatment and outcome.
In this framework, a total effect may be decomposed into two components: an indirect
effect, operating through the mediator of interest, and a direct effect operating through all
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other unmodeled intermediate variables. Recent literature has clarified the assumptions
under which these mechanisms are identified (see, for instance, Imai et al. (2011); Huber
et al. (2016); Keele et al. (2015) for recent reviews and applications).
In contrast to the older literature, which employed more restrictive parametric meth-
ods (Baron & Kenny, 1986), the recent focus has been on non-parametric identification,
leading to the development of a range of flexible estimation approaches.
This paper employs the results developed in Yamamoto (2014) and Park & Kürüm
(2018), who shows that—-given certain assumptions—the LATE can be decomposed into
components explained, and unexplained, by a mediator of interest. To do so, Yamamoto
(2014) and Park & Kürüm (2018) develop a proof of non-parametric identification of aver-
age causal mediation effects among compliers, and propose a flexible estimation approach
to implement the method. This section draws on that paper to briefly outline the frame-
work.
Let Di ∈ {0, 1} denote the level of treatment selected by individual i, where i =
1, ..., N . Di = 1 if a pupil leaves school at 16, andDi = 0 if a pupil leaves at 15 years. Zi
denotes the observed value of the instrument. Di(Zi) indicates the potential treatment state
for individual i; the treatment they would select depending on the value of the instrument.
The observed schooling level can then written asDi = Di(Zi) = ZiDi(1)+(1−Zi)Di(0).
LetMi and Yi denote observed mediator and observed cognitive outcomes, respectively,
andXi a vector of observed pre-treatment covariates. Mi(d) indicates the potential medi-
ator state, depending on the level of schooling chosen. Mi(1) is the value of the mediator
chosen under treatment level 1, and Mi(0) is the value the mediator would take under
treatment level 0. The potential cognitive outcomes are denoted Yi(d,m), depending on
treatment and mediator.
The local average treatment effect, incorporating the choice of mediating variable, can
be written as follows:
τ = E [Yi( 1,Mi(1) )− Yi( 0,Mi(0) ) |Di(1) = 1, Di(0) = 0 ] (1.8)
Varying the treatment exogenously, but fixing the mediator at the its potential value for
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d ∈ {0, 1} yields the average direct effect among compliers: the Local Average Natural
Direct Effect (LANDE).
ζ(d) = E [Yi( 1,Mi(d) )− Y ( 0,Mi(d) ) |Di(1) = 1, Di(0) = 0 ] (1.9)
Fixing the treatment at d ∈ {0, 1}, but varying the mediator to its potential values
under treatment and non-treatment yields the average indirect effect among compliers:
Local Average Complier Mediated Effect (LACME).
δ(d) = E [Yi( d,Mi(1) )− Yi( d,Mi(0) ) |Di(1) = 1, Di(0) = 0 ] (1.10)
The LACME and LANDE, defined on opposing treatment states, sum to the LATE.4
δ(1), for example, represents the difference in two potential outcomes: Yi(1,Mi(1)) repre-
sents the observed cognitive outcome if pupil i stays at school until 16 years; Yi(1,Mi(0))
represents the cognitive outcome under a counterfactual scenario, in which the pupil again
stays at school until 16 years, but then selects the occupation they would have chosen if
they had left at 15 years. The difference between these two potential outcomes is the ef-
fect of the change in the mediator induced by the treatment, fixing the direct effect of the
treatment.
Conversely, ζ(1) represents the difference in potential cognitive outcomes between
leaving school at 15 years and 16 years, holding occupation constant at the level which
would be chosen after leaving at 16 years. Therefore, this is the portion of the treatment
effect not transmitted through the mediator. The notation ζ(d) and δ(d) suggest the possi-
bility of interaction between mediator and treatment.5
4The following should be conditioned on being a complier; notation omitted for brevity.
LATE = E [Yi( 1,Mi(1) )− Yi( 0,Mi(0) )]
= E [Yi( 1,Mi(0) )− Y ( 0,Mi(0) )] + E [Yi( 1,Mi(1) )− Y ( 1,Mi(0) )] = ζ(0) + δ(1)
= E [Yi( 1,Mi(1) )− Y ( 0,Mi(1) )] + E [Yi( 0,Mi(1) )− Y ( 0,Mi(1) )] = ζ(1) + δ(0)
5For example, this wouldmean that the indirect effect—the effect of schooling-induced occupation choice
on average cognitive outcomes—could differ between those who leave at 15 and those leave at 16 years.
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ζ(d) and δ(d) are counterfactual quantities, since we do not observe any individual
with, for instance, the value of the mediator they would have selected under the counter-
factual treatment. Given the counterfactual nature of the effects of interest, identification
of causal mechanisms requires accounting for potential endogeneity of not only the treat-
ment, but also the mediating variable.
The assumptions required to identify the LANDE and LACME include, first, an exclu-
sion restriction for the instrument, and second, monotonicity—as required in a standard
instrumental variable analysis. The third assumption is the so-called local sequential ig-
norability assumption (described in Equations 1.11 and 1.12). The first component of this
local sequential ignorability assumption, described Equation 1.12, requires conditional in-
dependence of the instrument with respect to both the potential cognitive outcomes and
potential mediator states. This is satisfied by a valid instrument for schooling. The second
component, Equations 1.11, requires the mediator to be conditionally independent of the
potential cognitive outcomes, given the treatment (years of schooling) and pre-treatment
covariates, among the compliant subpopulation (clearly this is less restrictive than requir-
ing this independence across all compliance types).
Yi(d,m), Mi(d
′), Di(z) ⊥ Zi | Xi (1.11)
Yi(d
′,m) ⊥Mi(d) | Di = d,Xi, type = complier (1.12)
In this application, this final condition will be satisfied if we believe that there is no
unobserved variable systematically influencing both occupation choice and cognitive func-
tion, within cells defined by both education level and the pre-treatment covariates, among
the compliers to the reform. In contrast to the choice of education level, it is more difficult
to think of specific confounding variables which would play this role. One candidate is
parental occupation, and sensitivity analyses are conducted to the addition of this potential
confounder6. Additional maintained assumptions include the absence of any confounders
6In Appendix 1.G, I conduct a sensitivity analysis which assesses the impact of deviations from condi-
tional independence
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of the mediator and outcome which are themselves caused by the treatment (so-called in-
termediate confounders).
An alternative option to handle endogeneity of mediator is to deploy a second instru-
mental variable. For example, Dippel et al. (2017) propose a method which uses one
instrument to handle the endogeneity of both the treatment and mediator, to investigate
the role of labour market impacts in explaining trade liberalisation’s effects on political
polarisation 7. Tchetgen et al. (2012) and Huber et al. (2017a) have considered non-
parametric identification using two instruments, which also requires an instrument for the
mediator as well the treatment. In the current application, I have explored a number of
potential instruments (local labour market conditions, parental occupation), but failed to
identify a credible instrumental variable for occupation choice.
The estimator employed for the LANDE and LACME is described here in Appendix
1.F. It is expressed as functions of conditional expectations (and densities) of the outcome,
treatment and mediator. The estimation procedure involves fitting flexible predictive mod-
els to the treatment (years of schooling), mediator and outcome. The relevant conditional
expectations, or conditional densities, are then computed and plugged into the respective
formulas (in Appendix 1.E). Standard errors were obtained via bootstrapping, with 1000
replications.
One caveat of the analyses presented here is that each of the intermediate variables are
treated as independent from each other: the LANDE and LACME are computed separately
for each mediator. This does not allow for causal dependence between the mediators.
Conceptually, the purpose is to examine these variables as alternative measures of the
same potential channel, rather than the intention being to model them jointly as a system
and disentangle the distinct role of each mediator. Extending the framework to multiple
dependent mediators would require more complex sets of potential outcomes: defining
the potential mediator values in response to the choice of the other mediators, and the
imposition of further assumptions about confounding between mediators themselves (e.g.,
see Park & Kürüm (2018)). This type of extension is left for further work.
7I have endeavoured to apply this approach to the current paper, however the assumptions required failed
to hold, leading to a weak instrument problem, and I concluded it is not a credible approach for this setting.
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1.6 Findings
This section considers the findings from the OLS and RD specifications, sensitivity anal-
yses, and an examination of the channels through which these effects operate.
1.6.1 OLS and RD results
Table 1.3 reports OLS and RD results of the effect of schooling on Word Recall, Numeric
Ability, Verbal Fluency and Subtraction, respectively. The sample used in this table has
twomain restrictions: 1) respondents who left school before the age of 17 years (this group
represents the bulk of the compliers), 2) respondents who have complete data for each of
the three occupation type measures examined in the analyses of mechanisms (for compa-
rability). Estimates of the effects of schooling on cognitive outcomes for the unrestricted
sample are presented in Appendix Table 1.6.
The findings show a positive association between years of schooling and each cogni-
tive outcome. An additional year of schooling is associated with a 0.15 standard deviation
increase in Word Recall, 0.18 standard deviation increase in Verbal Fluency, 17 percent-
age point increase in Numeric Ability and a 10 percentage point increase in Subtraction.
These results corroborate those found in other literature: the positive correlation between
education and cognitive outcomes persists into later life. However, these findings may not
necessarily represent causal effects, due to omitted variable bias. The RD specification
addresses this issue by exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in schooling.
Table 1.3 shows the RD estimates using a linear specification in the running variable
(month-year of birth cohort). A discontinuity in average years of schooling is present at
the reform cut-off. This is reflected in the first-stage results: the average difference in
years of schooling between those exposed and unexposed to the reform is between 0.33
and 0.44, depending on the sample window used. The RD estimates exploit this jump
in years of schooling. Computed at the optimally-selected bandwidth, 30 month-year of
birth cohorts, the RD estimates show that an extra year of schooling is associated with
a statistically significant 0.53 standard deviation increase in Word Recall. Considering
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the two components of the word recall measure separately, i.e., delayed and immediate
recall, the effect size is larger for delayed recall (data not shown). For Verbal Fluency,
the effect size is 0.15 standard deviations, but not statistically significant at conventional
levels. Again these estimates are derived from a small sample window, comprising those
born 30 months either side of the threshold.
Although there is a positive association between schooling and the two measures relating
to numeracy—Serial 7 Subtraction and Numeric Ability—shown in the OLS estimation
results, this is not reflected in the RD specifications. The effect size is similar for Numeric
Ability, an additional year of schooling is associated with a 17 percentage point increase
the probability of successfully answering 4 or 5 questions out of the 5 numeric ability
questions asked. For Serial Subtraction, the sign of the effect switches, with an effect size
of minus 14 percentage points. These effects are not statistically significant at conventional
levels. This may be due to ceiling effects: clustering toward the top of the distribution of
performance on these tests, such that the measure may have little ability to distinguish
between moderate and high functioning. Treating these variables as continuous variables,
rather than dichotomising them, produces similar results.
Education may affect men and women differently; men and women have both different
labour market trajectories and different levels of cognitive function in older ages. Table
1.6 in Appendix 2.E reports results from the same sample and specification used in Table
1.3, now separately by gender. At the optimal bandwidth, no statistical evidence is detected
for a differential association between schooling and the cognitive outcomes by gender. The
size of the treatment effect by gender does vary by bandwidth and the sample definition,
however the difference in estimates between men and women in other sample windows is
also not statistically significant. Given the small sample sizes in the gender subgroups, a
more complete examination of gender differences is not pursued here.
RDD sensitivity analyses
An important choice is the choice of sample window (the bandwidth). To assess the sen-
sitivity of the findings to a range of bandwidths, the point estimates and confidence in-
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tervals by bandwidth were examined. For instance, Figure 1.4 plots the treatment effect
on each cognitive outcome, and 99%, 95% and 90% confidence intervals, for a range of
bandwidths. The optimally-selected bandwidths are indicated by vertical lines. There is
variation in the effect size by bandwidth: for Word Recall, the treatment effect ranges
from a minimum of 0.24 to a maximum of 0.74 across bandwidths from two to five years.
This shows that the estimates do vary by choice of sample, however they remain positive
and significant at least the 10% level across a reasonable range of bandwidths. This is
in contrast with the other outcomes, where the effects size oscillates around zero and no
statistically significant effects are detected across all values of bandwidth choice.
These plots are presented again in Appendix 2.E, Figure 1.7, using a local quadratic,
rather than local linear, RD specification: the local quadratic specification has the running
variable included as a quadratic, rather than linear, term. These results corroborate those
from the simple linear case, and show the results are robust to a more flexible specification
of the birth cohort trends. Appendix Table 1.6 and Appendix Figure 1.8 reports results—
the causal effect of years of schooling on each cognitive outcome—for the full sample
with no restrictions (i.e., including those who left school at ages 17, 18, or 19 years, and
including those who did not report data for the occupation variables). The main findings
are qualitatively similar to those in the restricted sample. Figure 1.6 also reports on a
specification with month-of-birth dummies as covariates, demonstrating that the results
are similar with this addition. Overall, the size of the estimates of the effects of schooling
on cognitive outcomes do vary with the sample definition, covariate choice and bandwidth,
and are not statistically significant in all specifications examined. However, taken as a
whole, the positive, statistically significant, effects across a range of reasonable bandwidths
and sample definitions provides a strong case for the veracity of the main results.
The corresponding findings in the most similar paper—Banks & Mazzonna (2012),
who exploited the 1947 raising of the school leaving age from 14 to 15 year—include a
causal effect of an additional year of schooling on Word Recall, which ranges between
about one-fifth of a standard deviation to two-thirds of a standard deviation among men,
and between one-fifth of a standard deviation to two-thirds of a standard deviation among
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women. Their preferred estimates are an effect of half a standard deviation among men,
and 0.4 among women. For Verbal Fluency, the effect sizes are similar to that for Word
Recall among men, and statistically significant at the 10% level. Among women, no evi-
dence was detected for any effects on Verbal Fluency—the effects oscillated around zero
and were not statistically significant.
1.6.2 Channels
The RD results revealed a positive causal effect of schooling onWord Recall. This section
reports on the analyses of potential underlying mechanisms.8
Table 1.4 presents the results of the analysis of causal mechanisms. The table presents
the LATE, the LACME (portion of the LATE explained by the mediator) and LANDE
(remaining portion of the LATE, explained by all other unmodeled intermediate vari-
ables). These quantities are calculated separately to test the role of three alternative medi-
ator variables—first occupation type, current occupation type, technical skills—presented
across the three columns.
The indirect effects among compliers are presented separately depending on whether
the treatment status is fixed at the control or treatment status (leaving school at 15 years
or 16 years). This allows for an interaction between treatment and mediator; the size of
the indirect effect can differ by treatment level. The table shows that occupation type of
first job explains 0.0% of the LATE for the controls, and 0.02 (3.8%) for treatment, al-
though these are estimates are very imprecise and not significant at conventional levels.
For the occupation type of current job, these figures are both 0.06 (11.3%). Considering
the level of technical skills used in the first job, the size of the indirect effect is negligible
at 0.00 for the controls, and 0.10 (18% of the total LATE) for treatment. These models
were fit to the sample window defined by the optimally-selected bandwidth of 30 month-
year of birth cohorts. The size of the estimates vary as the sample window is modified,
however the qualitative conclusions remain the same. The findings are also robust to the
addition of parental occupation as an additional covariates (see Appendix 1.F, Table 1.9).
8Further analyses in Appendix 2.E.1 presents simple estimates of the effects of schooling on occupation.
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In Appendix 1.G, further sensitivity analyses are presented to assess the impact of devia-
tions from conditional independence. This analysis shows that the findings are robust to
moderate deviations from the conditional independence assumption.
The small, positive, indirect effects suggest occupation choice may play a role, con-
sistent with theory—however the estimates of the indirect effect are very imprecisely es-
timated. This is to some extent due to the nature of the estimation method, which is less
efficient than a parametric approach, as can be seen in comparing the precision of the
LATE estimated by 2SLS with the nonparametric method. In terms of effect size, the
magnitude of the portion explained by occupation is in line with that in other studies. Re-
cent work from the United States found that occupational complexity of the longest held
job explained between 11% and 22% of education’s association with cognitive function,
in a sample of adults aged over 44 years (Fujishiro et al. , 2017). This study was wholly
based on a selection-on-observables identification strategy; the findings are less plausible
as causal estimates.
Fujishiro et al. (2017) examined mediation effects among gender and race subgroups,
as well across different margins of education. Occupational complexity explained differing
amounts of the effect of education on cognition across subgroups—especially at the high-
est levels of education. A potential explanation suggested is differential skill mismatch in
the labour market: if workers do not find roles which match their education level, they may
not obtain the full cognitive returns to their education. Altenatively, for the same occupa-
tion, there may be heterogeneous cognitive returns across groups. Although the sample
size in the present paper is too small to investigate more granular subgroups, exploring dif-
ferences in the role of occupation by subgroup—gender, age, ethnicity and region—may
represent a useful avenue for future work.
If occupation does represent a causal pathway between education and cognitive out-
comes, this suggests a second policy lever after full-time education has been completed—
supporting young people into employment, providing training to assist with continued
work and engagement in later life, and matching employees with work commensurate with
their skill set. Although the effects of occupation may themselves operate through subse-
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quent mediating variables that may come with higher status occupations—autonomy and
control over job tasks, positive peer group effects, a healthy and safe work environment—
occupational mismatch and employment conditions may still represent a “catch-all" indi-
cator for policy intervention. The positive contribution of technical skill usage provides
support that effect is not entirely due occupational social status.
The findings also highlight the role of the type of work in sustaining mental perfor-
mance. Continuing to work into later life in a role which is not engaging, or is physically
hazardous, would not be expected to provide continuing benefits. In this case, work-like
activities which provide mental engagement, such as volunteering or other non-market
activity, may be effective in maintaining long-term cognitive health. Empirical evidence
for this hypothesis is provided in Andel et al. (2015), who assess the role of mid-life
occupational complexity and leisure activity on late-life cognition, and suggest that such
non-market activity can compensate for a lack challenging paid work, and vice versa.
1.7 Concluding Remarks
Continued increases of the minimum school leaving age aim to improve the educational,
economic and social prospects of those individuals who would otherwise choose to drop
out early. Successive changes of this kind have increased average years of education over
the the last century. Given these policies are not without cost, the size of social and private
returns remains an important question. This paper used a change in compulsory schooling
laws, enacted in 1972 in England and Wales, to study the effects of schooling on later-life
cognitive performance. The findings show that an additional year of high school confers
a protective effect on memory, ranging from one- to two-thirds of a standard deviation,
depending on the sample and model specification employed. Little evidence was detected
for effects on numeric ability or verbal fluency; the effect sizes were generally close to
zero, and statistically insignificant.
These results are in line with previous studies which have generally found a large im-
pact of schooling on working memory, across a range of time periods, countries and es-
timation strategies, among those at the lower end of the schooling distribution (Glymour
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et al. , 2008; Banks & Mazzonna, 2012; Schneeweis et al. , 2014; Mazzonna, 2014). The
most similar study Banks & Mazzonna (2012), exploited the 1947 raising of the school
leaving age in England andWales. The 1947 reform had large effects on staying-on rates—
at a lower margin of schooling than the 1972 reform—inducing about 50% of the affected
cohort to remain in school to 15 years, rather than 14 years.
The effects of schooling on memory are within a similar range of magnitudes as in
Banks & Mazzonna (2012) (e.g., effects of 0.5 standard deviations among men, and 0.4
standard deviation amongwomen): evidently, the cognitive returns to basic education have
not been exhausted, for an outcome which is especially relevant for the onset of cognitive
impairment. In contrast to memory, the present study does not detect any causal effect
on Verbal Fluency or the numeric ability measures. This finding may be due to diminish-
ing returns to years of education, to lack of sensitivity of the cognitive battery measures
employed, or the fact that the sample examined in Banks & Mazzonna (2012) were older,
by about a decade—the full effects on cognitive outcomes may not materialise until older
ages. The absence of evidence for an effect on simple measures of numeric ability is con-
sistent with other studies using changes in compulsory schooling laws, which have failed
to detected effects of education on both numeric ability, measured both by simple cognitive
battery tests (Schneeweis et al. , 2014) and through measures of financial decision-making
quality (Banks et al. , 2018).
This paper also conducted a formal analyses of the mechanisms shaping the effects
of schooling on memory, focussing on the role of occupation type. Occupation type can
explain up to about one-fifth of the total effect—in line with other studies (Fujishiro et al.
, 2017). However, the figures are imprecisely estimated and not statistically significant.
Based on the effect sizes, intervening on occupational mismatch and working conditions
may exert a small to moderate effect on cognitive outcomes—however given the large
standards errors the analyses remain inconclusive.
As global populations age, understanding the drivers of health and functioning of older
people is increasingly important. The findings of this paper show that one additional year
secondary schooling has a causal effect on memory, an important and policy-relevant com-
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ponent of cognitive functioning. The expansion of public schooling throughout the twenti-
eth century may reduce growth in the burden of adverse cognitive outcomes as the cohorts
exposed these reforms age.
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Figure 1.2: Years of Schooling by month-year of birth
(a) Full sample (b) Restricted to those who left school before age17 years
Notes: Sample means of years of school by month-of-birth cohort.
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(c) Serial Subtraction (d) Numeric Ability
Notes: Mean cognitive outcomes (Word Recall, Verbal Fluency, Serial Subtraction and Numeric Ability) by
age-at-interview and school leaving age (SLA), among those who left school at either 15 years or 16 years
of age.
58
Human capital formation 1.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Figure 1.4: Sensitivity analyses
(a) Word Recall (b) Verbal fluency
(c) Numeric ability (d) Serial subtraction
Notes: The bold black line plots coefficients from a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design assessing the
effect of years of school on each cognitive outcome (Word Recall, Verbal Fluency, Numeric Ability, Serial
Subtraction) across a range of bandwidth choices (22 month-year of birth cohorts to 60 month-year of birth
cohorts). The grey areas depict 90%, 95% and 99% confidence intervals around the treatment effect. The
vertical line indicates the optimally chosen bandwidth.
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Table 1.1: Age left school (SLA), Before and After Reform
Men Women
Treatment status Treatment status
SLA Non-treated Treated Total Non-treated Treated Total
% % %
15 37.8 7.9 21.7 37.7 9.2 22.0
16 30.1 60.3 46.4 33.1 60.0 47.9
17 9.9 10.4 10.2 9.5 9.9 9.7
18 19.9 19.7 19.8 18.9 19.8 19.4
19 2.3 1.6 1.9 0.9 1.1 1.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: Survey-weighted column percentages summarising age left secondary school (SLA), for men and
women. The column Non-treated is restricted to respondents unexposed to the new the school leaving age,
born before 01, September, 1957. The column Treated is restricted to respondents exposed to the new the
school leaving age, born on or after 01, September, 1957. The sample is restricted to respondents born
within five years of the treatment cut-off.
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics for demographic and cognitive variables
Variable Mean SD Min Max N
(a) Pooled sample
Female 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 4,915
Age 53.54 2.94 48.00 60.00 4,915
Years of school 11.33 1.04 10.00 14.00 4,833
Word recall 11.60 3.23 0.00 20.00 4,797
Verbal Fluency 22.93 6.80 0.00 71.00 4,877
Numeracy 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 4,864
Serial Subtraction 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00 4,779
Notes: Weighted summary statistics for analysis variables. Restricted to respondents born five years before
or after the 01, September, 1957.
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Table 1.3: OLS and RD estimates of the effect of schooling on cognitive outcomes
Outcome
Word recall Verbal Fluency Numeric Ability Subtraction
OLS RD OLS RD OLS RD OLS RD
(a) RD treatment effect
Years 0.15 0.53 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.10 -0.14
Std. Err 0.06 0.28 0.06 0.38 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.17
(b) First-stage statistics
First-stage βˆ 0.33 0.34 0.44 0.38
F -statistic 35.35 36.08 41.21 35.86
(c) Sample size
Bandwidth 30 30 30 30 21 21 26 26
N 939 939 950 950 671 671 810 810
Notes: Panel(a) reports results from OLS and FRD regressions assessing the effect of an additional year
of schooling on each cognitive outcome. Each model adjusts for the following covariates: a linear trend
in month-year of birth cohort (interacted with the reform dummy), indicators for gender, interview month,
interview year and a quadratic term in age. The standard errors are clustered by month-year of birth cohort.
Survey weights adjusting for unit non-response and sample design were used in all specifications. Panel(b)
presents the first-stage statistics. First-stage βˆ is the coefficient on the reform dummy in the first stage regres-
sion. F -statistic is the robust F-statistic for the first-stage. Panel(c) shows the sample size. Bandwidth
refers to the number of month-year of birth cohorts included in the estimation sample on each side of the
treatment cut-off, selected using a data-driven procedure. N is the sample size used in each regression.
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Table 1.4: Causal mechanisms: LACME and LANDE
Occupation (first job) Occupation (current job) Technical skills
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
LATE 0.52 (0.38) 0.53 (0.39) 0.53 (0.39)
LANDE
ζ˜(0) 0.50 (0.53) 0.47 (0.84) 0.53 (0.73)
ζ˜(1) 0.52 (0.74) 0.47 (0.46) 0.43 (0.38)
LACME
δ˜(0) 0.00 (0.86) 0.06 (0.32) 0.00 (0.52)
δ˜(1) 0.02 (0.62) 0.06 (0.79) 0.10 (0.30)
Bandwidth 30 30 30 30 30 30
N 939 939 939 939 939 939
Notes: This table shows estimates of the local average treatment effect (LATE) of one additional year of
schooling on Word Recall, and decomposes this into components explained and unexplained by three alter-
native intermediate variable (Occupation type of first job, Occupation type of current job, Technical skills in
first job). ζ˜(0) and ζ˜(1) ( δ˜(0) and δ˜(1) ) denote estimates of the LACME (LANDE) when the treatment is
fixed to either d = 0 or d = 1, respectively. Each model adjusts for the following covariates: linear trend in
month-year of birth cohort interacted with the reform dummy, indicators for gender, interview month, inter-
view year, age. Bandwidth refers to the number of month-year of birth cohorts included in the estimation
sample on each side of the treatment cut-off.
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Appendix 1.A Distributions of outcome variables
Figure 1.5 displays the distribution of raw data for the main cognitive outcome variables
considered. Word recall and verbal fluency are continuous measures, and were subse-
quently standardised to have mean zero and standard deviation of 1. The results are robust
to excluding zero values for word recall and verbal fluency.
64
Human capital formation 1.A. OUTCOME DISTRIBUTIONS
Figure 1.5: Histograms of variables
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Table 1.5: Summary statistics for occupation variables
Variable Column % / Mean N
NS-SEC (first job)
Semi-routine; routine; LT unemployed 23.1 777
Lower supervisory and technical 33.7 1,134
Small employers and own account 5.0 168
Intermediate occupations 26.1 876
Lower managerial; Higher managerial and professional 12.0 405
Total 100.0 3,361
NS-SEC (current job)
Semi-routine; routine; LT unemployed 28.0 1,157
Lower supervisory and technical 7.5 311
Small employers and own account 10.5 437
Intermediate occupations 12.6 520
Lower managerial; Higher managerial and professional 41.4 1,714
Total 100.0 4,139
Skills
Technical skills (in first job) 16.85 3,389
Notes: Weighted column percentages for occupation variables. Restricted to respondents born five years
before or after the 01, September, 1957 who left school before age 17 years.
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Appendix 1.B Descriptive analyses
Figure 1.6: Cognitive outcomes by birth cohort
(a) Word Recall (b) Verbal Fluency
(c) Serial Subtraction (d) Numeric Ability
Notes: Sample means of Word Recall, Verbal Fluency, Serial Subtraction and Numeric Ability by month-
of-birth cohort, overlaid with a quadratic fit.
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Appendix 1.C Sensitivity analyses: Regression Discon-
tinuity Design
Figure 1.7 assesses the sensitivity of the main results to changes in the bandwidth choice.
The treatment effect coefficient and confidence intervals (90%, 95%, 99%) are plotted for
models with different bandwidths, from 24 months to 121 months (units born within 2
years either side of the reform up to 10 years either side). As in the main text, this sample
is restricted to respondents who left school before age 17 years.
Figure 1.7: Sensitivity analyses
(a) Memory: Quadratic (b) Verbal: Quadratic
(c) Serial Subtraction: Quadratic (d) Numeric Ability: Quadratic
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Table 1.6 reports the main results computed for the full sample: i.e., including respon-
dents who left school at age 17, 18 or 19 years, in addition to those who left at 15 or 16
years, and including those who did not report occupation information. Figure 1.8 reports
sensitivity analyses to the bandwidth choice.
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Table 1.6: OLS and RD estimates of the effect of schooling on cognitive outcomes (full
sample, i.e., left school ≤ 19 years)
Outcome
Word recall Verbal Fluency Numeric Ability Subtraction
RD1 RD2 RD1 RD2 RD1 RD2 RD1 RD2
(a) RD treatment effect
Years 0.32 0.41 0.24 0.29 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.02
Std. Err 0.13 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.13
N 2311 2311 2356 2356 1645 1645 2000 2000
(b) RD treatment effect (Women)
Years 0.52 0.67 0.53 0.68 0.24 0.59 0.03 -0.07
Std. Err 0.26 0.31 0.34 0.43 0.22 0.71 0.26 0.26
N 1290 1290 1316 1316 916 916 1115 1115
(c) RD treatment effect (Men)
Years 0.22 0.23 0.06 0.06 0.24 -0.09 0.00 0.07
Std. Err 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.32 0.22 0.23 0.16 0.18
N 1021 1021 1040 1040 729 729 885 885
p-value of
diff.
0.63 0.50 0.12 0.12 0.94 0.30 0.62 0.27
Bandwidth 30 30 30 30 21 21 26 26
Notes: Panel(a) reports results from two FRD regressions assessing the effect of an additional year of
schooling on each cognitive outcome. RD1 adjusts for the following covariates: a linear trend in month-year
of birth cohort (interacted with the reform dummy), indicators for gender, interview month, interview year
and a quadratic term in age. RD2 additionally adjusts for month-of-birth dummies. The standard errors are
clustered by month-year of birth cohort. Survey weights adjusting for unit non-response and sample design
were used in all specifications. Panel(b) presents the first-stage statistics. First-stage βˆ is the coefficient
on the reform dummy in the first stage regression. F -statistic is the robust F-statistic for the first-stage.
Panel(c) shows the sample size. Bandwidth refers to the number of month-year of birth cohorts included
in the estimation sample on each side of the treatment cut-off, selected using a data-driven procedure. N is
the sample size used in each regression.
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Figure 1.8: Sensitivity analyses
(a) Memory (b) Verbal fluency
(c) Numeric ability (d) Serial subtraction
Notes: The bold black line plots coefficients from a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design model of the
effect of years of school on each cognitive outcome (Word Recall, Verbal Fluency, Numeric Ability, Serial
Subtraction) across a range of bandwidth choices (12 month-year of birth cohorts to 60 month-year of birth
cohorts). The sample window is determined by bandwidth, measured in month-of-birth cohorts included
either side of the 01 September 1957 treatment cut-off. The grey areas depict 90%, 95% and 99% confidence
intervals around the treatment effect. The vertical line indicates the optimally chosen bandwidth.
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Table 1.7 reports the main results computed for the full sample now using a quadratic
specification in the running variable. This specification is less reliable than the linear case:
the optimal bandwidth is larger, and comparison is being made between persons born too
far apart to be considered comparable. Additionally, recent work have made the case that
higher order polynomials are a unreliable specification in RD applications (Gelman &
Zelizer, 2015) and generally favour the local linear approach (Cattaneo et al. , 2017b).
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Table 1.7: OLS and RD estimates of the effect of schooling on cognitive outcomes (full
sample, i.e., left school ≤ 19 years, quadratic running variable)
Outcome
Word recall Verbal Fluency Numeric Ability Subtraction
RD1 RD2 RD1 RD2 RD1 RD2 RD1 RD2
(a) RD treatment effect
Years 0.44 0.61 0.41 0.78 0.10 0.68 0.06 -0.09
Std. Err 0.17 0.22 0.35 0.52 0.16 1.16 0.17 0.44
F-statistic 21.6 18.0 9.0 4.4 3.8 0.3 5.8 1.1
Bandwidth 52 52 34 34 27 27 30 30
N 4044 4044 2667 2667 2096 2096 2307 2307
(b) RD treatment effect (Women)
Years 0.65 0.90 0.60 1.67 0.61 5.29 -0.08 4.67
Std. Err 0.29 0.39 0.61 2.02 0.34 37.02 0.72 32.63
F-statistic 6.6 4.9 2.7 0.8 1.7 0.0 0.8 0.0
Bandwidth 52 52 34 34 27 27 30 30
N 2267 2267 1489 1489 1166 1166 1286 1286
(c) RD treatment effect (Men)
Years 0.35 0.43 0.27 0.42 0.61 -0.43 0.10 0.23
Std. Err 0.24 0.29 0.39 0.60 0.34 1.13 0.23 0.38
F-statistic 17.2 13.3 6.3 4.9 1.7 0.4 5.1 2.1
Bandwidth 52 52 34 34 27 27 30 30
N 1777 1777 1178 1178 1166 930 1021 1021
p-value of
diff.
0.63 0.50 0.12 0.12 0.94 0.30 0.62 0.27
Bandwidth 30 30 30 30 21 21 26 26
Notes: Panel(a) reports results from two FRD regressions assessing the effect of an additional year of
schooling on each cognitive outcome. RD1 adjusts for the following covariates: a quadratic trend in month-
year of birth cohort (interacted with the reform dummy), indicators for gender, interview month, interview
year and a quadratic term in age. RD2 additionally adjusts for month-of-birth dummies. The standard
errors are clustered by month-year of birth cohort. Survey weights adjusting for unit non-response and
sample design were used in all specifications. Panel(b) presents the first-stage statistics. First-stage βˆ is
the coefficient on the reform dummy in the first stage regression. F -statistic is the robust F-statistic for
the first-stage. Panel(c) shows the sample size. Bandwidth refers to the number of month-year of birth
cohorts included in the estimation sample on each side of the treatment cut-off, selected using a data-driven
procedure. N is the sample size used in each regression.
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Appendix 1.D Schooling’s effects on occupation
Table 1.8 examines the effect of an additional year of schooling on the intermediate out-
comes. It shows the results of three models: the causal effect of an additional years of
schooling on occupation type of the first job after leaving school, occupation type of the
current job, and technical skill usage. The first two specifications, which have categorical
outcomes, are estimated via Maximum Likelihood using the cmp package in Stata. The
third specification, with a continuous outcome, was estimated using 2SLS. The first col-
umn in Panel (a) shows the effect of taking 16, rather than 15 years of schooling on the
average probability of choosing each occupation type in one’s first job. An additional year
of schooling leads to statistically significant reduction in the probability of taking a rou-
tine or semi-routine occupation immediately after leaving school, of 11 percentage points.
On the other end of the spectrum, an additional year of schooling leads to an average of
a 4 percentage point increase in the probability of taking a managerial or professional job
immediately after leaving school.
As shown in Panel (b), the effects on current occupation (measured toward the end of
working life) are smaller in magnitude: for instance, an additional year of schooling leads
to 16 percentage point reduction in the average probability being in a routine or semi-
routine occupation. Panel (c) presents the results of a 2SLS regression examining the
effect of schooling on the extent of technical skills used in first job after leaving school.
An additional year of school increases the index of technical skills used in first job out of
school by 1.72 units, the equivalent of half of a standard deviation.
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Routine; semi-routine -0.11 0.02
Lower supervisory and technical -0.01 0.00
Small employers and own account 0.01 0.00
Intermediate occupations 0.07 0.01
Managerial and professional 0.04 0.00
Panel (b)
NS-SEC (current job)
Routine; semi-routine -0.16 0.01
Lower supervisory and technical -0.01 0.00
Small employers and own account 0.01 0.00
Intermediate occupations 0.02 0.00
Managerial and professional 0.14 0.01
Panel (c)
Technical skills
Cognitive skills 1.72 0.80
Notes: This table reports results from three separate instrumental variable (IV) pro-
cedures, assessing the effect of an additional year of schooling on the intermediate
outcomes using the RoSLA as the IV. Panel(a) shows results from an IV ordered pro-
bit model, with occupation type of first job as the outcome. Panel(b) shows results
from an IV ordered probit model, with occupation type of current job as the outcome.
These two specifications were estimated using Maximum Likelihood via the −cmp−
Stata package. The third specification, in Panel(c) shows results from a 2SLS regres-
sion with Technical Skill usage as the outcome. The covariates in each specification
are: a linear trend in month-year of birth cohort (interacted with the reform dummy),
indicators for gender, interview month, interview year, and a quadratic term in age.
The standard errors are clustered by month-year of birth cohort (the running variable).
Survey weights adjusting for unit non-response and sample design are used in all spec-
ifications.
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Appendix 1.E Estimation of direct and indirect treatment
effects
The following expressions describe the estimators for the Local Average Complier Medi-
ated Effect (LACME), δ(d), and the Local Average Natural Direct Effect (LANDE), ζ(d),
developed in Yamamoto (2014); Park & Kürüm (2018). For the categorical mediators
























× (Q˜d|dXiG˜m|ddXi − Q˜d|(1−d)XiG˜m|d(1−d)Xi
Q˜1|1Xi − Q˜1|0Xi
dm. (1.14)
where, S˜mdzx = E[Yi | Mi = m,Di = d, Zi = z,Xi = x], G˜m|tzx = p(Mi =
m |Di = d, Zi = z,Xi = x), Q˜d|zx = Pr(Di = d |Zi = z,Xi = x).
A linear model, estimated using least-squares, was employed for the treatment, the
continous mediator (intensity of technical skills used in first job) and the outcome (Word
Recall). The covariates in the treatment equation were the instrument and pre-treatment
covariates; the covariates in the mediator equation were the treatment, instrument, an in-
teraction between treatment and instrument, and pre-treatment covariates; in the outcome
equation the covariates were main effects and interactions between the mediator, treatment
and instrument, and pre-treatment covariates.
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An ordered probit model was employed for categorical mediators (occupation type),
conditioning on treatment, instrument, an interaction between treatment and instrument,
and the pre-treatment covariates. The pre-treatment covariates included were: a linear
trend in month-year of birth cohort (interacted with the reform dummy), indicators for
gender, interview month, interview year, and age-at-interview.
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Appendix 1.F Causal mediation analysis: sensitivity to
additional covariates
Table 1.9: Causal mechanisms: LACME and LANDE (highest parental occupation
(SOC2000))
Occupation (first job) Occupation (current job) Technical skills
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
LATE 0.53 (0.39) 0.53 (0.42) 0.53 (0.41)
LANDE
ζ˜(0) 0.45 (0.82) 0.40 (0.86) 0.53 (0.87)
ζ˜(1) 0.53 (0.55) 0.54 (0.48) 0.43 (0.49)
LACME
δ˜(0) 0.00 (0.40) 0.04 (0.34) 0.00 (0.41)
δ˜(1) 0.08 (0.74) 0.04 (0.79) 0.10 (0.75)
Bandwidth 30 30 30 30 30 30
N 939 939 939 939 939 939
Notes: This table shows estimates of the local average treatment effect (LATE) of one additional year of
schooling on Word Recall, and decomposes this into components explained and unexplained by three alter-
native intermediate variable (Occupation type of first job, Occupation type of current job, Technical skills in
first job). ζ˜(0) and ζ˜(1) ( δ˜(0) and δ˜(1) ) denote estimates of the LACME (LANDE) when the treatment is
fixed to either d = 0 or d = 1, respectively. Each model adjusts for the following covariates: linear trend in
month-year of birth cohort interacted with the reform dummy, indicators for gender, interview month, inter-
view year, age. Bandwidth refers to the number of month-year of birth cohorts included in the estimation
sample on each side of the treatment cut-off.
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Appendix 1.G Causal mediation analysis: sensitivity anal-
yses to unmeasured confounding
This section explores the sensitivity of the findings to mediator-outcome confounding.
VanderWeele (2010, 2015) develop a formula to acsertain the effects of a hypothesis level
of confounding on the mediated effect. This approach has been applied in various ap-
plications, including Ananth & VanderWeele (2011), and in Park & Kürüm (2018) (who
develop the estimation approach used in this paper).
In VanderWeele (2010, 2015)’s method, the impact of mediator-outcome confounding
on the estimate of the indirect effect, δ(t), can be split into two pathways. First, denoted β,
is the association between the instrument (and hence the treatment, given an excludability
assumption) and the unobserved covariates via the mediator. Second, denoted α, the as-
sociation between the unobserved covariate and the outcome. Assume these associations
do not vary by the value of the observed covariates (although this could, in theory, be re-
laxed). The biased estimate of δ(t) is expressed as ˆδ(t) = δ(t) + αβ. Re-arranging gives
the true estimates for the confounding effects of the unobserved covariate U , the estimate
of the indirect is δ(t) = ˆδ(t)− αβ
A useful exercise is to consider how large the effects of the unobserved covariate would
need to be, such that the true estimate of δ(t) would be zero. As an exemplar, I take the
estimate ˆδ(1)=10%—i.e., how much of the total effect of education on cognitive function
can be explained by working in a job relying on technical/STEM-type skills.
Considering the the first path, supposing that a person with a high value of the unob-
served covariate has high working memory by 0.15 standard deviations (selected based
on the largest associated between any observed covariate the outcomes, conditioning on
pre-treatment covariates and occupation choice—which is from the lagged value of the
outcome), for any given values of their occupation and pre-treatment covariates. Suppose
also that persons who stay for an additional year of schooling had a higher probability of
having a high value of the unobserved covariate of 60% (compared to those who leave at
15 years), then this level of confounding would mean the unbiased estimate would be zero
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(0 = 0.10 - (0.6)(0.15)). This level of confounding could be considered very high, in the
economic and social sciences, and likely implausibly in this scenario. A more moderate
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2.1 Introduction
Demand for places at popular schools exceeds supply, and not all families are able to at-
tend their preferred school—yet attending a preferred school may have potentially impor-
tant consequences for long term outcomes, if parents choose schools based on test score
improvements or other school attributes important for child outcomes. In addition to aca-
demic outcomes, parents may rationally value wider factors provided by schools, for ex-
ample non-cognitive skill development, peer groups and pupil well-being, which can have
important consequences for success in life (Heckman et al. , 2006; Mendolia et al. , 2018).
Evidence to date has revealed mixed findings on whether parents choose schools based
on a causal improvements in test scores, rather than peer mix, pedagogy or other school
attributes (Abdulkadiroglu et al. , 2017a). Consequently the effects of attending a preferred
school are also mixed, with the majority of studies documenting little effect of attending
a preferred school on short-run test scores (Cullen et al. , 2006; Dobbie & Fryer, 2014;
Deming et al. , 2014; Abdulkadiroglu et al. , 2014; Hoekstra et al. , 2018; Abdulkadiroglu
et al. , 2017b, 2018). These studies are typically based on data from specific cities (for
example, Boston or New York), and specific settings, such as attendance at academically
“elite” schools.
In England, who gets into their preferred secondary school is a well-publicised issue in
the media. We know that parents value secondary schools which perform well on common
academic metrics (Burgess et al. , 2017; Gibbons & Silva, 2011), and there is regional and
demographic patterning in the share of families gaining entrance to their preferred school
(Weldon, 2018). Yet to date there is no evidence on the causal effects of attending (or not)
their preferred school. This is in spite of the fact that the UK provides an ideal laboratory
to explore the effects of schooling, due to a centrally managed quasi-market for secondary
schools and high quality linked administrative data. Our paper contributes new evidence
by combining powerful administrative data and detailed cohort data, which follows pupils
from secondary school to age 25 years, to study the long-term consequences of attending
a preferred school.
Generally speaking, how pupils are matched to schools is governed by the so-called
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“school choice” problem. This refers to the mechanism that matches pupils and schools,
given parental preferences, school capacities and other policy priorities—for instance, di-
versity in schools or social mobility. A mature literature on the market design approach
to school choice has developed over the last decades, which considers how to best elicit
parental preferences over schools and then assign places to children (Abdulkadiroglu &
Sönmez, 2003; Cantillon, 2017).
The way this system operates in England is that families submit their ranked prefer-
ences over schools to the local government authority, each school ranks families based
on a set observable characteristics (such as distance from the school), and then this infor-
mation is combined to offer places parents, subject to school capacity constraints. High-
performing secondary schools tend to be oversubscribed: there are more applicants than
places available. In the case of oversubscribed schools, places are rationed based on a set
of published criteria, such as whether the applicant has older siblings at the school, and
the family’s distance from the school (West et al. , 2011).
A number of empirical regularities have been established in England. We know that, on
average, parents value schools perceived as academically “good” schools, and are willing
to travel to attend them (Burgess, 2015; Burgess et al. , 2017). There are demographic and
socio-economic differences in engagement with the school choice process. For example,
families of minority ethnic groups engage more with the school choice process thanWhite
families: they are willing to travel further to attend a high quality school, and they list more
schools in their submission of preferences.
However, less aﬄuent pupils, and ethnic minority groups, are less likely to attend good
schools than their peers, and have poorer performance in high stakes exams, and subse-
quently entry into elite higher education. Thismotivates current UK government priority is
to broaden access to high performing schools, as recently recognized in the Government’s
Unlocking Talent, Fulfilling Potential: A plan for improving social mobility through edu-
cation, “In Britain today, the community where you grow up will shape your chances of
attending a good school and your wider educational and career outcomes.”(Department for
Education, 2017). School admissions may represent one component of the complex rea-
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sons for variation in attainment in England, as the socio-economic and ethnic variation in
who attends good schools is not fully explained by variation in preferences and residential
location (Weldon, 2018).
While many changes in the operation of the school choice system have occurred over
recent decades (West et al. , 2011), the share of children being offered a place at their first
choice school has remained static at about 84%. Taking the stock of “good schools” as
fixed, this statistic has both equity and allocative efficiency concerns at its core. First, if
particular segments of society more likely to miss out on a place at a preferred school, this
raises and equity concern about equal access to good schools. In England, there are large
differences in attending a good school by ethnic group, which is unlikely to be explained
by differing preferences. A second possibility is school-pupil match effects, which would
mean the productivity of school varies depending on its intake, and matching the right
pupils to the right schools improves school performance and child outcomes.
Outside the UK, there are a number of studies combining market design theory with
modern methods for policy evaluation to assess how missing out on a preferred school
impacts outcomes (Pop-Eleches & Urquiola, 2013; Cullen et al. , 2006; Dobbie & Fryer,
2014, 2015; Abdulkadiroglu et al. , 2017b), often with a focus on peer effects as a possible
channel (Abdulkadiroglu et al. , 2014; Hoekstra et al. , 2018). Peer effects are an appealing
channel through which preferred schools could exert and effect on outcomes, especially if
they are dynamic in nature. Somewhat counter-intuitively, the majority of these studies do
not find any causal effect of attending a preferred secondary school in academic outcomes.
This puzzle could have a number of possible explanations. Many of these studies use a
compelling empirical design, comparing the outcomes of pupils who “just” got into a
school compared with those who just missed out—either side of a threshold based on a
continuous tests score.
There are at least two possible offsetting effects. First, pupils who just get will be at
the bottom of the ability rank in a top tier school, whereas those who miss out will be
at the top of the ability rank. Rank has been documented to have a direct effect on out-
comes (Elsner & Isphording, 2017). Second, parents and families may increase (reduce)
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their effort invested in the student if they get in (misses out), again exerting an offsetting
effect (Pop-Eleches & Urquiola, 2013). More generally, parents may not choose schools
based on school effectiveness; either because they are not aware of the effectiveness of
different schools, or they mistake the quality of the intake mix for school effectiveness
(Abdulkadiroglu et al. , 2017a).
On the other hand, parents may value other school attributes, such as “elite” status of
the school, diversity in the school, or expected skill improvements on other margins, such
as non-cognitive skills. Indeed, choosing a school based on considerations other than test
scores can certainly be a rational choice, which would show up in a wider set of outcome,
such as well-being and mental health, and longer-term outcomes. For instance, Jackson
& Beuermann (2018) provide compelling evidence that while attending preferred school
in Barbados does not improve test scores, it does reduce early pregnancy and enhance
employment rates among women.
We contribute by providing the first evidence to date on on the long-run consequences
of attending a preferred school in England. England is a useful laboratory to explore this
topic for a number of reasons. First, nationwide data are available and school finances
are determined centrally, allowing us to study this topic at the national level. Second,
given parental preferences and school capacities, two different mechanisms for allocating
school places were deployed across different areas at the time that the children in our co-
hort were making their school selections. This allows us to estimate the treatment effects
separately for two mechanisms which have been studied widely in the theoretical litera-
ture (Pathak & Sönmez, 2013). Third, for most schools in England selection on ability is
explicitly prohibited—meaning we escape the confounding effect of ability rank faced by
other studies, and our estimates are more generalisable across the ability distribution.
Another advantage is that our data capture long term outcomes observed at age 25 years
as well as the typical short run educational outcomes which, in our case, are high-stakes
in that they play a decisive role in dropping out from school (i.e. leaving at the minimum
school leaving age because one is unable to gain admission to post compulsory schooling)
and in facilitating access to higher education.
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We employ the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE, also known
as Next Steps), a nationally representative birth cohort study which tracks the lives of a
cohort of around 15,000 young people in England who were born in 1989/90 (Henderson,
2017). LSYPE began when the children were in Year 9, the second year of secondary
school, and follows them until they are aged 25 years (annually until age 19/20, then a gap
until age 25/26 years).
The LSYPE contains detailed information on school choice, including whether the
child attends their preferred school, family background, experiences in school and, cru-
cially, labour market and university outcomes. This data is confidentially linked to the
National Pupil Database (NPD), a database of administrative school records, containing
individual test scores and child characteristics, as well as school-level attributes. From
these data we can characterize the attributes of schools, preferred and otherwise, and track
the achievement of the LSYPE pupils in high-stakes examinations (the GCSE, taken at age
15/16, and A-levels taken at age 17/18).
To apply for a place at a state school in England (about 90% of schools during our
time period), parents submit a ranking of their preferred schools. Parents can list between
3 and 6 places depending on their local area. For oversubscribed schools, allocation of
places is prioritised based on a set of observable criteria, typically including: whether
the child is categorised as “looked after”; whether the child has special education needs;
whether the child has an older sibling at the school; and, finally, the distance from the
school. In some cases, faith may also be considered. If a pupil cannot be allocated to any
of their listed preferred school they are assigned to a school with spare capacity (which
is typically of lower quality). For example, two families who look observationally similar
may have different rates of acceptance due to small—arguably random—differences in
their proximity to their preferred school.
Based on the literature on parental choice and the details of the institutional setting,
we build a case that the child’s potential outcomes are independent of whether they get
into their first-choice school after conditioning on variables determining school admission,
proxies for parental preferences, detailed information on socio-economic status, prior abil-
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ity of the child and the feasible choice set of schools. After adjusting for these factors, we
argue that missing out on a preferred school is conditionally independent of the child’s
outcomes.
In terms of estimation, we use a combination of matching and regression adjustment to
estimate the average effect of attending a preferred school. First, we use kernel matching
to create a matched sample of pupils, matching each pupil who missed out on a place
at their preferred school, to a set of control pupils who got in—and who live in close
proximity to the treated pupil’s school. The matches are selected based on their straight
line distance from the treated pupil’s school, within an optimally selected radius. Using
this geographically matched sample, we use regression-adjustment to estimate the average
treatment effect of attending a preferred school, where the contributions of the control
observations are weighted in inverse proportion to their distance from the treated unit’s
school. The purpose of pre-processing the data via the matching is to balance the sample,
such that both the control and treated units have a similar choice set of schools. This
reduces reliance on the functional form of the regression to capture geographical factors.
Average treatment effects are likely to hide variation in treatment effects, as the con-
sequences of attending a preferred school are likely to differ across the population. We
explore variation in treatment effects by gender and assignment mechanism. When our
cohort were applying for schools, two mechanisms to allocate places (given preferences
and school capacities) were used by admissions authorities: so-called Deferred Accep-
tance (DA) and First Preference First (FPF) approaches. The mechanism deployed differs
by local area. This allows us to estimate the treatment effects for these two different algo-
rithm designs that have been most studied in the mechanism design literature (Pathak &
Sönmez, 2013).
We unpack the effects of attending a preferred school by investigating a number of po-
tential mechanisms. The average effect of missing out on a preferred school is informed
by comparisons both within and between schools. Pupils who miss out may have poorer
outcomes due to attending a lower quality school, and/or due to a direct effect of “not
attending a preferred school”— a “match effect”. We control for school fixed effects to
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assess the extent to which the effects of attending a preferred school is due to between-
school variation in school attributes, and within-school variation—potential match effects.
Second, we considering a number of intermediate outcomes—such as mental well being,
and engagement in risky behaviours.
Pupils who miss out on a preferred school are more likely to be a member of ethnic mi-
nority groups, are less likely to have older siblings (a key determinant of admissions),
and there is negligible difference in prior ability. Preferred schools have higher headline
measures of attainment, and tend to be more aﬄuent, on average. Our analysis fails to
detect convincing evidence for effects of missing out a preferred school on test scores and
university attendance. However, we do find consistent evidence of increased high school
drop-out after the age of compulsory schooling, and increased university drop-out among
pupils who miss out on a preferred school. These negative effects persist to age 25 years,
where we find long-lasting negative effects on mental health and income.
Pupils who miss out show increased patterns of early engagement in risky behaviours, rep-
resenting a potential mechanism driving the increased drop-out rates. While we do not find
strong evidence for gender differences, the negative consequences of missing out are more
pronounced in local areas which used a more manipulable mechanism (‘first-preference
first’) for allocating school places. Pupils exposed to the first-preference mechanism who
miss out end up commuting further to school than their counterparts exposed to a De-
ferred Acceptance mechanism, possibly indicating much poorer school matches. Overall,
our findings highlight that which school a child attends can have consequences for broader
outcomes than only test scores, and the way places are allocated matters for ensuring chil-
dren attend a school which is right for them.
2.2 Institutional setting
2.2.1 School types and curriculum stages
Ages and stages:
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The English school curriculum is divided into blocks of years called “key stages” (KS).
At the end of each KS, performance is examined via examination. The final three years of
primary school form Key Stage 2, which is assessed in a test at age 10/11 years. Children
now transition to secondary school, where they must attend until age 16 years. Key Stage
3 runs from Year 7 to Year 9. Key stage 4 follows from year 10 and 11, culminating in
the high stakes General Certificate of Secondary Education examinations (GCSEs) exams.
Pupils typically take between 5 and 10 subjects.
At this point, with satisfactory performance in GCSEs, pupils can study for Advanced
levels (A levels), from age 16 to 18 years. A-Levels are the most common route to uni-
versity entrance, and are taken either at the same secondary school, or some pupils move
to another school or to a specialised “sixth form college” to take their A levels. Further
education (FE) colleges provide vocational training, often pursued in combination with
employment or A-levels. Pupils typically enter Higher Education (University) from age
18. Higher Education participation rates are over 40% of the cohort and this has grown
dramatically in the last two decades.
School types:
There were different types of secondary schools in England in 2001, described as fol-
lows. The first type are “state schools”, which comprise about 92% of schools, and are
controlled and funded by the government. All children in England between the ages of
5 and 16 are entitled to a free place at a state school. These schools all follow the Na-
tional Curriculum and are inspected by Ofsted (the government’s Office for Standards in
Education, Children’s Services and Skills). The second type is “Independent Schools”.
Around 7% of families choose to pay for a place at an Independent (also called a private
or public) school. Our analysis is based on pupils who attend state schools (starting school
in September 2001), rather than independent schools.
Within the category of state schools, there are community schools (69%), voluntary-
controlled (3%), voluntary-aided (14%) and foundation schools (14%) andGrammar schools.
Community schools are entirely run by the local council (Local Authority). Foundation
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or Trust schools are run by a local governing body. These schools were formerly called
“Grant-maintained” schools–this was an initiative to allow more freedom in provision
of education where, by majority parental vote, schools could opt-out of Local Authority
control and be run by a governing body with more control over admissions and staffing.
Voluntary-aided schools are typically religious or faith schools, which can admit pupils
on religious affiliation grounds. Voluntary-controlled schools are almost all faith schools.
They are a mix between community and voluntary-aided schools: similar to a community
school, the local authority employs the staff and sets the entrance criteria, but the school
land and buildings are owned by a charity, often a church, which also can appoint some
members of the governing body. Regardless of governance arrangement, all state schools
have to comply with the school admissions code of practice which sets guidelines for fair
admissions. Finally, there are some remaining Grammar schools, again run by the coun-
cil, a foundation body or a trust - they select all or most of their pupils based on academic
ability based on the so-called 11 plus exam.
2.3 School choice in England
“School choice” is defined as policies which allow parental preferences to influence which
school their child will attend. The central problem in designing a school choice system is
in allocating pupils to schools, accounting for both parental preferences, school capacities
and wider policy objectives (e.g. diversity in schools). One motivation for school choice
focuses on the importance of respecting parental preferences, and allowing them to choose
from a diversity of school types. A second motivation, not necessarily implied by the first,
is to induce competition among schools with the aim of improving school standards. Both
of these motivations have been referenced by different UK Governments in relation to
school choice policy.
The rationale behind using school choice to enhance competition, is that by allowing
families to choose which school they attend, popular schools will flourish, and poor per-
formers will be forced out of this “quasi-market”. A number of conditions are required for
this system to work, including: (i) parents engage with this process, they can observe the
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quality of different schools, and they choose schools based on effectiveness; (ii) there is
a choice of schools available to parents; (iii) good schools can expand to meet increased
demand; (iv) and poor performing schools face consequences (they are shut down or pro-
vided with remedial assistance).
In England, features of parental “choice” and a “quasi-market” in compulsory school-
ing were introduced largely from 1988, formalising the role of parental preferences, award-
ing extra funding for popular schools, and allowing school some discretion in the pupils
they admitted. The specific operation and political motivation of the school choice setting
in England has evolved substantially over the last few decades. Very generally, the pro-
cess to allocate places works as follows: to apply for a place at a state school in England,
parents submit a ranking of their preferred schools to the local government. They can list
between 3 and 6 places depending on their local area.
For oversubscribed schools, allocation of places is prioritised based on a set of ob-
servable criteria (“school priorities”), typically including: whether the child has exception
“medical or social needs”; whether the child has an older sibling at the school; and, fi-
nally, the distance from the school as the tie-breaker. In some cases, faith may also be
considered. An algorithm is used to allocate school places, given parental preferences,
school priorities and school capacities (for example, a Deferred Acceptance algorithm is
used). If a pupil cannot be allocated to any of their listed preferred schools (often because
the parents do not list enough schools), they are assigned to a school with spare capacity
(which is typically a less desirable school).
The LSYPE cohort were applying to schools in 2000, to start in September 2001, when
the admissions arrangements were less regulated, and subject to less stringent legislation,
compared with today. The following section describes in detail the policy settings appli-
cable for the LSYPE cohort.
Admissions and oversubscription criteria used in September 2000
The admission process varied bothwithin and between local authorities, and in Septem-
ber 2001 was more heterogeneous and under-developed compared with the present day ar-
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rangements. At its most general level, the admissions process had three stages (i) parents
submit their preference(s) to the admission authority (or authorities), (ii) the admission
authority tries to assign families to their preferred schools, and (iii) in the case of over-
subscription, applications are ranked based on a set of observable criteria to ration scarce
places. The School Code in force at the time provided some suggestions for the specific cri-
teria to be used: “Commonly used and acceptable criteria include sibling links, distance
from the school, ease of access by public transport, medical or social grounds, catchment
areas and transfer from named feeder primary schools, as well as parents’ ranking of pref-
erence” (DfE (2001), para. 3.14). In practice, the actual procedures followed vary and are
difficult to categorise (see West et al. (2004); Williams et al. (2001) for surveys of the
admission protocol used, and specific examples from LEA brochures).
Once the families’ preference rankings have been submitted to an admissions authority,
a procedure is required to allocate school places, given school capacities and priorities.
There are a number of approaches for doing this. The two used in 2000 were: the FPF
first-preference algorithm, also called the Boston or immediate-acceptance mechanism;
and the equal-preference algorithm, also called the Gale-Shapley, or deferred-acceptance
(DA), mechanism.
The FPF approach proceeds in rounds. First, each school starts by assigning places to
pupils who put that school as their first choice, based on the ranking determined by the
school’s admission criteria—until either there are no places left, or all students who put
that school as first choice are assigned. The next round conducts the same procedure for
pupils who put that school as their second-choice, and so on. This approach maximises the
share of families getting their first-choice school. The drawback of this approach is that
families who are not offered a place at their first preference school can also be rejected
by their second preference school in favour of a child of parents who placed that school
first, despite living further away. If families put their true preferred school as their first
choice, but where they have a very low chance of acceptance, they may not only fail to
secure a place at their preferred school, but also fail to be placed at any school they deem
acceptable. This means that families have an incentive to trade-off their true preferences
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against their probability of acceptance, in order to increase the chance of gaining a place
at a satisfactory, but not most preferred, school. 41% of schools used a ‘first-preference’
approach to offer places for the September 2001 intake (West et al. , 2004).
In contrast, the DA approach does not use the preference ranking as a method for
schools to rank applicants. In this method, parents submit their preference ranking over
schools. The families’ application is considered at each school that they listed as a prefer-
ence without reference to its ranking. Places are offered to applicants who fulfil the over-
subscription criteria of a school to the greatest extent. This may lead to a parent whose
child does not meet the criteria of his first preference school being offered a place at a
nearby school for which he has named a second preference. Where proximity is a key cri-
terion, one effect of this system is to confer advantage to parents who live near to several
popular schools.
West et al. (2004) used survey evidence to explore the use of various admission criteria
and identified older siblings at the school (96%), distance from home to the school (86%),
medical/social need (73%), catchment area (61%) and ‘first preference’ (41%) as the most
common admission criteria practices (see Appendix 2.E, Table 2.20 for a longer list). In
2000, it was not required to give “looked-after” children first priority. From 2006, it was
a statutory requirement that children in care should be given top priority in the event of
a school being oversubscribed, and in 2008, almost all schools (99%) had an admissions
criterion relating to children in care compared with 2% in 2001 (West et al. , 2011).
As described further in Appendix 2.E, there are a range of sources of uncertainty about
whether one will be admitted to a particular school. Catchment area policies, while be-
coming less popular coming up to 2001, were used in both general admissions (14.9%)
and featured somewhere as an oversubscription criteria in (63.1%) of LEAs Williams
et al. (2001). Catchment area policies create uncertainty because the catchment areas
can change over time in unpredictable ways. For example, in the survey by Williams et al.
(2001), one LEA deployed a flexible catchment area system based on the numbers of
children applying to particular secondary schools from particular primary schools over a
period of time. Additionally, sibling and catchment criteria can interact; for example, sib-
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lings in a catchment area, other children living in a catchment area, siblings living outside
a catchment area and, finally other children outside a catchment area. Given random fluc-
tuations in the sibling distribution, this creates some random variations in the effects of
the catchment area on the probability of admission.
The changing interaction of sibling and distance criteria makes it difficult for parents
to predict their chances of gaining a place at a particular school, complicated further by the
interaction with banding by ability. Distance to school is itself an unpredictable criterion,
because families do now know in advance whether or not they live close enough to a
school in any given year, because the distance cut-off changes every year due to population
fluctuations, changes in siblings at the schools, house-building programmes, changes in
LEA boundaries, and school closures. Although some individual schools, in some LEAs,
publish information over several years about the ‘cut-off point’ for distance, typically it is
not clear how near ‘near enough’ will be the next year (Williams et al. , 2001). The least
predictable factor is the FPF system because it depends, among other things, upon how
many parents apply to a school in a given year, which fluctuates year-on-year and cannot
be known in advance (Williams et al. , 2001).
A final important issue is the interaction between the non-selective public school sector
with grammar schools and private schools. Appendix 2.E provides detail about the various
ways in which the Local Authority preference lists interacted with the grammar school
admission process, and shows that these arrangements varied by area. Sensitivity analyses
to how these outside options may impact the analyses in this paper is a area which will be
pursued in further extensions to this work.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Longitudinal Study of Young People in England
We employ the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE, or Next Steps),
a nationally representative birth cohort study which tracks the lives of a cohort of around
15,000 young people in England who were born in school year 1989/90 (Department for
Education, 2011; Henderson, 2017; University College London, 2018). The study begins
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when the children are in Year 9, the third year of secondary school, and follows them until
they are aged 25 years (annually until age 19/20). The LSYPE contains detailed informa-
tion on school choice, including whether the child attends their preferred school, as well
as family background, experiences in school, and crucially labour market and university
outcomes.
These data are confidentially linked to the National Pupil Database (NPD) (linkage
rate = 97%), a database of administrative school records. The NPD contains individual
test scores, individual characteristics, and school-level attributes (e.g., socio-economic and
ethnic mix). From this data we can track the achievement of the LSYPE pupils in statutory
examinations: primary school tests taken at age 10/11 (Key Stage 2), tests taken at age
13/14 in secondary school (Key Stage 3); the high stakes national examinations taken at age
15/16 in at least five subjects, including English and Mathematics (General Certificate of
Secondary Education (GCSE); finally, at age 17/18, further national examinations known
as A(dvanced)-levels are taken usually in three subjects.
The LSYPE sampling frame comprised all pupils attending maintained schools, inde-
pendent schools, and pupil referral units (attended by the most challenging students) in
England in February 2004. The first 7 waves of the study were funded by the Department
for Education (DfE), commissioned to explore the factors shaping educational attainment
and transitions out of compulsory schooling. The final wave, at age 25 years, was funded
by the Economics and Social Research Council.
The LSYPE used a two-stage sampling design, first sampling schools, then pupils
within schools. Deprived schools, defined as those in the top quintile of the free school
meal receipt distribution, were oversampled by a factor of 1.5. Pupil selection probabilities
were dependent on ethnic group (White; Indian; Pakistani; Bangladeshi; Black African;
Black Caribbean; and Mixed), and on school selection probabilities, aiming to sample
at least 1,000 pupils in each ethnic group. The interviews in Waves 1 to 4 were carried
out face-to-face at the young person’s home, using computer assisted personal Interview
(CAPI) software, and interviewed both the young person and the main parent. FromWave
5 onward, the survey used mixed-methods (online, telephone and face-to-face interviews).
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Table 2.12 shows the structure of the LSYPE, the sample size in each wave, response
levels and fieldwork timing. The fieldwork was mainly carried out between April and
October, with the bulk occurring toward the end of the school year, i.e. April to August.
However, a minority of the interviews fell in the subsequent academic year. The timing
was designed to ensure that pupils applying to university would have passed most stages
of the process and be holding offers by the time of the LSYPE interview.
In Wave 8, now managed by Centre for Longitudinal Studies, productive interviews
were achieved with 7,707 cohort members, yielding a cross-sectional response rate of
51%, and the longitudinal Wave 7 to 8 figure was 69% (i.e. 69% of those responding to
Wave 7 also responded to Wave 8). The LSYPE achieved cross-sectional responses rates
ranging from a minimum of 51% (in wave 8), to a maximum of 92% (in Waves 3 and 4).
Weights are provided with each LSYPEwave to account for the complex survey design
and survey non-response. Solon et al. (2015) classify the situations where weighting is
appropriate into three groups: estimating population representative quantities; if missing-
ness or survey design is correlated with the association, or causal relationship in question,
and heterogeneity. In this analysis we use the weights throughout—we are interested ini-
tially in describing population quantities, such as the share of pupils who miss out on a
preferred school. Additionally it seems plausible that the relationship between missing out
and later outcomes could be confounded by survey design or survey drop out.
To classify local authorities by whether they used a Deferred Acceptance or First Pref-
erence mechanism, we use data collected by Coldron et al. (2008). This data was collected
in 2006, and indicates whether a Local Authority (or in some cases specific schools) used
a ‘first-preference’ approach. Important caveats are that, in 2000, when our cohort were
applying to schools, there was less co-ordination by Local Authority in arranging admis-
sions, therefore there was variation both within- and between- Local Authorities in use
of first-preference as a mechanism—some schools were their own admission authorities.
Additionally, areas which use DA in 2006 may have used FPF in 2000 and switched during
the intervening years. Therefore this classification is inevitably fuzzy but still gives an in-
dication of areas where at least some places, if not all, were likely allocated by FPF—and
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our subgroup estimates are in the vein of intention-to-treat estimates.
2.4.2 Outcomes
Short-run academic outcomes
• Key stage 3: Average points score from Key Stage 3 examinations
• Five A*-C: Binary variable indicating whether the pupil gained at least 5 GCSEs at
grade C or above
• Stayed on: Binary variable indicating whether the pupil stayed on to study for a
‘Level 3’ qualification which attracts UCAS points
• UCAS points: continuous variable summing the UCAS tariff points from the pupil’s
best three (A-level or vocational equivalent) subjects (using the pre-2017 legacy
UCAS points assignment system.)
Longer-run academic outcomes
• At uni: University attendance
• Russell group: Binary variable indicating whether the pupil attends an ‘elite’ Russell
group university
• Drop-out (five-year completion rate: Among pupils who started university at age 18
or 19, did they complete their degree before age 25/26?
• First class: Degree class
Wider long-run outcomes
• Mental health: GHQ 12 point scales, where a higher score indicates poorer mental
health
• Crime: Binary variable indicating whether the young person reports having any
interaction with the criminal justice system
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• Fertility: Does the young person have a child at wave 8?
• Income: Ln(annual income) at age 25 years.
Intermediate outcomes (Wave 1 and 2)
• Cannabis: ever tried cannabis?
• Any alcohol?: Drank alcohol in the past 12 months
• Truant: Has the child played truant in the past 12 months?
• Risky behaviours: sum of risky behaviours engaged in (0-12).
2.5 Empirical strategy
The key threats to credible identification of the effects of attending a preferred school can
be characterised as follows:
Pupil characteristics: Some pupils have better outcomes than others due to greater
family resources, initial endowments of skills, parental inputs and higher quality previous
primary school inputs. These attributes may also be correlated with being accepted to a
first choice school, via having the resources to move closer to better schools (“selection-
by-mortgage”).
Preferences: Families have different preferences over schools, and interact differently
with the school choice process. The net direction of bias from this source is unclear. While
some variation in preferences may be completely idiosyncratic, or related to unobserved
variables, much is likely to be explained by observed variables, such as region, religion,
ethnicity and socio-economic status.
Area characteristics: the number, quality and variation of the local choice set of schools
can influence the probably of getting into a preferred school, as well as subsequent child
outcomes via a correlation with regional fixed effects.
98
Human capital formation 2.5. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
2.5.1 OLS and distance matching
In our data, we have detailed information on pupil and family background characteristics,
examination outcomes from primary school, primary school attributes, and information
about the local area and the choices of schools. Our identification strategy exploits this
information, using a conditional independence assumption, motivated by the institutional
setting, economic theory, and the prior literature. Our main estimation strategy uses a
combination of kernel matching, based on geographical distance, overlaid with regression
adjustment, to estimate the average effect of attending a preferred school.
First, we match each pupil who gained a place at their preferred school to a set of con-
trol pupils who attend schools in close proximity. We do this using multivariate distance
kernel matching on the Euclidean (straight-line) distance.1 The purpose of this matching to
ensure the sample is balanced on geography, such that less reliance is put on capturing ge-
ography correctly in the functional form of the regression. Residential location is a choice
which may act as a sufficient statistic for unobserved variables—unmeasured wealth, or
preferences, for example.
Generally speaking, kernel matching involves the following steps. First, defining a
measure of similarity between treated and control units (in this case, straight-line dis-
tance). Second, selecting a set of “similar” control units for each treated unit. The control
units are selected within a certain bandwidth (radius), with the contribution of the control
observations weighted by the shape of a selected kernel function, giving more weight to
“closer” observations. Finally, the differences between treated and control outcomes are
averaged (over the distribution of treated units’ covariates for an average treatment effect
on the treated).
In this case, the control units are weighted in inverse proportion to their straight-line
distance from the treated unit’s school, using an Epachnikov kernel. The bandwidth is
selected “optimally” as 1.5 times the 90% quantile of the (non-zero) distances in pair
matching with replacement, the default option in Jann (2017) (see Huber et al. (2015)).
Thematching is performed usingmultivariate distancematching, specificallymatching
1Implemented using the software -kmatch- (Jann (2017)), available from
“https://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s458346.html”
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on the Euclidean distanceDi,j between two points (i, j), defined by co-ordinatesXi1, Xi2
and Xj1, Xj2 (e.g., Eastings and Northings), computed as follows in Equation 2.1:
Di,j =
√
(Xi1 −Xj1)2 + (Xi2 −Xj2)2 (2.1)
Using this geographically matched sample, we use regression-adjustment to estimate
the average treatment effect (on the treated) of attending a preferred school. The variables
we include in the regression can be loosely grouped into three (overlapping) categories:
admissions-relevant variables; variables proxying for preferences over schools; and socio-
economic variables. To capture factors which shape admissions probabilities, we adjust
for: the presence of resident older siblings; region indicators (government office region);
small area fixed effects (Local Authority). We have data on whether the child has been in
state-care; however, the proportion is so small that we choose not to match on this.
We also include indicators for whether the child has a certificate of Special Educa-
tional Needs—a small group of high needs pupils who may qualify for admission under
the “medical and social needs” category. During the time period when our cohort were
applying for school, it wasn’t required by law to admit pupils with a SEN statement as it
is now. We also control for have Special education Needs, but not statement, which is a
broader group.
Socio-economic variables are included to indirectly capture aspects of both admission
probability and preferences, as well as being associated with child outcomes. For example,
family income shapes a family’s ability to move closer to their preferred school. In this
category we control for (i) the child’s prior academic test score—their average points score
from their KS2 tests completed at the end of primary school, (ii) Urban-Rural indicator, and
(iii) average KS2 points score from child’s primary school, (iv) family income, parental
education and occupation. The number and quality of schools available to families varies
by area, which may correlate with the probability of getting into a preferred school and
subsequent outcomes.
We construct a variable characterizing the potential schools a child could have at-
tended; a distance-weighted share of Good or Excellent rated schools by OFSTED (the
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Office for Standards in Education is the regulatory monitor of school quality based on
school inspections), within a 20 kilometre radius of the school (for urban areas) or 50 km
for rural areas (as defined by the Office for National Statistics).
We adjust for variables which proxy for the families’ preferences (the type of schools
they prefer). In this category we have: (i) religious denomination, (ii) ethnicity of the
parents, and (iii) the information used to choose a school. Religion and ethnicity capture
parents’ preference for attending religious schools, and school with children of the same
ethnicity. The LSYPE asks about school preferences. One question asks what information
the parents used in their school application decision, listing options such as “looked at
league tables on the internet", used “Local Authority brochure", and so on.
Using the geographically matched sample and associated weights, we estimate the pa-
rameters of a parametric linear model using OLS as outlined in Equation 2.2. Yijk is the
outcome under consideration, for pupil i, in school j in Local Authority k. co is a constant.
Dijk is the treatment indicator: equal to 1 for pupils who missed out on their first-choice
school, and 0 for pupils who attend their preferred school. Xijk is a vector of covariates.
LAk denotes Local Authority fixed effects.
Yijk = co + βDijk +X
′
ijkγ + LAk + ijk (2.2)
We consider two initial sets of covariates:
Specification 1: Share of Good/Excellent schools in local area; female; English sec-
ond language; religion (dummies, five categories); ethnicity; parental education; any sib-
lings?; government office region; urban-rural indicator; special education needs; parental
NS-SEC; parental income; information used in choosing a schools (8 dummy variables,
e.g. looked at league tables).
Specification 2: Specification 1 plus: Key Stage 2 average points score; average Key
Stage score of the primary school they attended; Local Authority fixed effects.
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2.5.2 Channels
Attending a preferred school is a bundle of treatments: the preferred school many have
smaller class sizes, better teachers, better peers, and so on. We explore a number of po-
tential mechanisms to unpack the treatment effect of attending a preferred school.
The treatment of missing out varies both within and between schools. At any given
school, there are some pupils for whom this is their preferred school, and others for whom
it is not. First, we note that the coefficient β is informed by comparison between pupils
who get in or miss out both between and within schools.
Missing out on first choice school could impact outcomes through two general chan-
nels. First, the indirect effect of being exposed to different school attributes at a non-
preferred school compared with a preferred school. Second, a direct “match effect”: inde-
pendent of the particular school characteristics, some pupils may do worse than average
at a given school, solely due to the fact that it is not their preferred school. Parents choose
schools based on headline measures of “school quality”, but also on factors specific to
their child: parents are likely to have information about their child’s suitability for a given
school, which is unobserved by the researcher.
To disentangle these two channels, Equation 2.3 adds current school fixed effects, αjk,
such that β is now informed only by within-school variation. This is labelled as Specifica-
tion 3 (Specification 2 plus current school fixed effects). Looking at the reduction in the
size of the coefficient β, in Equations 2.2 and 2.3, indicates what share of the total effect
is due to school attributes, as opposed the remaining match effect.
Yijk = co + αjk + βDijk +X
′
ijkγ + LAk + ijk (2.3)
In terms of the role of school attributes, we aim to unbundle the nature of the school
effect by examining the effect of missing out on a range of school characteristics, as well
as engagement in risky behaviours by the child.
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2.6 Findings
Summary statistics
Table 2.1 reports the basic characteristics of the sample. Table 2.2 shows mean dif-
ferences in key outcomes by whether a pupil got in (control group) or missed out (treated
group) on their preferred school. Some of the key characteristics of the pupils associated
with gaining a place preferred school include having older siblings, being of White ethnic-
ity, having highly educated parents, begin an owner occupier and being of a Christian faith.
Pupils who get in have on average high Key stage 2 scores, while there is little difference
in the quality of local schools.
In terms of the attributes of schools themselves, Table 2.4 shows the attributes of pre-
ferred and non-preferred schools. Preferred schools tend to have a higher share of White
pupils, have a smaller share of FSM pupils, higher levels of achievement in GCSE, higher
OFTSED inspection outcomes, and higher value-added.
Table 2.3 shows the raw differences in pupil outcomes by whether they attend their
preferred school. Pupils who miss out tend to be more likely to engage in risky behaviours,
such as truancy and trying cannabis. Pupils who miss out have, on average, significantly
poorer academic outcomes—for instance a lower Key Stage 3 average points score and a
lower probability of having 5 or more GCSE passes. In terms of longer run outcomes,
there are significant differences observed in a number of outcomes measured at age 25
years. Pupils who do not attend their preferred school are 7 percentage points more likely
to drop out of university compared with their counterparts who get in, 4 percentage points
less likely to attend a Russell Group university, and a have a lower annual income by -0.08
log-points.
2.6.1 OLS and distance matching
Turning to the regression findings, Table 2.5 presents the effects of missing out on a pre-
ferred school on short-run academic outcomes. Specification 1 is the most basic model,
including only demographic and socio-economic covariates. Specification 2 adds controls
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for prior attainment, and Local Authority fixed effects. Specification 3 adds current school
fixed effects, to assess the extent to which the treatment effects are comprised of within or
between school variation. Missing out on a preferred school could impact outcomes via an
indirect effect of attending a poorer quality school. A second channel, comparing pupils
who get in or missing out within a given school, is a direct effect of “attending a school
you do not want to be attending”.
Specifications 1 and 2 in Table 2.5 show little evidence for negative impacts of missing
out on short-run academic outcomes. The effect sizes are small and statistically insignif-
icant. The exception is staying on at school at age 16 years to study for A-levels, which
is reduced by 2.4 percentage points (or 7% from the control group mean) and is statisti-
cally significant at the 10% level. However, this effect disappears after adjusting for school
fixed effects, suggesting the effect is likely explained by between- rather than within-school
variation. In Specification 3, which includes school fixed effects, there is now a positive
coefficient on Key Stage 3 points which is statistically significant at the 10% level. How-
ever, it is a very small effect size (0.28 points).
Table 2.6 reports on longer run academic outcomes—attending university at age 20
years, attending an “elite” Russell Group university at age 20 years, gaining a first or 2:1
degree class by age 25 years, and dropping out of university by age 25 years. Consider-
ing Specifications 1 and 2, again there is little evidence for detrimental effects on these
outcomes. The exception is five-year drop out rates, where dropping out is increased by 5
percentage points among those who miss out (30% increase on the control group mean).
This is a large effect size, and it is statistically significant at the 10% level in Specification
1—although not statistically significant in Specification 2. Specification 3 adds school
fixed effects—here the effect on dropping out is reduced to 2 percentage points, and is
again statistically insignificant.
Finally, Table 2.7 considers a broader set of outcomes: mental ill-health, fertility, con-
tact with the criminal justice system and (log) income. In Specifications 1 and 2, pupils
who miss out on attending a preferred school have poorer mental health at age 25 years
(about 10% of a standard deviation), statistically significant at the 5% level. Pupils who
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miss out have reduced income by approximately 1.4% (on a base of about 25,000 GBP
per year), which is statistically significant at the 5% level. There is little evidence for any
effects on fertility or crime.2
Specification 3 adds school fixed effects. In this specification, the negative effect on
income remains significant at the 5% level. The effect on mental health is now larger, and
statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests that the between-school variation in
missing out on a preferred school has a smaller negative impact on mental health com-
pared with the within-school effect. One interpretation is that parents know something
idiosyncratic about where the child will do best—which isn’t explained by league tables
and other attributes which vary between schools.
2.6.2 Channels
We explore the role of a number of intermediate variables, including alcohol consumption,
drugs and mental well-being, which could be plausible variables driving the results. Table
2.8 shows the effects of missing out on these intermediate outcomes. While there is little
evidence of an effect on drinking alcohol, playing truant or the GHQ, missing out sig-
nificantly increases the probability of trying cannabis and increases the risky behaviours
score. For example, in Specifications 1 and 2, missing out increases the probability of
trying cannabis by 2.4 and 2.3 percentage points, respectively. These effects are statisti-
cally significant at the 5% level. Missing out increases the mean risky behaviours score
by 0.126 and 0.127 points in Specifications 1 and 2, respectively. These effects are statis-
tically significant at the 5% level. After adjusting for school fixed effects, in Specification
3, the effects on the risky behaviours score become insignificant. The effects on trying
cannabis remain, with a similar effect size of 2.4 percentage points.
2.6.3 Heterogeneity
Previous literature has documented gender differences in the effects of school lotteries
(Deming et al. , 2014). There is also a burgeoning literature assessing gender differences
2These results are robust to corrections for multiple hypothesis testing.
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in the elasticity to childhood disadvantage (see Autor et al. (2016); Brenøe & Lundberg
(2018)). These findings motivate an assessment of whether the effects of missing out on
a preferred differ by gender. Tables 2.15 and 2.16 show the findings among boys and girls
separately. The detrimental effects of mental health are more pronounced among girls, and
the income effect more pronounced among boys, although the differences between boys
and girls is not statistically significant.
In Tables 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11, we look separately by whether deferred acceptance or
first-preference was the dominant assignment mechanism in the child’s Local Authority
in 2001. We find that the detrimental effects on mental health are more pronounced in
areas which used the first-preference system. Table 2.14 shows that these areas are not
different based on KS2 attainment or school quality, suggesting that these differences are
not explained by FPF areas being less aﬄuent or some other explanation. There is no
consistent difference by area in the academic outcomes considered.
While there are small differences in school quality between those who get in and miss
out, between DA and FPF areas, the biggest factor appears to commuting distance. The
difference in the distance travelled between those who get in and miss out is much larger
in FPF areas (those who miss out in an FPF area travel 3.2km further than those who get
in, compared with a difference of 0.4km in DA areas). This suggests that pupils who miss
out are being allocated a school possibly much further than they would prefer to travel,
and may also be a poorer match on other unobservable dimensions. This may explain why
the negative effects on mental health are worse in FPF areas.
2.7 Conclusions
This paper examines the long run effects of missing out on a place at a preferred secondary
school in England. Employing rich cohort data confidentially linked to administrative data
on education outcomes, we compare a range of outcomes between pupils who get into their
preferred school and those who miss out. Our empirical strategy leverages features of the
institutional setting, literature on school choice and rich administrative data to make a
credible case for a selection-on-observed variable identification assumption.
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We contribute to a growing literature assessing the long run effects of attending schools
which are preferred by parents, providing the first evidence on this topic for state schools
in England. During our time period of interest, two mechanisms to allocate school places
given preferences and capacities were in operation—a Deferred-Acceptance and a ‘first-
preference’ mechanism—which have been studied extensively in the mechanism design
literature. This allows us to estimate separate effect for pupils exposed to each type of
assignment mechanism.
In line with much of the international literature, the results do not reveal strong evi-
dence for detrimental effects of missing out on a preferred school on short run academic
outcomes. However, those who miss out are more likely to drop out of high school, more
likely to drop out of university, have reduced wages and poorer mental health at age 25
years. Increased engagement in risky behaviours, such as drug use and truancy, repre-
sent a plausible channel. The negative findings in our paper are more pronounced in areas
which used a manipulable mechanism to assign school places (which has since been out-
lawed).
An important note about the interpretation of these findings is that we are comparing
the outcomes of children who look similar observationally similar, and have a similar
choice set of schools. From this very specific comparison, it would be incorrect to conclude
that “schools don’t matter” for academic outcomes.
While themajority of families live within a reasonable commuting distance of a “good”
school—at least in terms of headline academic attainment—many of these families are
unlikely to gain a place due to rationing by proximity. In this analysis, we take residential
location choice and the choice set of schools as fixed—while in reality these parameters
can be changed by policy. For instance, changing admission probabilities for families by
altering the oversubscription criteria, so it is not so reliant on distance, could conceivably
have a large impacts on the school parents apply for and subsequently child outcomes.
A second broader issue, which we intend to investigate in further work, is the extent to
which families reveal their true preferences, and the potential welfare loss from not apply
to a “truly preferred” school. Strategic families trade-off the probability of acceptance
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with their true preferences, and list an“acceptable” school as their first choice, rather than
their truly preferred school.
A related point is that if some proportion of families are playing it safe with their
choices, and we still observe negative consequences of missing out, our estimates could
be conceivably seen as a lower bound on an estimate of missing out in a world where if all
parents revealed their true preferences (i.e., more ambitious choices of popular schools).
Further work will examine a range of complementary estimation methods (combining
geographic and propensity score matching), alternative identification assumptions (em-
ploying changes in the local school-age population as instrumental variables) and extended
subgroup analyses (by region, prior ability and ethnic group).
Overall, our findings have a number of suggestive policy implications. First, which
school a child attends shapes their broader outcomes such asmental health and engagement
in risky behaviours, which perhaps should be considered alongside traditional measures of
school quality. Second, the nature of the assignment mechanism and how parents under-
stand and engage with it is important for ensuring equal access to schools. Finally, getting
into a preferred school matters for important child outcomes. In this light, the oversub-
scription criteria which act as the gatekeeper to popular schools—determining who gets
in and who misses out—is an area ripe for innovation to ensure fair access to schools.
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2.8 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary statistics for key variables
Mean SD N
In LA care 0.01 0.08 15,344
Support for SEN 0.13 0.34 15,437
Statement of SEN 0.04 0.21 15,488
Any resident older siblings? 0.86 0.35 15,652
Female 0.49 0.50 15,431
Main parent’s higher qualification
Higher ed. 0.25 0.43 15,087
A-levels, A-C GCSE 0.14 0.35 15,087
Lower GCSE 0.39 0.49 15,087
Other qualification 0.02 0.13 15,087
No qualification 0.20 0.40 15,087
Benefit receipt 0.39 0.49 15,508
Housing tenure
Owner occupier 0.71 0.45 15,582
Renting from council/LA 0.22 0.41 15,582
Private renter/Other 0.07 0.25 15,582
Religion of main parent
None 0.24 0.42 15,485
Christian 0.67 0.47 15,485
Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish 0.04 0.20 15,485
Muslim 0.06 0.23 15,485
Ethnicity of main parent
White 0.88 0.33 15,604
Indian 0.03 0.16 15,604
Pakistani 0.02 0.15 15,604
Bangladeshi 0.01 0.10 15,604
Black African, Black Caribbean 0.03 0.18 15,604
Other, Mixed 0.03 0.18 15,604
Notes: Weighted using the Wave 8 survey weights.
109
2.8. TABLES CHAPTER 2. SECONDARY SCHOOL CHOICE
Table 2.2: Summary statistics for pupils (covariates)
Missed out Got in Difference p-value
Female 0.51 0.49 0.01 0.25
Statement of SEN 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02
Support for SEN 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.70
Any resident older siblings? 0.79 0.84 -0.05 0.00
In LA care 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03
Ethnicity of main parent
White 0.78 0.89 -0.11 0.00
Indian 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00
Pakistani 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02
Bangladeshi 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.64
Black African, Black Caribbean 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.00
Other, Mixed 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.00
Benefit receipt 0.49 0.41 0.08 0.00
Main parent’s higher qualification
Higher ed. 0.21 0.24 -0.03 0.01
A-levels, A-C GCSE 0.13 0.15 -0.02 0.08
Lower GCSE 0.39 0.40 -0.01 0.44
Other qualification 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.44
No qualification 0.25 0.19 0.05 0.00
Housing tenure
Owner occupier 0.61 0.71 -0.11 0.00
Renting from council/LA 0.31 0.22 0.09 0.00
Private renter/Other 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.04
Religion of main parent
None 0.25 0.23 0.02 0.22
Christian 0.61 0.68 -0.06 0.00
Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.00
Prior attainment and choice set
KS2 average points score 26.68 27.09 -0.40 0.00
Primary school average KS2 184.95 197.47 -12.52 0.00
Share of schools in local area rated as Very Good 0.27 0.26 0.01 0.05
Notes: Weighted using the Wave 8 survey weights, p-values are computed from robust standard
errors clustered by school (the Primary Sampling Unit)
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics for pupils (outcomes)
Missed out Got in Difference p-value
Had a drink? 0.90 0.93 -0.02 0.06
Played truant? 0.20 0.15 0.05 0.00
Ever tried Cannabis 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.01
GHQ (wave 2) 1.73 1.68 0.05 0.50
Risky behaviours 1.10 0.95 0.15 0.00
KS3 32.96 33.92 -0.96 0.00
GCSE 0.58 0.62 -0.03 0.02
Any UCAS points? 0.30 0.36 -0.06 0.00
UCAS pts 214.25 221.72 -7.47 0.08
GHQ (wave 8) 2.59 2.26 0.33 0.01
Whether has Children 0.23 0.20 0.03 0.06
Crime 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.18
Ln(Annual income) 9.56 9.64 -0.08 0.00
At Uni (Age 20) 0.48 0.48 0.01 0.76
Russell group (w7) 0.16 0.21 -0.04 0.02
Upper Class 0.69 0.73 -0.04 0.27
Dropped out of university 0.24 0.17 0.07 0.00
Notes: Weighted using the Wave 8 survey weights, p-values are computed
from robust standard errors clustered by school (the Primary Sampling
Unit)
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics for schools
Preferred school Non-preferred school Difference p-value
Value-added (KS2-KS4) 988.64 978.26 10.37 0.00
% Free School Meals 17.75 26.59 -8.84 0.00
% English first language 84.52 76.46 8.06 0.00
Derived ethnic composition variables
%White 76.36 65.79 10.57 0.00
% Indian 4.00 4.62 -0.62 0.01
% Pakistani 4.47 6.65 -2.18 0.00
% Bangladeshi 2.54 3.05 -0.50 0.03
% Black Caribbean 1.79 3.98 -2.19 0.00
% Black African 2.07 4.68 -2.61 0.00
% Mixed 2.66 3.72 -1.07 0.00
% Other (inc. Black other & Asian Other) 2.94 4.80 -1.86 0.00
OFSTED rating (satisfactory or up?)
Satisfactory+ 0.74 0.26 0.11 0.01
Notes: Weighted using the Wave 8 survey weights, p-values are computed from robust standard errors clustered
by school (the Primary Sampling Unit)
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Table 2.5: Short-run academic outcomes




ATT -0.095 -0.007 -0.026 -1.580
(s.e.) (0.175) (0.015) (0.016) (4.875)
n 8,602 9,093 9,093 4,145
Specification 2:
ATT -0.045 -0.007 -0.024 0.001
(s.e.) (0.091) (0.016) (0.016) (4.917)
n 7,463 7,823 7,823 3,638
Specification 3:
ATT 0.283 0.006 -0.011 3.518
(s.e.) (0.150) (0.020) (0.018) (6.593)
n 7,463 7,823 7,823 3,638
Bandwidth (km) 17 17 17 12
ATT: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated; se: bootstrapped standard error of ATT (with 100 replica-
tions); Specification 1 covariates: Share of Good/Excellent schools in local area; female; English second
language; religion; ethnicity; parental education; any siblings?; government office region; urban-rural
indicator; special education needs; parental NS-SEC; parental income; information used in choosing a
schools. Specification 2 covariates: Specification 1 plus: Key Stage 2 average points score; average Key
Stage score of the primary school they attended; Local Authority fixed effects. Specification 3 covariates:
Specification 2 plus current school fixed effects.
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ATT -0.015 0.003 -0.033 0.069
(s.e.) (0.018) (0.024) (0.055) (0.034)
n 6,149 2,934 1,011 2,000
Specification 2:
ATT -0.003 -0.002 0.011 0.050
(s.e.) (0.021) (0.028) (0.064) (0.037)
n 5,354 2,559 884 1,728
Specification 3:
ATT 0.026 0.021 0.036 0.020
(s.e.) (0.025) (0.028) (0.097) (0.043)
n 5,354 2,559 884 1,728
Bandwidth (km) 9 8 18 9
ATT: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated; se: bootstrapped standard error of ATT (with 100 replica-
tions); Specification 1 covariates: Share of Good/Excellent schools in local area; female; English second
language; religion; ethnicity; parental education; any siblings?; government office region; urban-rural
indicator; special education needs; parental NS-SEC; parental income; information used in choosing a
schools. Specification 2 covariates: Specification 1 plus: Key Stage 2 average points score; average Key
Stage score of the primary school they attended; Local Authority fixed effects. Specification 3 covariates:
Specification 2 plus current school fixed effects.
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ATT 0.318 0.009 0.003 -0.006
(s.e.) (0.149) (0.018) (0.010) (0.006)
n 4,654 4,848 4,848 4,848
Specification 2:
ATT 0.334 0.018 0.006 -0.014
(s.e.) (0.165) (0.022) (0.010) (0.006)
n 4,048 4,210 4,210 4,210
Specification 3:
ATT 0.540 -0.001 0.000 -0.012
(s.e.) (0.207) (0.023) (0.014) (0.008)
n 4,048 4,210 4,210 4,210
Bandwidth (km) 11 11 11 11
ATT: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated; se: bootstrapped standard error of ATT (with 100 replica-
tions); Specification 1 covariates: Share of Good/Excellent schools in local area; female; English second
language; religion; ethnicity; parental education; any siblings?; government office region; urban-rural
indicator; special education needs; parental NS-SEC; parental income; information used in choosing a
schools. Specification 2 covariates: Specification 1 plus: Key Stage 2 average points score; average Key
Stage score of the primary school they attended; Local Authority fixed effects. Specification 3 covariates:
Specification 2 plus current school fixed effects.
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Table 2.8: Mechanisms: early risky behaviours




ATT -0.006 0.019 0.024 -0.032 0.126
(s.e.) (0.016) (0.013) (0.010) (0.076) (0.059)
n 3,615 8,407 8,744 8,583 8,157
ATT 0.000 0.018 0.023 -0.054 0.127
(s.e.) (0.020) (0.014) (0.011) (0.078) (0.050)
n 3,223 7,290 7,558 7,429 7,044
ATT 0.002 0.008 0.024 -0.034 0.085
(s.e.) (0.020) (0.017) (0.012) (0.114) (0.061)
n 3,223 7,290 7,558 7,429 7,044
Bandwidth (km) 16 17 17 15 17
ATT: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated; se: bootstrapped standard error of ATT (with 100 replications); Specification 1 co-
variates: Share of Good/Excellent schools in local area; female; English second language; religion; ethnicity; parental education; any
siblings?; government office region; urban-rural indicator; special education needs; parental NS-SEC; parental income; information
used in choosing a schools. Specification 2 covariates: Specification 1 plus: Key Stage 2 average points score; average Key Stage score
of the primary school they attended; Local Authority fixed effects. Specification 3 covariates: Specification 2 plus current school fixed
effects.
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Table 2.9: Short-run outcomes (by exposure to assignment mechanism)
KS3 GCSE Stayed on UCAS pts.
Specification 1 “First-preference-first” areas
ATT -0.225 -0.017 -0.024 -13.482
(s.e.) (0.479) (0.027) (0.033) (13.158)
n 2,294 2,410 2,410 1,075
Specification 2
ATT -0.268 -0.027 -0.059 -17.996
se (0.274) (0.032) (0.033) (16.208)
n 1,919 2,005 2,005 918
Specification 3
ATT 0.002 -0.005 -0.020 -15.431
se (0.259) (0.032) (0.035) (14.993)
n 1,919 2,005 2,005 918
Bandwidth (km) 17 17 17 12
Specification 1 “Deferred Acceptance” areas
ATT -0.051 -0.003 -0.026 1.053
(s.e.) (0.202) (0.018) (0.013) (5.443)
n 6,308 6,683 6,683 3,070
Specification 2
ATT -0.008 -0.001 -0.015 2.367
(s.e.) (0.122) (0.017) (0.015) (5.077)
n 5,544 5,818 5,818 2,720
Specification 3
ATT 0.341 0.009 -0.006 6.703
(s.e.) (0.131) (0.016) (0.021) (6.786)
n 5,544 5,818 5,818 2,720
Bandwidth (km) 17 17 17 12
p-value (1) 0.734 0.660 0.970 0.312
p-value (2) 0.405 0.497 0.224 0.230
p-value (3) 0.215 0.695 0.714 0.215
ATT: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated; se: bootstrapped standard error of ATT (with 100 replications);
Spec. 1 covariates: Share of Good/Excellent schools in local area; female; English second language; religion;
ethnicity; parental education; any siblings?; government office region; urban-rural indicator; special education
needs; parental NS-SEC; parental income; information used in choosing a schools. Spec. 2 covariates: Speci-
fication 1 plus: Key Stage 2 average points score; average Key Stage score of the primary school they attended;
Local Authority fixed effects. Spec. 3 covariates: Specification 2 plus current school fixed effects.
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First or 2:1 Drop out
Specification 1 “First-preference-first” areas
ATT -0.015 0.010 -0.153 0.135
(s.e.) (0.045) (0.053) (0.206) (0.091)
n 1,645 707 279 518
Specification 2
ATT -0.024 -0.038 -0.145 0.054
(s.e.) (0.046) (0.111) (1.496) (0.388)
n 1,390 595 240 436
Specification 3
ATT -0.010 -0.004 -0.144 -0.006
(s.e.) (0.046) (0.139) (14.214) (1.595)
n 1,390 595 240 436
Bandwidth 9 8 20 9
Specification 1 “Deferred Acceptance” areas
ATT -0.012 0.002 -0.014 0.066
(s.e.) (0.025) (0.027) (0.057) (0.035)
n 4,504 2,227 732 1,482
Specification 2
ATT 0.006 -0.004 0.061 0.057
(s.e.) (0.020) (0.029) (0.071) (0.048)
n 3,964 1,964 644 1,292
Specification 3
ATT 0.038 0.022 0.076 0.027
(s.e.) (0.026) (0.027) (0.129) (0.052)
n 3,964 1,964 644 1,292
Bandwidth (km) 9 8 20 9
p-value (1) 0.948 0.895 0.502 0.489
p-value (2) 0.566 0.761 0.890 0.993
p-value (3) 0.354 0.851 0.988 0.983
ATT: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated; se: bootstrapped standard error of ATT (with 100 replications);
Spec. 1 covariates: Share of Good/Excellent schools in local area; female; English second language; religion;
ethnicity; parental education; any siblings?; government office region; urban-rural indicator; special education
needs; parental NS-SEC; parental income; information used in choosing a schools. Spec.2 covariates: Specifica-
tion 1 plus: Key Stage 2 average points score; average Key Stage score of the primary school they attended; Local
Authority fixed effects. Spec. 3 covariates: Specification 2 plus current school fixed effects.
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Specification 1 “First-preference-first” areas
ATT 0.706 0.037 0.015 -0.006
(s.e.) (0.350) (0.043) (0.023) (0.016)
n 1,307 1,352 1,352 1,352
Specification 2
ATT 0.987 0.099 0.036 -0.034
(s.e.) (0.480) (0.047) (0.029) (0.016)
n 1,100 1,136 1,136 1,136
Specification 3
ATT 1.294 0.054 0.028 -0.025
(s.e.) (0.478) (0.059) (0.030) (0.019)
n 1,100 1,136 1,136 1,136
Bandwidth (km) 7 9 9 9
Specification 1 “Deferred Acceptance” areas
ATT 0.232 0.001 0.002 -0.010
(s.e.) (0.175) (0.021) (0.012) (0.008)
n 3,347 3,496 3,496 3,496
Specification 2
ATT 0.221 0.006 0.002 -0.013
(s.e.) (0.214) (0.024) (0.014) (0.008)
n 2,948 3,074 3,074 3,074
Specification 3
ATT 0.450 -0.011 -0.004 -0.011
(s.e.) (0.231) (0.034) (0.013) (0.009)
n 2,948 3,074 3,074 3,074
Bandwidth (km) 7 9 9 9
p-value (1) 0.238 0.413 0.626 0.849
p-value (2) 0.102 0.109 0.277 0.310
p-value (3) 0.089 0.319 0.329 0.535
ATT: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated; se: bootstrapped standard error of ATT (with 100 replications);
Spec.1 covariates: Share of Good/Excellent schools in local area; female; English second language; religion;
ethnicity; parental education; any siblings?; government office region; urban-rural indicator; special education
needs; parental NS-SEC; parental income; information used in choosing a schools. Spec. 2 covariates: Speci-
fication 1 plus: Key Stage 2 average points score; average Key Stage score of the primary school they attended;
Local Authority fixed effects. Spec. covariates: Specification 2 plus current school fixed effects.
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Appendix 2.A Descriptive statistics
Table 2.12: Structure of LSYPE
Wave Fieldwork start Fieldwork end Response rate N
1 30 March 2004 18 Oct. 2001 74 15,770
2 18 April 2005 18 Sept. 2005 86 13,539
3 21 April 2006 28 Sept. 2006 92 12,439
4 12 June 2007 14 Oct. 2007 92 11,801
5 3 June 2008 28 Oct. 2008 88 10,430
6 12 May 2009 14 Oct. 2009 87 9,799
7 18 May 2010 12 Oct. 2010 90 8,682
8 25 August 2015 25 August 2016 51 7,707
Notes: The eligible sample for theWave 8 sweep comprises all original
sample members: the sample identified at Wave 1, and the subsequent
boost sample in wave 4. The eligible sample in the previous waves
comprises only those who responded to the previous wave, leading to
a monotone attrition and the appearance of higher response rates from
Wave 1 to 7. Alternative response rate calculations are computed in:
Collingwood, A., Cheshire, H., Nicolaas, G., D’Souza, J., Ross, A.,
Hall, J., Armstrong, C., Prosser, A., Green, R., Collins, D., Gray, M.,
and McNaughton Nicholls, C. (2010). A review of the Longitudinal
Study of Young People in England (LSYPE): recommendations for a
second cohort. DfE Research Report DFE-RR048, Department for
Education/NatCen.
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Appendix 2.B Timeline of pupil events
Table 2.13: Timeline of pupil events: ages and stages
School year LSYPE Year Age
Key stage 2 (Primary school)
Sept. ’00 - Sept. ’01 Year 6 10/11
Key stage 3 (Secondary school)
Sept. ’01 - Sept. ’02 Start school Year 7 11/12
Sept. ’02 - Sept. ’03 Year 8 12/13
Sept. ’03 - Sept. ’04 Wave 1 Year 9 13/14
Key stage 4 (Secondary school)
Sept. ’04 - Sept. ’05 Wave 2 Year 10 14/15
Sept. ’05 - Sept. ’06 Wave 3 Year 11 15/16
Key stage 5 (Secondary school, college, further education)
Sept. ’06 - Sept. ’07 Wave 4 Year 12 16/17
Sept. ’07 - Sept. ’08 Wave 5 Year 13 17/18
Sept. ’08 - Sept. ’09 Wave 6 18/19
Sept. ’09 - Sept. ’10 Wave 7 19/20
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Appendix 2.C Heterogeneous treatment effects
Table 2.14: Means of key variables by missing out and area type
Deferred acceptance
Got in Missed out Difference
KS2 points 27.2 26.9 -0.3
Primary school average KS2 191.1 178.7 -12.4
Share of good local schools 0.3 0.3 0.0
Distance to current school (km) 3.1 3.5 0.4
Value-added 989 979 10
First preference
KS2 points 27.3 27.0 -0.3
Primary school average KS2 198.9 187.9 -11.0
Share of good local schools 0.3 0.3 0.0
Distance to current school (km) 3.9 7.1 3.2
Value-added 989 981 8
Notes: This table reports on means of various characteristics by first-
preference vs deferred-acceptance areas. The means are weighted
using the Wave 8 survey weights.
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The tables in this section summarise the effects of missing out on a first choice school
on a range of child outcomes. The p-value section (p-value (1), (2) and (3) shows the p-
values from tests of whether the effect of missing out on a first choice school differs by
gender, for each specification and outcome (the tests all fail to detect gender differences).
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Table 2.15: Short-run outcomes (by gender)
KS3 GCSE Stayed on A-levels UCAS pts
Girls
Specification 1
ATT -0.150 0.022 -0.017 0.016 0.655
(s.e.) (0.239) (0.016) (0.020) (0.033) (5.839)
n 4,290 4,515 4,515 2,238 2,232
Specification 2
ATT -0.105 0.004 -0.024 -0.002 2.795
(s.e.) (0.131) (0.022) (0.026) (0.027) (6.469)
n 3,746 3,910 3,910 1,972 1,967
Specification 3
ATT 0.053 0.013 -0.005 0.049 14.086
(s.e.) (0.161) (0.023) (0.027) (0.053) (10.033)
n 3,746 3,910 3,910 1,972 1,967
Bandwidth (km) 21 17 17 12 12
Boys
Specification 1
ATT 0.055 -0.024 -0.029 -0.019 -6.553
(s.e.) (0.246) (0.020) (0.023) (0.037) (8.964)
n 4,312 4,578 4,578 1,919 1,913
Specification 2
ATT -0.012 -0.017 -0.027 -0.012 -11.813
(s.e.) (0.200) (0.021) (0.027) (0.052) (9.533)
n 3,717 3,913 3,913 1,677 1,671
Specification 3
ATT 0.418 -0.005 -0.030 -0.015 -13.382
(s.e.) (0.216) (0.025) (0.027) (0.052) (10.420)
n 3,717 3,913 3,913 1,677 1,671
Bandwidth (km) 21 17 17 12 12
p-value (1) 0.591 0.071 0.651 0.496 0.483
p-value (2) 0.680 0.475 0.922 0.866 0.202
p-value (3) 0.155 0.598 0.484 0.419 0.043
Notes: ATT: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated; se: bootstrapped standard error of
ATT (with 100 replications); Specification 1 covariates: Share of Good/Excellent schools
in local area; female; English second language; religion; ethnicity; parental education;
any siblings?; government office region; urban-rural indicator; special education needs;
parental NS-SEC; parental income; information used in choosing a schools. Specification
2 covariates: Specification 1 plus: Key Stage 2 average points score; average Key Stage
score of the primary school they attended; Local Authority fixed effects. Specification 3
covariates: Spec. 2 plus current school fixed effects.124
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Table 2.16: Long run outcomes (by gender)




ATT 0.388 -0.006 0.005 -0.001
(s.e.) (0.187) (0.026) (0.008) (0.009)
n 2,596 2,701 2,701 2,701
Specification 2
ATT 0.458 0.011 0.007 -0.008
(s.e.) (0.316) (0.032) (0.009) (0.011)
n 2,264 2,355 2,355 2,355
Specification 3
ATT 0.593 0.006 0.008 -0.005
(s.e.) (0.312) (0.040) (0.010) (0.015)
n 2,264 2,355 2,355 2,355
Bandwidth (km) 28 28 28 28
Boys
Specification 1
ATT 0.237 0.035 0.002 -0.013
(s.e.) (0.233) (0.029) (0.021) (0.009)
n 2,058 2,147 2,147 2,147
Specification 2
ATT 0.312 0.035 0.011 -0.027
(s.e.) (0.280) (0.031) (0.025) (0.011)
n 1,784 1,855 1,855 1,855
Specification 3
ATT 0.360 -0.033 -0.002 -0.023
(s.e.) (0.360) (0.035) (0.029) (0.015)
n 1,784 1,855 1,855 1,855
Bandwidth (km) 28 28 28 28
p-value (1) 0.611 0.344 0.902 0.299
p-value (2) 0.757 0.612 0.892 0.246
p-value (3) 0.638 0.470 0.725 0.417
Notes: ATT: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated; se: bootstrapped standard error of
ATT (with 100 replications); Specification 1 covariates: Share of Good/Excellent schools
in local area; female; English second language; religion; ethnicity; parental education;
any siblings?; government office region; urban-rural indicator; special education needs;
parental NS-SEC; parental income; information used in choosing a schools. Specification
2 covariates: Specification 1 plus: Key Stage 2 average points score; average Key Stage
score of the primary school they attended; Local Authority fixed effects. Specification 3
covariates: Specification 2 plus current school fixed effects.
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Table 2.17: Risky behaviours outcomes (by gender)
Had a drink? Played truant? Ever tried Cannabis GHQ Risky behaviours
Girls
Specification 1
ATT -0.004 0.027 0.024 -0.085 0.141
(s.e.) (0.026) (0.016) (0.012) (0.120) (0.073)
n 1,818 4,186 4,352 4,265 4,006
Specification 2
ATT 0.002 0.034 0.032 -0.082 0.205
(s.e.) (0.025) (0.019) (0.017) (0.163) (0.092)
n 1,619 3,650 3,784 3,712 3,479
Specification 3
ATT -0.012 0.034 0.036 -0.038 0.209
(s.e.) (0.035) (0.025) (0.019) (0.177) (0.073)
n 1,619 3,650 3,784 3,712 3,479
Bandwidth (km) 16 17 17 15 24
Boys
Specification 1
ATT -0.017 0.014 0.025 0.025 0.112
(s.e.) (0.028) (0.019) (0.014) (0.101) (0.067)
n 1,797 4,221 4,392 4,318 4,151
Specification 2
ATT -0.024 0.000 0.022 -0.006 0.049
(s.e.) (0.025) (0.020) (0.017) (0.112) (0.072)
n 1,604 3,640 3,774 3,717 3,565
Specification 3
ATT 0.002 -0.020 0.022 0.019 -0.059
(s.e.) (0.038) (0.025) (0.018) (0.159) (0.092)
n 1,604 3,640 3,774 3,717 3,565
Bandwidth (km) 16 17 17 15 24
p-value (1) 0.735 0.582 0.957 0.458 0.785
p-value (2) 0.414 0.225 0.614 0.662 0.182
p-value (3) 0.790 0.147 0.578 0.837 0.027
Notes: ATT: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated; se: bootstrapped standard error of ATT (with
100 replications); Specification 1 covariates: Share of Good/Excellent schools in local area; female;
English second language; religion; ethnicity; parental education; any siblings?; government office re-
gion; urban-rural indicator; special education needs; parental NS-SEC; parental income; information
used in choosing a schools. Specification 2 covariates: Specification 1 plus: Key Stage 2 average points
score; average Key Stage score of the primary school they attended; Local Authority fixed effects. Spec-
ification 3 covariates: Specification 2 plus current school fixed effects.126
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Appendix 2.D Longitudinal Study of Young People in
England
We employ the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE), a nationally rep-
resentative birth cohort study which tracks the lives of a cohort of around 15,000 young
people in England who were born in 1989/90. The study begins when the children are
in Year 9, the second year of secondary school, and follows them until they are aged 25
years (annually until age 19/20, then a gap until age 25/26 years). The LSYPE contains
detailed information on school choice—including whether the child attends their preferred
school—family background, experiences in school and crucially labour market and uni-
versity outcomes. This data is confidentially linked to the National Pupil Database (NPD)
(linkage rate = 97%), a database of administrative school records, containing test scores
and school attributes. From this data we can track the achievement of the LSYPE pupils in
high-stakes examinations, e.g., primary school examination results, GCSE and A-levels.
The NPD also provides information on the attributes of schools.
The sampling frame comprised all pupils attending maintained schools, independent
schools and pupil referral units in England on February 2004. The first 7 waves of the
study were funded by the Department for Education (DfE), commissioned to explore the
factors shaping educational attainment and transitions out of compulsory schooling. The
final wave, at age 25 years, was funded by the Economics and Social Research Council, and
management transferred to the Center for Longitudinal Studies, now with a wider remit to
explore wider aspects of the transition to the labour market.
The LSYPE has a a complex sampling design, involving clustering and stratification.
Clustering involves categorising a population by a grouping variable (e.g., schools), then a
number of clusters are selected via some rule, e.g. a random sample, and then cases within
those clusters are sampled. One reasons for clustering is to enhance the cost-effectiveness
and convenience of data collection. For example, the LSYPE clustered by school. Because
the pupil’s addresses were not available from Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC)
at that time, the addresses were collected from schools. Clustering tends to increase the
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sampling variance; without accounting for the clustered nature of the data tends to over-
estimate the precision of an estimate, the standard errors would be too small.
Stratification involves categorization of a population by a grouping variable (e.g., deprived/non-
deprived), and then cases are sampled independently within each strata. A common mo-
tivation is to oversample in particular strata, in order maintain a sufficient sample size in
specific subgroups: LSYPE oversampled ethnic minority pupils and the most deprived
schools, for example. More generally, stratification can increase the precision of estimates
in subsequent analysis. However, without adjusting for this type of stratification in sub-
stantive analyses, such as by down-weighting the oversampled groups, estimates will not
necessarily represent the target population.
LSYPE used a two-stage sampling design (first sampling schools, then pupils within
those schools). Maintained schools were selected from the Pupil Level Annual Schools
Census (PLASC), stratified by deprivation status: deprived schools—those in the top quin-
tile of the distribution of free school meal receipt—were oversampled by a factor of 1.5.
Within each deprivation stratum (top quintile vs bottom four quintiles), the schools were
then ordered by region (London/not London), then by school admissions policy, before
the selection of pupils (this is a way to implicitly stratify on these variables). Independent
schools and PRUs were sampled from the School Level Annual Schools Census (SLASC).
Independent schools were stratified by percentage of pupils achieving 5 or more A*-C
GCSE grades in 2003 within boarding status (i.e. whether or not had any boarding pupils),
by gender of pupils (i.e. boys, girls and mixed). PRUs formed a stratum of their own.
The second stage sampled pupils within the selected schools. Home-schooled pupils,
pupils in very small schools (fewer than ten pupils for maintained sector, and fewer than
6 for independent schools), and children residing in the UK solely for education pur-
poses, were excluded. Within the maintained sector, pupils were sampled from PLASC.
Pupil selection probabilities were dependent on ethnic group (White; Indian; Pakistani;
Bangladeshi; Black African; Black Caribbean; and Mixed), and on school selection prob-
abilities. According the User Guide, “The school sampling stage took into account the
number of pupils from each [of these] minority groups. Taken together, the school selec-
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tion probabilities and the pupil selection probabilities ensured that within a deprivation
stratum, all pupils within an ethnic group had an equal chance of selection.” The pupil
selection aimed to sample at least 1,000 pupils in each ethnic group. The average number
of pupils sampled per school was 33.25, although the number sampled per school varied
according to the ethnic group composition of the school population.
Pupils in independent schools and PRUs were sampled directly from school rolls by
interviewers using a sampling program installed on their laptop computers. 33 or 34 Year
9 pupils (33.25 on average) were randomly selected at each independent school or PRU
containing 34 or more year 9 pupils. All the Year 9 pupils were selected in the independent
schools / PRUs that contained fewer than 34 but more than 5 Year 9 pupils. Of the 892
schools selected in total, 647 schools (73%) co-operated with the study.
Table 2.12 shows the survey structure of the LSYPE. The fieldwork was mainly carried
out between April and October, with the bulk occurring toward the end of the academic
year, i.e. April to August. However, a minority of the interviews fell in the subsequent
academic year. Pupils applying to university would have passed most stages of the process
and be holding offers by interview.
The LSYPE achieved cross-sectional responses rates ranging from 51% (in wave 8), to
92% (in Waves 3 and 4). For wave 1 to 7, the sample issued (response rate denominator)
at each wave comprised respondents from the immediately preceding wave, who agreed
to be re-contacted (rather than all participants identified as the sampling frame in wave
1). The exception is the Wave 4 sample frame also included an ethnic minority boost of
six hundred Black African and Black Caribbean young people. This sample was selected
from schools who did not co-operate in the initial Wave 1 sampling frame. This boost
had a response rate of 59%, adding an additional n=352 participants. Therefore, despite
reasonable cross-sectional response rates, over time the sample size was severely reduced.
Response rate (2) in Table reports the number of respondents in each wave divided by all
Wave 1 respondents.
Wave 8, now managed by CLS, widened the issued sample from not only those who
were in wave 7 who agreed to be re-contacted (the procedure in previous waves), but all
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participants: the 15,770 from wave 1 plus the Wave 4 ethnic boost of 352, to yield a
sampling frame of 16,122 cases. A small number asked to op-out, leaving 15, 629 to be
contacted for the Wave 8 interview. Of the 15,531 sample issued, 423 were ineligible,
and productive interviews were achieved with 7,707 cohort members, yielding a cross-
sectional response rate of 51%, and the longitudinal Wave 7 to 8 figure was 69% (i.e. 69%
of those responding to Wave 7 also responded to Wave 8).
The interviews inWaves 1 to 4were carried out face-to-face at the young person’s home
using computer assisted personal Interview (CAPI). FromWave 5 onward, the survey used
mixed-methods (online, telephone and face-to-face interviews). Wave 5 comprised 32%
online interviews, 44% telephone interviews, and 12% face-to-face interviews at the par-
ticipants’ homes. From Wave 5 onward, only the young person as interviewed, not the
parents. Wave 6 comprised 39% online interviews, 48% telephone interview and 13%
face-to-face. The figures for Wave 7 are 40% online, 40% telephone and 18% face-to-face
(a further 2% face-to-face interviews were issue but not completed). Wave 8 also deployed
a sequential mixed mode strategy, with an online option first (64%), then telephone inter-
view (9%) and finally face-to-face (29%).
The fact that many of the participants in wave 8 had not participated in each wave, due
to the sequential sampling method, means that out of the 7,707 Wave 8 participants, many
do not have a complete history from participation in all waves. Out of the total sample
of 16,122 participants, 33.7% (n=5,426) of all respondents partook in all 8 Waves, 16.7%
(n=2,694) had interrupted response –largely due to dropping out somewhere betweenWave
1 and 7, and then being re-issued at Wave 8; 49.6% (n=8,002) had a monotone pattern of
response, that is, they partook in some number of consecutive waves then permanently
dropped out. Another issue is that if you add to the denominator the pupils in the schools
which didn’t respond in the first wave–then response rate are lower, for example 51% rather
than 74% for Wave 1.
Survey drop-out both reduces power, due to the reduced sample size, and can lead
to biased analyses, depending how the research questions at hand relates to missingness.
Weights are provided with each LSYPE wave to account for account for the complex sur-
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vey design, and non-response. The Wave 1 weights account for the sampling in the fol-
lowing way: design weights (accounting for the survey design) are computed separately
by maintained vs non-maintained schools (independent). 28 out of the 54 independent
schools issued with questionnaires responded, yielding 530 pupil responses. The inde-
pendent school weights were computed to weight the responding schools to match the
population figures on on variables found to be associated with non-response: school type
(mixed/boy/girls) and London/other regions.
Out of the 838 schools issued in the maintained sector, 646 responded. Maintained
sector weights were computed for school non-response, pupil non-response and then cali-
brated to totals. School non-response was explored by share of non-White pupils, share of
pupils with 5+A*-CGCSE grades, and deprivation status of the school and region, weights
were created based on deprivation band and region, which were significant predictors of
school response. The pupil non-response weights used gender, ethnicity interacted with
region, GCSE attainment. The school and pupil response weights were combined and
calibrated to create weights which matched populations totals (ethnicity, region, GCSE
outcome and gender, from NPD), and then adjusted to match independent vs maintained
population totals.
Weights for subsequent waves were calculated by modeling the probability of contin-
uing from Wave n to Wave n + 1. These weights were multiplied by the weight from
the previous wave, to account also for the survey design and selection into the previous
wave. A similar procedure was carried out at Wave 8 by CLS: response at wave 8 was
modeled as a function of family background and young person’s characteristics at Wave 1
(including: parental qualification and employment, NS-SEC, marital status, ethnicity and
gender of the child); and the young person’s characteristics at Wave 7 (including: housing
tenure, labour market/education status, ever tried cannabis, interviewmonth and interview
mode). Missing data on predictor variables—due to item non-response, or having not par-
ticipated in Wave 7—was handled via multiple imputation. This non-response weight was
then multiplied by the Wave 7 final weights, which accounts for non-response up to Wave
7, and the complex survey design.
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Solon et al. (2015) classify the situations where weighting is appropriate into three
groups: (i) estimating population representative quantities; (2) if missingness or survey
design is correlated with the association, or causal relationship in question, and (iii) het-
erogeneity. In this analysis we use the weights throughout—we are interested initially in
describing population quantities, such as how many pupils miss out on a preferred school,
in its own right, and (2), it seems plausible that the relationship between missing out and
later outcomes could be confounded by survey drop out.
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Appendix 2.E Institutional setting
2.E.1 Historical setting
Beginning with Conservative administrations between 1979 and 1997, a number of sig-
nificant reforms have been introduced which have substantially modified the operation of
the market for secondary schools.
The 1988 Education Reform Act introduced a number of important changes increasing
the agency of parents and schools, including open-enrolment—allowing parents to apply
to any school in England, rather then being constrained by the boundaries of their LEA.
It also prevented schools from rejecting pupils for any reason aside from over-capacity.
The 1988 Act also initiated a new development in school governance, “grant-maintained
status". Grant-maintained schools could manage their own admission arrangements (sim-
ilar to voluntary-aided schools, which were often church schools). This increase in choice
from schools over pupils, and increase in choices available to parents, was a significant
landscape of school choice and governance (Committee on Education and Skills, 2004).
A number of concerns emerged at this point (West et al. , 2004), including a lack of
co-ordination of admission policies across school types, local areas and admission author-
ities; increased complexity of choosing and applying for a school; potential for “cream-
skimming” among grant-maintained and voluntary-aided schools (West et al. , 2004). In
advance of the 1997 election, the Labour party manifesto highlighted education its first
priority, committing to two key themes: limiting selection (from schools) and enhancing
(parental) choice through diversity of school types. The commitment to reducing the de-
gree of selection by schools was made clear by David Blunkett MP, the shadow Education
Secretary at the 1995 Labour Party conference: “read my lips: no [more] selection, either
by examination or interview, under a Labour government". The right of parents to express
a preference was strongly affirmed: “all parents should be offered real choice through
good quality schools, each with it’s own strengths and individual ethos” (Committee on
Education and Skills, 2004).
The key piece of legislation introduced by Labour, once in Government, was the 1998
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School Standards and Frameworks Act (SSF Act). The goal of the SSF Act was to make
admissions transparent, objective and allow each child a fair chance of satisfactory place.
The SSFAct required the Secretary of State to publish a Code of Practice regarding schools
admission—a document providing guidance on best practice in admissions. This and sub-
sequent editions of the School Admission Code contain descriptions of the primary legisla-
tion from which they stem, extensive guidance, and reference to statutory responsibilities
which must be met, but are not themselves a legal document. The Codes “signpost the
relevant legal provisions but they do not aim to provide definitive guidance on the inter-
pretation of the law: that is a matter for the courts." (cite: School Admissions Code of
Practice, Department for Education and Skills, 2003, para A1).
The guidance associated with the SSF Act was the Code of Practice on School Admis-
sions 2001 (DfE, 2001), enacted on 01 April 1999, and in force for admissions for intakes
in September 2000 onward. Schools and admission authorities were required to “have re-
gard to” the indications in the Code. The Code encourage increased uptake of common
admission processes: “LEAs should consider, with other admission authorities, having
co-ordinated admission arrangements - including standard application forms and com-
mon timetables - for all schools” (DfE (2001), para. 3.9). Each school has an admissions
authority which decides which children are admitted to the school. While for maintained
(government controlled) schools, this was generally the Local Authority, for foundation3
(grant-maintained), voluntary-aided (church schools) and City Technical Colleges, it was
typically the school governing body (Williams et al. , 2001).
The Code provided guidance on oversubscription criteria, mandating that these criteria
and exactly how they are used need to be published, and in be accordance with the law:
“Admission authorities have a fairly wide discretion to determine their own oversubscrip-
tion criteria provided these criteria are objective, clear, fair, compatible with admissions
and equal opportunities legislation.” (DfE (2001), para. 5.2). The Code provided some
suggestions for criteria to be used: “Commonly used and acceptable criteria include sib-
ling links, distance from the school, ease of access by public transport, medical or social
3the 1998 Framework converted grant-maintained schools either to voluntary-controlled schools or, most
commonly, foundation schools.
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grounds, catchment areas and transfer from named feeder primary schools, as well as
parents’ ranking of preference." (DfE (2001), para. 3.14). “Admission authorities should
make clear the order of priority in which the criteria will be applied, and how any tie-break
decisions will be made.”(DfE (2001), para. 5.3)
After the 2001 Code, the next piece of primary legislation introduced was The Ed-
ucation Act 2002, and the associated School Admissions Code 2003. Some of the key
requirements introduced the 2002 Act are: (i) a requirement for LEAs to coordinate ad-
mission arrangements between admission authorities and across LEA boundaries; (ii) the
statutory creation of admissions forums in each local authority, in which all admissions
authorities must participate; (iii) explicit advice (but not a statutory requirement) that pri-
ority should be given to children in public care (Committee on Education and Skills, 2004).
The School Admissions Code 2007 and School Admissions Code 2010 followed.
Admissions in 2001
The admission process varied both within and between local authorities, and in September
2001 was much more heterogeneous and under-developed compared with the present day
arrangements. At its most general level, the admissions process three stages (i) parents
submit their preference(s) to the admission authority (or authorities), (ii) the admission
authority processes tries to assign families to their preferred schools, and (iii) in the case
of oversubscription, applications are ranked based on a set of observable criteria to ration
scarce places. In practice, the actual procedures followed vary greatly and are difficult to
categorise (see West et al. (2004); Williams et al. (2001) for surveys of the admission
protocol used, and specific examples from LEA brochures).
Once the families’ preference rankings have been submitted, a procedure is required
to allocate school places, given school capacities and priorities. There are a number of
approaches for doing this. The two used in 2001 are (1) the first-preference algorithm,
also called the Boston mechanism, or immediate-acceptance, and (2) the equal-preference
algorithm, also called the Gale-Shapley mechanism, or deferred-acceptance. West et al.
(2004) found that 41% of schools used a ‘first-preference’ approach to offer places for the
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September 2001 intake. Reproducing the helpful example in Cantillon (2017), this section
briefly describes the main features of these two approaches as relevant for this paper.
Suppose we have three schools, A, B and C, and to simplify, only one priority group
is used in admission, older siblings at the school, and then places are rationed using the
tie-breaker of straight line distance from the school. Each school has one place to offer,
and there are three students competing for places: Anne, Bob and Chloe. Table 2.18 lists
the preference ordering over the schools for Anne, Bob and Chloe. School A is known
in the community to be the best school (both Anne and Bob rank it first choice), and is
typically oversubscribed. School C is seen as the worst school which is described as a bad
outcome (everyone’s last choice).
Table 2.18: Anne, Bob and Chloe’s preferences over schools, and whether they have sib-
lings at the school
Anne Bob Chloe
School A (sibling) School A School B
School B School B School A
School C School C School C
After applying the admission criteria—older siblings and distance—the ranking of the
pupils at each school are listed in Table 2.19. Anne’s sibling is at School A, so she has
priority at School A, but not at school B. Bob lives closer to School A and B than Chloe,
and so on.
Table 2.19: Ranking of the pupils at each school, given their preferences and priorities
(siblings and distance)
School A School B School C
Anne (sibling) Bob Anne
Bob Chloe Bob
Chloe Anne Chloe
The first-preference method starts by each school assigning places to pupils who put
that school as their first choice, based on the ranking determined by the school’s admission
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criteria—until either all there are no places left, or all students who put that school as first
choice are assigned. The next round conducts the same procedure for pupils who put that
school as their second-choice, and so on. In this example, Anne is offered a place at School
A, because she listed School A as her first choice, and is ranked higher than Bob, who also
put School A as his first choice (due to Anne’s sibling at School A). Chloe put School B
as her first choice, and is assigned place at School B (Bob and Anne are out of this round).
Bob is assigned the remaining place at School C—his least desired outcome.
Bob is penalised for revealing his true first choice of School A. Had he put School B,
he would have been assigned a place there over Chloe by the distance rule. Hence, while
the first-preference method tends to have a a higher share of pupil’s getting into their first
choice; it also incentivises strategic behaviour. Families have an incentive to trade-off
their true preferences with their probability of acceptance. Without this consideration, if
families put a school as their first choice that have a very low chance of acceptance into,
they may not only fail to secure a place at their preferred school but also fail to be placed
at any school they deem acceptable.
The problem is that the preference rankings are themselves are used as a priority. In
contrast, the ‘equal-preference’ approach does not use the preference ranking as a prior-
ity. In this method, parents submit their preference ranking over schools. The families’
application is considered at each school that they listed as a preference without reference
to its ranking. In the case of listing a school with no excess demand, the family is offered
a place at that school. In the case of having listed an oversubscribed school, the oversub-
scription criteria are applied and places are offered up to capacity based on the resultant
ranking. After receiving offers, families can accept their most preferred school. Once
places are freed up from rejections, the place is offered to the next student in the ranking.
The process continues until all places have been offered (this process may be carried out
by a computer).
In this example, the first stage consists of offering the place at School A and School C
to Anne, because Anne is the top of the priority list at these two schools, and offering a
place at School B to Bob. Anne rejects School C, because it is not his preferred school.
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Bob holds onto his only offer, School B, for now. School A now has no more places to
offer. In Stage 2, School C, the only school with a spare place, offers it to Bob–the second
down on their list. Bob rejects, and accepts School B which he prefers. Stage 3, School C
is the only one with a place left, and offer the place to the next free student in the ranking,
Chloe, who holds onto it as her only current option, hoping she may still receive a better
offer. However, now all the places are offered, and the process ends and the places are
confirmed. 4
In 2001, while admissions authorities had a statutory obligation to have regard to
parental wishes, they had discretion as to what role, or priority, parental preference took in
relation to other oversubscription criteria in determining admissions: “Where parents can
express more than one preference, the order of priority by which parents rank their prefer-
ences may be given priority over any other means of determining how to allocate places at
oversubscribed schools, but that is not a statutory requirement. An LEA must have regard
to the guidance in this Code in drawing up its admission policy. It may do this by adopting
the parents’ order of ranking as one of its criteria, if it regards that as a fair and beneficial
way of determining such cases and maximising parental preference; or it may adopt an ad-
missions policy which applies some other criterion, compatible with parents’ preferences
and the guidance and objectives set out in this Code.” (DfE (2001), para. A.30). In the
survey of schools by West et al. (2004), 41% of schools used a ‘first-preference’ system.
This practice of using preference order as a priority was prohibited in the School Ad-
missions Code 2007: [schools must not] “give priority to children according to the order
of schools named as preferences by their parents, including ‘first preference first’ arrange-
ments;” (School Admissions Code 2007, 2.16 (b)). “the ‘first preference first’ criterion
made the system unnecessarily complex to parents” and “forces many parents to play an
‘admissions game’ with their children’s future.”(cite: School Code 2007, Foreword, p. 7).
In the nationally representative survey conducted in Flatley et al. (2001), about 25%
of parents reported that took into account the nature of the over-subscription criteria when
4This examples describes the school-proposing variant of DA, which in this specific example gives the
same result as the pupil-proposing variant. However, in general they are different and the pupil-proposing
variant Pareto dominates the school-proposing variant for pupils. In practise, a mix of these two variants is
used across LEAs
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consideringwhich schools to apply to. Parents whowere familiar with the oversubscription
criteria in their preferences tended to be more highly educated, owner occupier and of
white ethnic origin:
• families where the mother had a degree, or higher qualification, were three times
more likely than those without any qualifications, and approximately twice as likely
as those with lower qualifications, to report that they knew how popular schools
allocated;
• owner occupiers were about twice as likely to say they knew as were parents who
were social renters;
• families where the mother was of white ethnic origin were nearly twice as likely to
say they knew as those with a mother of non-white ethnic origin.
These different levels of strategy are reflected in testimony from a school admissions
officer interviewed in Flatley et al. (2001):
“The problem that we have been unable to overcome is that a significant number of
parents fail to understand that their local community school may not be available to them
as second preference if they take a gamble by stating a first preference for a voluntary-aided
school whose religious adherence they do not share, or a popular community school not
very close to where they live. We publish a list of the schools that have been oversubscribed
over recent years, but this does not succeed in deterring every applicant from naming one
of those schools as second preference. This is not really a disadvantage of the system, but
our failure to communicate with parents.”
2.E.2 Oversubscription criteria used in September 2001
Regarding pupils with a Statement of Special Education Needs, the 2001 Code specifies
that an admission authority has a duty to admit pupils with a certificate of special edu-
cational needs who named that particular school on their certificate: “Where a school is
named in a statement of special educational needs, the admission authority has a duty
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to admit the child to the school.”(DfE (2001), para. 5.8). It emphasized that pupils who
require support for Special Education Needs, but have no certificate, were not to be dis-
criminated against (i.e., due to their potential for extra resources being required to cater
for their needs).
Interviews with parents were now specifically prohibited, aside from in order to con-
duct a religious assessment: “Schools or admission authorities should not interview par-
ents as any part of the application or admission process. Church schools may carry out
interviews, but only in order to assess religious or denominational commitment.”(DfE
(2001), para. 5.25).
In 2000, it wasn’t required to give “looked-after” children first priority if a school
is oversubscribed. In the 2003 Code, it was suggested to give children in care priority,
and from 2006, it was a statutory requirement. In 2008, almost all schools (99%) had an
admissions criterion relating to children in care compared with only 2% in 2001West et al.
(2011).
The 1998 SSF Act allowed secondary schools to use “fair banding” in their admis-
sions, a method aimed at ensuring balanced distribution over ability. Specifically, Section
101 of the SSF Act permits admission authorities to employ arrangements which select
children by general ability, only if the arrangements are “designed to secure that in any
year children admitted into a normal year of entry are fully representative of the range of
ability amongst children applying to the school for that year of entry (which may well be
different from the range of ability nationally), and that no level of ability is substantially
over- or under-represented” (DfE (2001), A.65) Often the 11 plus test is widely taken in
the LEA, and the results are also used in comprehensive schools to ensure that the intake
is balanced over the test performance distribution. The usual oversubscription criteria are
then applied if there are more children falling within a particular band than places allocated
to that band.
The 1998 SSF Act allowed the admission authority for a school with a “specialism”
(“particular expertise or facility”—it does not require the school to be in the formal spe-
cialist schools programme) to give priority to up to 10% of pupils who can demonstrate an
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‘aptitude’ in the relevant subject (DfE (2001), A.69). The 10% limit is an overall limit, not
per subject (DfE (2001), A.70). The subjects which can be used are: physical education or
sport; performing arts; modern languages; design and technology; visual art (DfE (2001),
A.71). It is still unlawful to test for “ability” or aptitude in any subject aside from the ones
prescribed above.
As mentioned in the previous section, some schools used families’ preference ranking
in their oversubscription criteria (‘first-preference-first’).
What do we know about what admissions were actually used in 2001?
Two key surveys of admission policies were conducted during this time period, including
a survey of all government-funded schools by West et al. (2004), and a DfE-commission
survey of schools and parents conducted by Flatley et al. (2001) and analyses in Williams
et al. (2001). Both of these surveys have associated follow-up studies comparing changes
in admission processes over time, see West et al. (2011) and Coldron et al. (2008) re-
spectively.
West et al. (2004) conducted a survey of all government-maintained secondary schools
for pupils entering in September 2001. West et al. (2004) were able to collect data for
95%of secondary schools (N=3,013), and summarised the admission information from the
admission prospectuses. The key table summarising the frequency of different admission
criteria is reproduced in Table 2.20. 13% of schools referenced religious criteria; 73% had
regard to “medical or social needs” of the child; 39% referenced “special needs”; 41% used
‘first-preference’; 1.7% referenced children in public care. Only 2% of schools reported
interviewing pupils; in accordancewith the DfE (2001) which excludes interviewing, aside
from for religious purposes. The review concluded that, overall, the admissions criteria
do not appear to be unfair or be designed to advantage a particular type of student at the
expense of others. However, they did highlight the practices of specific types of schools—
with more control over their admission criteria—which did appear to try to select certain
students.
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Williams et al. (2001) collected information from the composite prospectuses sent to
parents in 1999, for children starting in September 2000, with coverage of 100% LEAS
which have secondary schools where pupils transfer from primary at age 11 years (n=141
LEAs). Similar to West et al. (2004) , they highlight the variation in admissions arrange-
ments and oversubscription within and between LEAs. Williams et al. (2001) find a range
of different ways in which parents could express their preferences, and categorise them into
four loose groups—noting that this categorization is necessarily an oversimplification. The
most common category (74.4%) was for parents to submit a ranking of preferences, and
the LEAs authority tries—either using a first- or equal-preference approach—to allocate
families to a preferred school. However, sometimes there were exceptions to this, includ-
ing where a first-choice could be overridden if another pupil, who put the school as second
choice, had an especially long or unsafe journey or some other exceptional circumstance.
In some occasions, parents were offered a second round to submit further preferences, if
their first set of preferences were unsuccessful. In the second category (12.8%), LEAs offer
a place at a school to a family; and then families can submit this school as their first pref-
erence, or alternatively the family can submit a ranked list of different preferred schools.
The third category (5.0%), parents submit multiple unranked preferences, and the LEA
aims to allocate the family to one of these preferred schools. The final category (7.8%) is
sequential: families are invited to submit a single preference, if this proves unsuccessful,
a second round of submitting preferences takes place.
Williams et al. (2001) present a number of concrete examples of the many different
admissions arrangements, including the following:
“The LEA uses a common form that every parent has to complete but if parents are
interested in voluntary-aided and foundation schools those schools have their own admis-
sion forms and parents complete an additional form for that particular school. There is a
two-part form and on one side they choose up to five schools that they are interested in.
On the second side, which is confidential to the LEA, parents list an order of preference
which only comes into play if parents meet the admission criteria for a place at more than
one school. If they satisfy the admission criteria of more than one school the LEA looks
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at the order of preferences but this is not shown to the schools. The LEA allocates places
for its community schools and has the admission lists for the other voluntary-aided and
foundation schools. The schools provide the LEA with a list of children that have been
offered places. The LEA identifies those that are going to be offered a place at more than
one school, and then rejects the lower preference places. The information will normally
be sent to a voluntary/foundation school saying that it has been possible to meet a parent’s
preference. It is only when parents meet the admission criteria for more than one school
that the list of preferences is looked at.”
Sources of variation in admission
There are a range of sources of variation and uncertainty about whether one will be ad-
mitted to a particular school.
Catchment area policies, while becoming less popular at that time, were used in both
general admissions (14.9%) and featured somewhere as an oversubscription criteria in
(63.1%) of LEAs Williams et al. (2001). Catchment area policies create uncertainty be-
cause the catchment area can change over time in unpredictable ways. In the survey by
Williams et al. (2001), one LEA deployed a flexible catchment area system based on
the numbers of children applying to particular secondary schools from particular primary
schools over a period of time. Additionally, sibling and catchment criteria can interact; for
example, siblings in a catchment area, other children living in a catchment area, siblings
living outside a catchment area and, finally other children outside a catchment area. Given
random fluctuations in the sibling distribution, this creates some random variation in the
effects of the catchment area on the probability of admission. The changing interaction of
sibling and distance criteria makes it difficult for parents to predict their chances of gaining
a place at a particular school, complicated further by the interaction with banding, where
applicable, as evidenced in this testimony from a school admissions officer in the survey
by Williams et al. (2001):
“Most local children are guaranteed a place but there have been years where a whole
band has been filled up with siblings and it changes. On average nearly 50% of our pupils
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will be siblings - so that’s 120. If they all happen to be in the same band, there’s a problem!
It’s never happened, but I suppose it could be that there’s 70 pupils in the top band that
have all got siblings”.
Distance to school also creates uncertainty, because families do now know in advance
whether or not they live close enough to a school in any given year. Although some in-
dividual schools, in some LEAs, publish information over several years about the ‘cut-off
point’ for distance, typically it is not clear how near ‘near enough’ will be the next year
(Williams et al. , 2001). The first preference system is also a source of uncertainty in the
probability of acceptance, because it depends, amongst other things, upon how many par-
ents apply to a school in a given year, which fluctuates year-on-year and cannot be known
in advance (Williams et al. , 2001).
Outside options
Some areas have grammar schools, which wholly select on ability. How these schools are
accounted for in the admissions process varied. The first is where parents submit com-
pletely separate preference lists to selective and non-selective schools. When the child’s
11 plus results are known, the appropriate list is consulted. The second approach is that
parents express their preferences for both selective and non-selective schools on the same
form. When the 11 plus results are known, the highest preference non-selective school
becomes their effective first preference if they do not pass the 11 plus. The third approach
is that parents express their preferences for both selective and non-selective schools on the
same form. When the 11 plus results are known, the list is interpreted literally: if a selec-
tive school is first preference and a non-selective is second preference, the non-selective
school is still counted as a “second preference”. This is a disadvantage when parents are
unsure a priori of their children’s eligibility for the selective school (Flatley et al. , 2001).
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Table 2.20: Non-exhaustive frequency of secondary schools admissions criteria practice







Special educational needs 39
Feeder school 28
Religion 13
Children of employees 9
Difficult journey 6
Children of former pupils 5
Banding 3
‘Other faiths’ 3
Aptitude in subject area 2
Pupil interview 2
Strong family connection 2
Parent interviews 2
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Chapter 3
Primary school preference, child
outcomes and parental response
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147
3.1. INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 3. PRIMARY SCHOOL CHOICE
3.1 Introduction
Schooling exerts long-lasting causal effects on a range of outcomes over the lifestyle, in-
cluding health (Jones et al. , 2011), cognition (Banks &Mazzonna, 2012), and labour mar-
ket outcomes (Harmon & Walker, 1995). Given school performance varies, and places at
the best schools are limited, how these places are allocated is potentially important for the
distribution of subsequent outcomes.
In England, there are differences in the measured academic performance of different
primary schools, and places at the best schools are hotly contested. Many families move
house to secure a place at good schools (Hansen, 2014): 18 per cent of parents reported
moving house during the two years prior to starting primary school, for reasons to do with
their child’s education. This preference for good schools is capitalised into house prices.
Gibbons & Machin (2003) show that an 1 percentage point increase in the share of local
pupils meeting the required academic target increases house prices by 0.67% in England.
While the majority of families are offered a place at their preferred school, some in-
evitably miss out. Not attending a preferred school may influence outcomes via attending
a lower quality school, being exposed to a different peer mix, or a sub-optimal school
match for the child. This setting offers an opportunity to credibly assess the effects of a
perceived early-life “shock”, both on child development and parental responses. For ex-
ample, parents may respond to this perceived disadvantage by paying for private tuition,
which is increasingly prevalent among primary school pupils in England, or helping with
homework.
Behavioural responses are especially important in education settings, because the pro-
duction of educational outcomes involves the interaction of pupils, parents, school teachers
and administrator and the policy context. Parental responses to public investment also dif-
fer by demographic group: recent evidence showed that by age 11 years, 22% of English
primary school students were receiving private tuition, with large variations by ethnicity
and social background (Kirby, 2016). These types of interactions could dampen or accel-
erate policy interventions in unintended ways. Despite the importance of understanding
these public-private interactions in educational investments (Albornoz et al. , 2018), there
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are few studies which credibly assess behavioural responses to early-life shocks. Recent
papers include parental responses to class size (Fredriksson et al. , 2016), responses to
month-of-birth (Bernardi & Gratz, 2015) and responses to birth weight and fetal health
(Restrepo, 2016; Almond & Mazumder, 2013). These papers report mixed evidence on
the presence of parental responses.
Missing out on a preferred school makes a compelling contribution to this literature for
a number of reasons. First, the school choice and admission process is widely publicised
in England—parents are aware of the importance of getting into the best-suited school for
their child, and are likely to see missing out on their preferred school as a disadvantage
to their child—perhaps more so than other inputs such as month-of-birth—making it a
useful case study. Second, the deterministic nature of the admission rules for primary
schools offers a study design especially amenable for credible assessment of the effects
of missing out on parental behaviours. Finally, primary school is an especially relevant
period to investigate parental responses in particular: in addition to being critical period
for skill development, greater investment at primary school may increase a child’s chances
of entry into a selective secondary school, potentially reducing effort required from parents
later (Albornoz et al. (2018).
In this paper, I employ data from a detailed birth cohort study—the Millennium Co-
hort Study (MCS) (Platt et al. , 2014). The MCS follows a cohort of families from birth
of the child, through ages 3, 5, 7, 11 and 14 years. This paper focuses on the primary
school stage, until 11 years. The MCS collects detailed data on family background, their
experience at school, skill development and parental involvement and investment. In terms
of child outcomes, the MCS administers age-appropriate cognitive skill tests, and a well-
validated scale measuring socio-emotional behaviours, allowing a characterisation of the
development of both cognitive and non-cognitive skills over time. The MCS is eminently
suitable for addressing the question of school allocations, because in addition to rich socio-
economic and demographic data, the MCS also collects information on school choice and
preferences for schools.
This study explores how missing out on a place at a preferred primary school affects
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pupils’ cognitive and non-cognitive skill development, and traces the dynamics of parental
behavioural responses. The challenge is to compare families who have a similar chance of
admission to their preferred school, as well as having similar school preferences—yet one
family misses out due to the nature of the admissions process.
In England, families submit a ranked list of schools they may wish their child to at-
tend and places are allocated in accordance with these preferences by the local governing
body who co-ordinate admissions. Oversubscribed schools are dealt with via a rule-based
rationing mechanism: places are allocated based on observed characteristics of the child
and their family. The priority criteria include whether they have special educational needs,
whether the child lives in the school catchment area, and whether the child has an older
sibling at the school. The tie-breaker above this is the straight-line distance of the child’s
home from the school. These criteria create some randomness in the chances of accep-
tance.
The MCS directly elicits the counterfactual school by asking parents, asking: if your
current school was not your first choice school, which school was your first choice? From
this question, we can compute the distance from a family’s home address to their current
school, and crucially, the distance to their preferred school (if they were not offered a
place at their first-choice school).
Distance to preferred school, suitably interacted with geographical area, is especially
useful for two reasons: (i) it informs on admission probability compared to other families
in the local area and, (ii), distance to first-choice school also informs on as on preferences
and unobserved family motivation. Previous research has shown that more ambitious fam-
ilies are willing to travel further in order to attend a high quality school, and this rate of
substitution between travel-time and school quality varies based on ethnicity, economic
status and the child’s prior cognitive ability (Weldon, 2018).
Exploiting a estimation methods based on a conditional independence assumption
(CIA), this paper compares the outcomes of children who have similar values of the ob-
served variables—but did and did not miss out on a place a their preferred school. Docu-
menting the association is a new contribution to this literature, and for a causal interpre-
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tation this strategy relies on a CIA assumption. Therefore I also assess the robustness of
the results to deviations from the CIA via sensitivity analyses (Nannicini, 2007).
The findings do not reveal compelling evidence that missing out on a first choice
school reduces cognitive development. There are small negative effects on Internaliz-
ing behaviours—an important component of the socio-emotional skill measure. However
these fade out by age 11 years. In terms of parental responses, there are small (not sta-
tistically significant) increases in the probability of parental investment activities at ages
7—including helping with homework and paying for private tuition.
At age 11 years, those parents whose children missed out are less likely to help with
homework than those who get into their preferred school, and significantly more likely
now to pay for extra lessons and preparations for exams governing entry into selective
schools. With the transition to secondary school imminent, using parental time to helpwith
homework may be perceived by parents as an inferior substitute for private tutoring. These
findings show that parental responses are important when considering policy impacts of
education interventions.
3.2 Data and setting
3.2.1 Primary school admissions in England and Wales
For over 30 years (since the 1988 Education Reform Act), parents in England, Wales, and
Northern Ireland1 have been able to express a preference for the school they would like
their child to attend. Parents may express, to their Local Authority (England and Wales)
or Education Library Board (Northern Ireland), their choices of schools they wish for their
child to attend (parents can select between three and six choice, depending on where they
live). This paper focusses on England and Wales.
Places at oversubscribed schools are rationed based on observable characteristics: (1)
children who are looked after by the state, (2) children with a Special Educational Needs
certificate, (3) having older siblings at the school, and finally the distance between home
1In Scotland, families are allocated a place at their local school, but can then apply to the Local Education
Authority to switch, if desired.
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and school. In the case where two families live in precisely the same location, e.g., same
apartment block, a coin flip is the decider. In the Millennium Cohort Study, about three
quarters of primary schools were state controlled schools for which admissions are gov-
erned by the Local Authority in this way. The current system is rule-based, including
proximity to school as a key determining factor. Compared to a completely random lot-
tery, this method still encourages selection-by-mortgage, as wealthier families can move
closer to their preferred school. This analysis takes the residential location decision as
fixed.
3.2.2 Data
The data employed are from theMillennium Cohort Study (MCS), a nationally representa-
tive dataset of children and their families in the UK. TheMCS target population comprises
all children born between 1 September 2000 and 31 August 2001 (for England andWales),
and between 24 November 2000 and 11 January 2002 (for Scotland and Northern Ireland),
alive and living in the UK at age 9 months, and eligible to receive child benefit at that age.
The children are first surveyed aged 9 months, and followed up at age 3 years, 5 years, 7
years, 11 years and 14 years. The data collected encompass pregnancy, infant and early-
childhood development, cognitive skills, behavioural problems, educational attainment,
family life.
The study has a complex survey design, using clustering and stratification to ensure
a sufficient sample size for analysis of target subgroups. The survey was clustered by
electoral ward. Ethnic minority families, children living in deprived areas (bottom quartile
of Child Poverty Index, a measure of the proportion of children in a ward whose families
received means-tested benefits in the local area) and populations in Wales, Scotland and
Northern Ireland were oversampled. The MCS attained a reasonable response rates; 72%
in Wave 1. The patterns of participation are non-monotone: by the fifth survey, 54% of
families had responded to all 5 waves, and another 20% had participated intermittently.
Weights are provided in the MCS to account for attrition and the complex survey design,
which I use throughout the analysis (specifically, the Wave 5 weights, because I use the
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sample which remains to Wave 5).
The survey principally tracks the child, and the bulk of the interview, especially in the
early years is carried out with the main informant—typically the mother. A point of dif-
ference with the the MCS is that it also interviews fathers, about their life and involvement
with the child and family. As the child grows older, they begin to conduct personal inter-
views directly with the child to elicit their experience in school and other development.
The majority of records are singleton births, yielding one cohort member per family,
however out of the 18,552 children responding in Wave 1, there were also 208 twin births,
and 11 triplets, in wave 1, yielding multiple cohort members per family in these cases.
Following previous studies, I only use only the singleton births, to abstract from issues of
birth order. Additionally, some of the key variables I use are only available for the first
cohort member (e.g. distance to school). Given that the multiple birth sample is so small,
it is highly unlikely that this exclusion would influence the results. Table 3.1 shows the
structure of the MCS datasets.
3.2.3 Variables
Treatment variable
The MCS asked which school the cohort member currently attends, and whether this
was their first choice school. The variableMissed out is equal to one if the current school
is NOT the first school, and zero if it is the first choice school.
Cognitive development
The MCS administers a set of age appropriate tests of cognitive development: the
British Ability Scales II (BAS II) (Elliott et al. , 1996), see Table 3.2. The BAS II has
demonstrated construct validity as a measure of cognitive ability (Elliott et al. , 1997;
Elliott, 1997) and high test-retest reliability (Elliott, 1997), making it suitable for a survey
setting. At age 3, the BAS Naming Vocabulary and Bracken School Readiness tests are
employed; at age 5, the BAS Verbal, Pattern Construction and Picture similarity tests are
administered; at age 7 years, the Pattern Construction and Word Reading tests are used.
Age 11 years used only the Verbal ability test is administered. The raw scores have been
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adjusted for the age-at-test and difficulty of the test.
The MCS cognitive ability scales are “tests of attainment based on the capability and
motivation to complete a particular task under given conditions” (Platt et al. , 2014)—they
not directly measure “general intelligence". In analyses of cognitive development, ability
tests are typically combined using factor analysis, or related techniques, to approximate
an underlying latent dimension of cognitive ability or general intelligence. Using multiple
test measures helps reduce potential measurement error and regression to the mean, which
could lead to spurious time trends (Jerrim&Vignoles, 2013). Following previous analyses
of the MCS, e.g., Jones & Schoon (2008) and Bruckauf & Chzhen (2016), I use principal
component analysis (PCA) to derive latent cognitive ability scores based on correlations
between the observed age-adjusted test scores.
PCA is typically used in the social sciences as a data reduction device, reducing the
variation in a set of correlated variables into a smaller set of components. The goal is to
explain the largest amount of the variation in the data in the smallest number of compo-
nents. The typical rule of thumb is to retain components if their associated eigenvalue is
greater than 1, which was only the case for the first component. Therefore, I use the first
component from the PCA, standardised to have mean zero and standard deviation of one.
Table 3.13 reports the estimates of factor loadings (the correlations between the latent
factor and observed variables) at ages 3, 5 and 7 years. The latent factor accounted for 79
per cent of the underlying variance at age 3, 56 per cent at age 5 and 62 per cent at age 7.
At age 11, there is only one cognitive ability test (BAS Verbal Similarity test). Therefore,
only one measure of cognitive ability is used at age 11, and may be measured with more
error than the combined measures used at earlier ages.
Socio-emotional development of the child
The Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) is a well-validated screening tool
for behavioural adjustment and mental health problems in children, and is widely used in
both research and clinical practice. It been employed as a measure of the development
of socio-emotional skills over time in the economics literature (Black & Kassenboehmer,
2017).
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The SDQ is specifically designed for use among children, unlike the GHQ, which is
primarily designed for use with adults. In the MCS, the SDQ is report by parents (about
their child) when the children are aged 5, 7, 11 years, and by teachers when the children are
aged 7 and 11 years. The SDQ comprises 25 itemswhich generate an overall score, and can
also been divided into five subscales, measuring different aspects of (dys)function. The
subscales measure conduct problems, hyperactivity, emotional symptoms, peer problems
and pro-social behavior.
Two commonly used summarymeasures of the SDQ are internalising and externalising
scales. The internalising scale is the sum of emotional symptoms and peer problems; exter-
nalising problems is the sum of conduct problems and hyperactivity. These two summary
measures have been found to have good properties in measuring childhood dysfunction.
They are often added together to create a “Total difficulties score”.
Because the SDQ is conducted in all but the first of the MCS waves, when the children
were very young, the development of any problems can be traced throughout childhood.
In this paper I use both the the parent and teacher reports of the SDQ. As noted in (Black
& Kassenboehmer, 2017), reports may in theory differ between parents and teachers—
however, the teacher questionnaires are typically completed by a different teacher each
wave, which is problematic for accurately measuring changes over time, as well as the
teacher survey having a much survey response rate (57%).
Parental investments
In wave 3 and 4, the MCS asks whether anyone helps with the child with homework,
across reading, writing and math, and the frequency (Not at all (=0), Less than a month,
once or twice a month, once of twice a week, several times a week, every day) (=5). I
created an additive variable which sums the frequency of help with homework across all
subjects. In wave 5, the question is how often does anyone at home help with the cohort
member’s homework (0=never or almost never, sometimes, usually, always=4), without
reference to the specific subject.
The MCS also asks about whether the child has any extra private lessons to help with
their schoolwork, creating the variable Extra indicating whether the parent has arranged
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for the child to receive extra lessons in either Math, Reading or Writing. This variable is
available at ages 7 and 11 years. At age 11 years, the families are also asked specifically
whether they have paid for private lessons to help them get into secondary school (Extra
prep), and whether they are applying to a school with an entrance exam (Entrance exam).
3.2.4 Covariates
School selection criteria
TheMCS asks parents first if they applied for school via the common LEA form (about
75%). For those who did apply via the LEA process, it asks which school their child
attends, and whether the current school is the most preferred (about 94% report attending
their most preferred school). If it is not the most preferred school, the survey asks which
school was their first choice, and where applicable, which school was their second or third
choice. From this information, a distance measure was constructed from home to the
current school, for those for whom their current school was not preferred, we also have the
distance to their first choice school (and second and third choice where appropriate).
The MCS data holds Ordnance Survey National Grid eastings and northings and uses
these to map the MCS schools in a GIS. Because the Centre for Longitudinal Studies
(CLS) also holds the unit postcodes of the addresses at interview of cohort members, it is
possible to calculate the distances between these unit postcode centroids and the schools
point data. These distances are straight line, or as the crow flies, based on straight line
calculations. For this study, the distance measure has been banded into size bands to meet
confidentiality requirements.
An indicator for whether the child has a certificate of Special Educational Needs (SEN)
was taken from the age 7 parents report, which asks whether the child had a statement of
special educational needs. There is also a teacher report at age 7 years, but the teacher
survey has a lower response rate (57%) so this variable was not used in the main analyses.
The Older Siblings module in the age 5 wave of the MCS asks about the older siblings of
the main cohort member, including whether the older siblings attend the same school as
the cohort member. In addition to variables which directly shape admissions probability,
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a range of detailed socio-economic and demographic variables are collected in the MCS:
• Gender of the child
• Ln(Household disposable income)
• Quintile of the Index of Multiple Deprivation
• Region (London, South West, South East, etc)
• Cognitive skills measured at age 3 years
• Month-of-birth of the child dummies
• Highest level of parental education




3.3.1 Propensity Score Matching
The empirical approach used in this Chapter is situated in the potential outcomes frame-
work. Let Yi(1) denote the value of the outcome Y under the treatment condition (D = 1)
for individual i, and Yi(0) is the value of the outcome Y under the treatment condition
(D = 0) for individual i. We wish to uncover the average difference in these outcomes
among treated individuals: the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET) (Equation
3.1).
E[Yi(1)− Yi(0) | Di = 1] (3.1)
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This analysis relies on a conditional independence assumption (Equation 3.2). This
assumption states that the mean counterfactual outcome Y (0) is independent of treatment
status given a vector of covariates Xi.
E[Yi(0) ⊥ Di = 1, Xi] (3.2)
This CIA assumptions means that the outcome under the control setting (Y (0)) is ran-
domly assigned within groups defined by Xi, implied by Equation 3.3.
E[Yi(0) | Di = 1, Xi] = E[Yi(0) | Di = 0, Xi] (3.3)
The credibility of this assumption depends heavily on the nature ofXi in relation to the
research question at hand.2 The second assumption, in addition to the CIA, is an overlap
assumption (see Equation 3.3). Each treated unit should have a similar control unit for
comparison.
Pr(Di = 1 | Xi) < 1 (3.4)
Given these assumptions, treatment assignment is effectively randomly assignedwithin
strata defined byXi. Therefore, the untreated outcomes can be used as counterfactual out-
comes for the treated, who similar on the covariatesXi. A range of methods for measuring
similarity between a treatment and control unit exist, including exact matching (match-
ing units who have exactly the same values of Xi), coarsened exact matching (matching
units within coarsened categories of Xi), multivariate distance matching (matching units
with a similar value of a multivariate distance measure, e.g., Mahalanobis or Euclidean),
propensity score matching (matching units with a similar conditional probability of being
treated). Averaging these treatment-control comparisons, over the covariate distribution
of the treatment group, gives an Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET).
In most applications, Xi is high-dimensional, making it impractical to compare with
exact strata defined byXi or coarsened categories ofXi. A commonly used option which
2Note that no such restriction is placed on Yi(1) (outcome under treatment) or Yi(1)− Yi(0) (selection-
on-gains), as would required for and Average Treatment Effect.
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resolves this issue is propensity-score matching—matching on the conditional probability
of treatment p(x) ≡ Pr(D = 1 | X), termed the propensity score. As shown in Rosen-
baum (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983), if Y (0) is independent of treatment given Xi, it will
also be independent of treatment given p(x). Hence, the propensity score can be used as
a unidimensional summary of the observed conditioning variables.
Propensity score matching compares treated and control units with similar values of
the estimated propensity score. How to select the control group matches give rise to var-
ious PSM estimation methods. For instance, nearest-neighbor or pairwise matching (se-
lecting the closest n control units), radius matching (selecting all control units within a
specified radius, or caliper), kernel matching (selecting all control units within a specified
bandwidth, usually chosen via cross-validation, with the control units weighed in inverse
proportion to their distance from the treated unit, governed by a kernel function).
Compared with Ordinary Least Squares regression, matching is a useful approach for
at least three reasons. First, matching does not rely on a linear outcome model and it is
less dependent on functional form. Often, many covariates are required to make the CIA
assumption credible, and obtaining the right functional form may not be straightforward.
Second, matching makes clear the comparison group, and facilitates an exploration of the
common support and balance over the covariate distribution between treated and controls.
That is, check if there is a control unit sufficiently similar to each treated unit. In contrast,
“controlling” for covariates using OLS does not make clear the distribution of the control
and treated units across covariates: in some cells there may not be a control unit to compare
with a treated unit, and extrapolation or interpolation of the outcome is made based on the
assumed functional form. It may also be hard to check whether the covariate distribution
is similar between treatments and controls if there are many covariates, an issue which is
resolved by using the propensity score.3 Finally, matching yields an population-averaged
treatment effect (e.g., an ATET or ATE), unlike OLS estimates which in general do not
yield either an ATE or ATET (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Gibbons et al. , 2014). OLS
3Inverse-probability-weighted regression adjustment (IPWRA) is another alternative to resolve this issue
of covariate balance and functional form: by re-weighting the sample by the inverse probability of treatment,
such that the distribution of Xi, via p(x), is more similar across treatment and control groups, IPWRA
method is then less reliant on the functional form imposed in the regression model.
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is a minimum-variance estimator, and yields estimates which are implicitly weighted by
the conditional variance of the treatment in each strata, penalising contributions from less
precise strata and giving more weight to more precise strata.
Propensity score model and regression
In this application, the main estimation approach I employ is kernel matching. Kernel
matching matches each treated unit to all control units within a specified distance (the
“bandwidth”, I use the default bandwidth of p(x) = 0.06 4), and gives a higher weight
to control units closer to the treatment (governed by the kernel shape, I use a Epachnikov
kernel). The standard errors are computed by bootstrapping.5
As a sensitivity check, I also employ multivariate distance matching on the Maha-
lanobis distance, fitting OLS models on the matched sample as a “bias adjustment”. The
rationale for this is as follows. Two advantages of matching are, first, overlap (ensuring
the distribution of treatment and control units share a common support), and second, bal-
ance, (increasing the similarity of the distribution of covariates in the treatment and control
groups).
Inexact matching, such as PSM, works to ensure balance. However, differences can
remain, and overlaying regression on the matched sample acts as an insurance policy to
soak up any remaining pre-treatment differences in covariates. In this context, combining
matching and regression is referred to “bias correction”. Another way to think about it to
start from OLS: ensuring a more comparable sample by pre-processing the data to create
a matched sample reduces the reliance on the correct functional form of the regression
specification, especially in areas of the data with sparse common support.
A second reason to include the bias adjustment is to address the concerns highlighted
in King & Nielsen (n.d.), who show that matching which randomly discards non-matches
(e.g. nearest neighbor), in doing so reduces the sample size and can lead poor balance due
to increased small-sample variation (among other arguments).
Covariate selection
4Paired with sensitivity analyses to deviations from this bandwidth)
5Unlike nearest neighbour matching, for which the analytic standard errors proposed by Alberto Abadie
and colleagues are most appropriate (e.g., Abadie & Imbens (2008)), bootstrapped standard errors have not
been proven to be invalid for kernel and local linear matching.
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The selection of the covariates to include in the propensity score is motivated by the
aim of making the CIA plausible. Whether the CIA is plausible depends on economic
intuition and subject matter knowledge about the relationship between the Xi, and the
potential values of Yi. In the case of the allocation of school places, a number of factors
shape both selection into treatment (missing out on a preferred school place) as well as
outcomes. First, factors which determine admission to a school. Places are allocated
based on a number of observable characteristics: (1) whether a child is looked after by the
state, (2) whether the child has a certificate of special educational needs, (3) whether the
child has an older sibling at the school, and (4) the straight line distance between home
and school, which acts as a tie-breaker. As proxies for the admission criteria, I adjust
for whether the parent reports that the child has a certificate of special educational needs,
whether the child has any older siblings and distance to first-choice school. While there is
a question on whether the child is in care, there are too few children in the sample reporting
being in care to include this information.
Second, demographic and socio-economic characteristics also are associated with the
likelihood of getting into a preferred school, the type of school which is preferred and child
outcomes. Therefore, in addition to the admission criteria, I adjust for number of socio-
economic variables, including log of household disposable income, region, ethnicity, quin-
tiles of the Index ofMultiple Deprivation, gender of the child, dummies for month-of-birth
of the child, highest parental education. Comparing families in the same local area, and
the same values of the selection criteria, is comparing families after residential sorting has
already taken place; therefore this analysis does not pick up the total effect of response to
the school choice mechanism. Residential choice is held fixed.
After selecting the covariates based on the economic considerations described above,
I chose the model for the propensity score based on statistical goodness-of-fit criteria (i.e.,
what is the best fit of the probability of treatment), and ad-hoc consideration of the re-
sulting balance statistics (as opposed to using an algorithm, such as in ‘genetic’ optimal
matching algorithms, which include the balance statistics in the procedure for determining
the propensity score specification). I include interactions between region and distance to
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preferred school, interaction between income and prior cognitive ability of the child and a
quadratic in the Index of Multiple Deprivation.
3.3.2 Sensitivity analyses
To evaluate the sensitivity of the estimates to confounding, I employ the sensitivity anal-
ysis developed in Nannicini (2007). This sensitivity analysis simulates the effects of a
potential binary confounder on the ATET. This method is similar in concept to many other
sensitivity analyses in the statistics and econometrics literature, for example Altonji et al.
(2008); Oster (2013) who also assess the sensitivity to unobserved confounding. The ad-
vantage of this specific method (Nannicini (2007)) is that is does not require a parametric
outcome model for Yi, making it suitable to use in a matching context.
The idea is that we suspect the conditional independence assumption (Equation 3.2)
may not hold, given the X variables we observe. However, conditional on a omitted co-
variate U , the assumption would now plausibly hold (Equation 3.5).
E[Yi(0) ⊥ Di = 1, Xi, Ui] (3.5)
Matching on U in addition to X allows us obtain a consistent estimate of the ATET.
By specifying the joint distribution of (U ,D,Y ) we can compute the “unbiased” ATT
which accounts for the confounding effects of U , and compare this to our original “biased”
estimate—which doesn’t adjust forU—to assess the difference made by accounting for the
unobserved covariate U .
To operationalise the method, one needs to specify the distribution of U in relation to
D and Y .
pij ≡ Pr(U = 1 | D = i, Y = j) = Pr(U = 1 | D = i, Y = j,X) (3.6)
Equation also highlights the maintained simplifying assumption that U is binary and
independent of X . After specifying pij , the relevant value of U is assigned to each obser-
vation, depending on which category of i, j they are in, andU is included in the calculation
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of the ATET as an additional covariate. For a given set of parameters, the matching proce-
dure is performed multiple times with varying draws of U , and the estimate of the ATET
is the average over the estimate of the ATET in each simulation. The standard errors are
calculated using Rubin’s rules for computing standard errors across multiple datasets (i.e.
the same procedure as used in multiple imputation for missing data).
I chose pij to mimic the distribution of ethnic minority status (equal to 0 for White
families and 1 for non-White). Families of an ethnic minority are more likely to miss
out on a preferred school, and have poorer child outcomes. The current literature shows
that ethnic minority families are ambitious in their choice of school—they are willing to
travel further to attend a high quality school. These beliefs and behavours are likely also
correlated increased parental input and effort into their children’s education—potentially
acting as a confounder if this information is not fully captured in my observed data.
3.4 Findings
Table 3.3 shows little evidence for a difference in the probability of missing out on the first
choice school by family income quintile or area deprivation quintile: the difference in the
probability of getting into a first choice school is not significant across these categories.
However, the right-hand panel of Table 3.3 does show differences in applying via the Local
Authority process by income and area quintile. Aﬄuent families in a higher income quin-
tile, or quintile of area deprivation, are more likely to say they applied via LEA. However,
this could be explained by differential recall bias or differential item-response. Table 3.4
shows the reasons stated by parents for their choice of school. Proximity and siblings are
the most commonly cited reasons, partly perhaps due to the fact that families tend to base
their location decision on the school desirability and the expected probability of getting
in.
An initial question regarding the consequences of missing out on a first choice school,
is whether the school quality is lower. While I do not have direct data on school charac-
teristics, we can examine the satisfaction of parents across a range of domains of school
performance. Table 3.5 reports parental satisfaction with their school by whether they got
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into their first choice or not. For example, 70% of parents who got their first choice are
very satisfied, compared with 64% of those who missed out; a significant difference of 6
percentage points.
Table 3.7 reports summary statistics of the child outcomes by treatment status (missed
out on first choice or not). There are significant differences in Internalising Problems
(favouring those who get in), which appears to be driven by differences in its component
subscale “Peer problems”. This effect size fades out over time: no significant effects are
detected at age 7 or 11 years. While those who miss out have slightly lower measured
cognitive skills at each wave, these differences are not statistically significant. Table 3.8
reports summary statistics of the teacher report of the SDQ by treatment status (missed out
on first choice or not). There are significant differences in Internalising Problems (favour-
ing those who get in) in wave 4, and significant differences in Externalising Problems in
wave 5. Table 3.9 summarises parental input by treatment status. Those who miss out
are more likely to have help with homework and extra lessons, aside from at age 11 years
when they seems to substitute from more homework to more paid lessons.
Table 3.10 shows “predetermined covariates” by treatment status; cohort members who
have older siblings, and who live closer to their preferred school, are more likely to be
offered a place, highlighting the importance of adjusting for these variables which shape
admission probability.
Table 3.11 shows matching results comparing child outcomes at wave 3 by whether
the child missed out on first choice school. In Wave 3, those who miss out have higher
Internalising problems, but there is little difference in Externalising and cognitive skills.
However, these differences are not statistically significant. In the subsequent Wave, there
are no statistically significant differences in any of the skill measures considered.
Table 3.12 reports on matching results assessing the association of parental inputs with
missing out on first choice school. There are positive associations betweenmissing out and
parental inputs in Wave 4, but they are not statistically significant. In Wave 5, the effects
of missing out on private tuition and extra lessons for school entrance exams are positive
and statistically significant: parents of children who miss out are more likely to invest
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in private tuition and exam preparations. Help with homework has a negative, but not
statistically significant, coefficient. This may reflect substitution toward paid help, away
from own inputs, now that the stakes are perceived to be high by parents.
The sensitivity analyses show that the positive association between missing out and
increased parental inputs, at Wave 5, are unlikely to be fully explained by unobserved
confounding. A potential confounder mimicking the distribution of minority ethnic status
would reduce the estimated ATET for private tuition (extra lessons) from 0.084 to 0.074, a
reduction of 13.5%. For preparatory lessons for selective school exams, the ATET reduces
from 0.085 to 0.082, a reduction of 3.7%.
The Appendix Tables show further matching results, using nearest neigbour matching
with a bias adjustment, rather than kernel matching, for comparison, which concord with
the matching findings described above. No strong evidence is detected for effects on non-
cognitive or cognitive development of missing out on a preferred primary school.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
School quality is an important factor shaping many life outcomes. This paper traces the
skill development and parental responses of families who are not offered a place at their
preferred primary school in England. Using a nationally representative cohort study, I
compare the outcomes for families with similar preferences and probability of obtaining
a place at their preferred school—however, some miss out on a place at their preferred
school.
The results do not reveal evidence for detrimental effects of missing out on a first choice
school on cognitive and non-cognitive skill development. In terms of parental responses,
there are small, statistically insignificant increases in the probability of parental investment
activities at ages 7—including helping with homework and paying for private tuition. At
age 11 years, parents of children who miss out are significantly more likely to pay for extra
lessons for their child. With the transition to secondary school imminent, using parental
time to help with homework may be seen as an inferior substitute for private tutoring.
Further work remains to assess whether parental responses vary by demographic and
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socio-economic group. A policy concern is that while private tutoring is becoming a
common tool to increase the chances of getting into selective schools, tutoring is more
accessible to wealthy families—potentially increasing education inequalities. On the other
hand, descriptive work shows that ethnic minority families, regardless of income, have
a high propensity to take up private tutoring and other educational investments (Kirby,
2016). Differential parental responses could also have offsetting effects on the child’s skill
development, leading to the observed null average effect of missing out on cognitive and
non-cognitive skills.
This study does not reveal any evidence that attending a non-preferred parental primary
school has lasting effects on the skill development of children. However, the findings do
highlight the importance of parental responses when considering policy impacts.
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Table 3.1: Millennium Cohort Study data structure
Wave Age of child Number of children Number of families
1 9 months 18,818 18,552
2 3 years 15,808 15,590
3 5 years 15,460 15,246
4 7 years 14,043 13,587
5 11 years 13,469 13,287
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Table 3.2: Cognitive tests in each wave of Millennium cohort study
Wave








CANTAB Spatial Working Memory Task
CANTAB Cambridge Gambling Task
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Table 3.3: Missed out by SES variables
Variable Mean SE Mean SE
Missed out on first choice Applied via LEA
Income quintile
Quintile 1 (low income) 0.06 0.00 0.66 0.01
Quintile 2 0.05 0.00 0.71 0.01
Quintile 3 0.05 0.00 0.78 0.01
Quintile 4 0.05 0.00 0.78 0.01
Quintile 5 (high income) 0.06 0.00 0.73 0.01
F-stat 2.84 29.63
Area deprivation quintile
Quintile 1 (most deprived) 0.06 0.00 0.67 0.00
Quintile 2 0.05 0.00 0.73 0.00
Quintile 3 0.05 0.00 0.74 0.00
Quintile 4 0.05 0.00 0.77 0.00
Quintile 5 (least deprived) 0.04 0.00 0.76 0.00
F-stat 2.32 19.83
Notes: F -stat is the F-statistic for a joint test of equality of means across
categories (e.g. testing the null hypothesis that the mean of Missed Out
is equal across income quintiles
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Table 3.4: Reasons for preferring chosen school
Main reason for choice % No.
Don’t Know 0.0 1.0
School is near or nearest to home 58.8 4,603.0
His/her friends go or were intending to go there 3.3 260.0
His/her brother/sister went/go there 17.7 1,387.0
Other relative/parent went/go there 3.3 257.0
Wanted them to go to a different school to friend(s) or othe 0.1 9.0
Wanted them to go to a different school to brothers/sisters 0.1 8.0
Wanted them to go to a different school to other relative/pa 0.1 4.0
How likely it was that he/she would get a place 0.3 27.0
School has good exam results/academic reputation 7.1 555.0
General good impression of school 4.2 327.0
School has strong anti-bullying policy 0.1 4.0
School has small class sizes 0.7 54.0
School caters for special needs 0.4 29.0
School offers specialised curriculum e.g. music, dance, acti 0.1 6.0
School has good facilities 0.5 42.0
School offers childcare for parents who work or study 0.1 6.0
School is a feeder school 0.1 6.0
Religious grounds 1.2 95.0
Easy to get to on public transport 0.1 4.0
Ethnic mix of the school 0.1 10.0
School teaches in a language other than English 0.5 42.0
Wanted him/her to go to single-sex only school 0.0 1.0
Other reasons relating to the other children who go to the s 0.0 2.0
Other reason (specify) 1.1 90.0
Total 100.0 7,829.0
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Table 3.5: Parental satisfaction with school in Wave 3
Got in Missed out Difference p-value
Parental satisfaction with school
Very satisfied 0.70 0.64 0.06 0.02
Fairly satisfied 0.26 0.28 -0.02 0.34
Neither satisfied or dissatisfied 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.05
Fairly dissatisfied 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.04
Very dissatisfied 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.12
Notes: Satisfaction of main parents with the child’s school in Wave 3
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Table 3.6: Child outcomes summary statistics by wave
Mean SD Min Max N
Wave 3
Internalising problems 2.50 2.54 0 18 9,152
Externalising problems 4.76 3.38 0 20 9,136
Conduct problems 1.49 1.49 0 10 9,196
Hyperactivity 3.27 2.36 0 10 9,141
Emotional problems 1.38 1.60 0 10 9,182
Peer problems 1.12 1.45 0 10 9,173
Cognitive ability 0.08 0.95 -4 3 9,290
Wave 4
Internalising problems 2.79 2.79 0 19 8,045
Externalising problems 4.80 3.58 0 19 8,046
Conduct problems 1.41 1.54 0 10 8,075
Hyperactivity 3.39 2.51 0 10 8,051
Emotional problems 1.57 1.77 0 10 8,064
Peer problems 1.23 1.56 0 10 8,062
Cognitive ability 0.01 0.98 -3 2 8,124
Wave 5
Internalising problems 3.30 3.23 0 19 7,583
Externalising problems 4.66 3.70 0 20 7,569
Conduct problems 1.47 1.67 0 10 7,592
Hyperactivity 3.19 2.48 0 10 7,573
Emotional problems 1.91 2.01 0 10 7,586
Peer problems 1.40 1.73 0 10 7,594
Cognitive ability 0.00 0.96 -4 2 7,681
Notes: Internalising problems is the sum of the emotional
and peer problems subscales. Externalising problems is
the sum of the conduct and hyperactivity subscales. Cog-
nitive ability is the average over the British Ability Scale
(BAS) measurements in that waves (BAS is an age appro-
priate measure of cognitive development.
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Table 3.7: Child outcomes by treatment status
Got in Missed out Difference p-value Raw N Wtd N
Nobs 8,916.00 505.00 9,421
Wave 3
Internalising problems 2.48 2.82 -0.34 0.01 9,152 10,161
Externalising problems 4.76 4.77 -0.01 0.96 9,136 10,153
Conduct problems 1.49 1.45 0.04 0.61 9,196 10,207
Hyperactivity 3.27 3.33 -0.05 0.63 9,141 10,157
Emotional problems 1.37 1.53 -0.15 0.05 9,182 10,191
Peer problems 1.11 1.30 -0.19 0.01 9,173 10,182
Cognitive ability 0.08 0.10 -0.02 0.58 9,290 10,246
Wave 4
Internalising problems 2.78 2.88 -0.10 0.49 8,045 8,970
Externalising problems 4.79 4.85 -0.05 0.77 8,046 8,975
Conduct problems 1.41 1.45 -0.04 0.61 8,075 9,004
Hyperactivity 3.39 3.40 -0.01 0.96 8,051 8,979
Emotional problems 1.56 1.67 -0.11 0.26 8,064 8,992
Peer problems 1.23 1.22 0.00 0.95 8,062 8,987
Cognitive ability 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.71 8,124 9,012
Wave 5
Internalising problems 3.28 3.67 -0.39 0.04 7,583 8,415
Externalising problems 4.65 4.73 -0.08 0.70 7,569 8,408
Conduct problems 1.47 1.50 -0.03 0.73 7,592 8,421
Hyperactivity 3.19 3.24 -0.05 0.69 7,573 8,410
Emotional problems 1.90 2.08 -0.18 0.12 7,586 8,417
Peer problems 1.38 1.59 -0.20 0.03 7,594 8,424
Cognitive ability -0.00 0.07 -0.07 0.22 7,681 8,475
Notes: Internalising problems is the sum of the emotional and peer problems subscales
(as reported by the parent). Externalising problems is the sum of the conduct and hy-
peractivity subscales (as reported by the parent). Cognitive ability is the average over
the British Ability Scale (BAS) measurements in that waves (BAS is an age appropri-
ate measure of cognitive development. These figures are weighted using the survey
weights, which account for the complex survey design and non-response. Standard
errors are clustered by electoral ward.
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Table 3.8: Child outcomes: as reported in the teacher survey by treatment status
Got in Missed out Difference p-value Raw N Wtd N
Wave 4
Internalising problems (ts) 2.55 2.90 -0.35 0.06 5,355 5,773
Externalising problems (ts) 3.58 3.95 -0.37 0.12 5,357 5,775
Conduct problems 0.75 0.87 -0.12 0.21 5,357 5,775
Hyperactivity 2.83 3.08 -0.25 0.14 5,358 5,775
Emotional problems 1.41 1.67 -0.26 0.04 5,356 5,774
Peer problems 1.14 1.22 -0.09 0.38 5,355 5,773
Wave 5
Internalising problems (ts) 2.59 2.71 -0.12 0.50 4,823.00 6,879
Externalising problems (ts) 2.96 3.59 -0.63 0.01 4,823.00 6,879
Conduct problems 0.69 0.91 -0.22 0.04 4,821.00 6,876
Hyperactivity 2.27 2.68 -0.41 0.01 4,820.00 6,876
Emotional problems 1.42 1.32 0.10 0.36 4,823.00 6,879
Peer problems 1.17 1.39 -0.22 0.05 4,821.00 6,872
Notes: Internalising problems is the sum of the emotional and peer problems subscales
(as reported by the teacher). Externalising problems is the sum of the conduct and hy-
peractivity subscales (as reported by the teacher). These figures are weighted using the
survey weights, which account for the complex survey design and non-response. Standard
errors are clustered by electoral ward.
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Table 3.9: Parental behaviours summary statistics
Got in Missed out Difference p-value Raw N Wtd N
Wave 3
Help with homework 11.68 11.70 -0.02 0.89 9,421 10,370
Wave 4
Help with homework 6.90 7.31 -0.41 0.07 8,278 8,777
Extra lessons 0.04 0.07 -0.03 0.02 8,237 8,731
Wave 5
Help with homework 1.59 1.50 0.09 0.06 7,761 9,875
Extra lessons 0.21 0.34 -0.14 0.00 7,766 9,884
Did entrance exams? 0.16 0.33 -0.16 0.00 7,827 9,956
Lessons for entrance exams? 0.06 0.16 -0.09 0.00 7,828 9,957
Notes: These figures are weighted using the survey weights, which account for the com-
plex survey design and non-response.
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Table 3.10: Covariates from Wave 3
Got in Missed out Difference p-value Raw N Wtd N
Wave 3
SEN 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.75 8,230 9,120
Older siblings? 0.84 0.72 0.12 0.00 9,420 10,369
Ethnicity
White 0.90 0.81 0.09 0.00 9,420 10,369
Indian 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.07 9,420 10,369
Pakistani 0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.07 9,420 10,369
Bangladeshi 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.19 9,420 10,369
Black African or Caribbean 0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.00 9,420 10,369
Mixed, Other 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.05 9,420 10,369
London 0.08 0.18 -0.10 0.00 9,419 10,366
Parental education
None 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.45 8,276 9,279
NVQ1 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.07 8,276 9,279
NVQ2 0.33 0.30 0.04 0.12 8,276 9,279
NVQ3 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.45 8,276 9,279
NVQ4 0.33 0.37 -0.03 0.18 8,276 9,279
NVQ5 0.05 0.09 -0.03 0.02 8,276 9,279
Distance from preferred school
0-1 km 0.67 0.36 0.31 0.00 9,306 10,264
1-2 km 0.17 0.31 -0.14 0.00 9,306 10,264
2-5 km 0.11 0.20 -0.09 0.00 9,306 10,264
5-10 km 0.03 0.07 -0.03 0.00 9,306 10,264
10- 20 km 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.01 9,306 10,264
20+ km 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.00 9,306 10,264
Ln(Family income) 7.37 7.05 0.32 0.16 9,421 10,370
Notes: These figures are weighted using the survey weights, which account for the complex
survey design and non-response.
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Table 3.11: Effect of missing out on cognitive and non-cognitive skills from ages 5 to 11
years: PSM kernel matching (Epach kernal, bandwidth 0.06)
ATT s.e. Total N
Wave 3
Internalising problems 0.2477 0.1232 5,473
Externalising problems 0.0819 0.1831 5,473
Cognitive ability -0.0154 0.0637 5,473
Wave 4
Internalising problems 0.0271 0.1624 5,473
Externalising problems 0.1566 0.2343 5,473
Internalising problems (teacher survey) 0.2184 0.2389 5,473
Externalising problems (teacher survey) 0.2564 0.2884 5,473
Cognitive ability 0.0523 0.0610 5,473
Wave 5
Internalising problems 0.1610 0.2337 5,473
Externalising problems -0.0316 0.2233 5,473
Internalising problems (teacher survey) 0.1825 0.1845 5,473
Externalising problems (teacher survey) 0.0377 0.2410 5,473
Cognitive ability 0.0834 0.0532 5,473
Notes: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) computed
from a regression on a matched sample. Standard errors computed
using 100 replications.
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Table 3.12: Parental responses to missing out on cognitive and non-cognitive skills from
ages 5 to 11 years: PSM kernel matching (Epachnikov kernel, bandwidth 0.06)
ATT s.e. Total N
Wave 3
Help with homework 0.0995 0.1770 5,473
Wave 4
Extra lessons 0.0301 0.0210 5,473
Help with homework 0.1278 0.2648 5,473
Wave 5
Extra lessons 0.0836 0.0311 5,473
Lessons for entrance exams? 0.0850 0.0182 5,473
Help with homework -0.0189 0.0532 5,473
Notes: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)
computed from a regression on amatched sample. Stan-
dard errors computed using 100 replications.
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Appendix 3.A Matching validity tests
Figure 3.1: Histogram to check common support region
Notes: Histogram of the propensity score by treatment status.
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Figure 3.2: Box plot to check common support region
Notes: Box plots of the propensity score by treatment status.
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Figure 3.3: Scatter plot summarising balance statistics
Notes: Summary of balance statistics for propensity score matching generated by -psgraph-.
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Appendix 3.B Principal components
Table 3.13: Factor loadings
Wave Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
Naming Vocabulary 0.71 0.57 -
Bracken School Readiness 0.71 - -
Picture Similarity - 0.59 -
pattern Construction - 0.57 0.54
Word reading - - 0.56
Math - - 0.62
% explained 79.2 56.1 62.5
Notes:This tables reports on the factor loadings for each ability test contributing to
the principal component analysis in each wave. The % explained report the % of
variance explained by the first principal component in each wave.
182
Human capital formation 3.C. MATCHING SENSITIVITY
Appendix 3.C Matching sensitivity
Table 3.14: Effect of missing out on cognitive and non-cognitive skills from ages 5 to 11
years: multivariate Mahalanobis distance kernel matching
ATT s.e. Total N
Wave 3
Internalising problems 0.3192 0.1710 5,341
Externalising problems 0.1420 0.2225 5,325
Cognitive ability -0.0400 0.0514 5,297
Wave 4
Internalising problems 0.0452 0.1955 5,296
Externalising problems 0.1309 0.2619 5,307
Internalising problems (teacher survey) 0.2161 0.2488 3,633
Externalising problems (teacher survey) 0.2489 0.3034 3,634
Cognitive ability 0.0448 0.0555 5,202
Wave 5
Internalising problems 0.2074 0.2149 5,236
Externalising problems -0.0206 0.2450 5,233
Internalising problems (teacher survey) 0.2005 0.2040 3,380
Externalising problems (teacher survey) 0.0902 0.3368 3,380
Cognitive ability 0.0684 0.0628 5,269
Notes: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) computed
from a regression on a matched sample. Standard errors computed
using 100 replications.
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Table 3.15: Parental responses to missing out on cognitive and non-cognitive skills from
ages 5 to 11 years: multivariate Mahalanobis distance kernel matching
ATT s.e. Total N
Wave 3
Help with homework 0.2426 0.1883 5,341
Wave 4
Extra lessons 0.0074 0.0168 5,341
Help with homework -0.1188 0.3169 5,341
Wave 5
Extra lessons 0.0507 0.0319 5,401
Lessons for entrance exams? 0.0515 0.0320 5,436
Help with homework -0.0339 0.0288 5,400
Notes: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)
computed from a regression on amatched sample. Stan-
dard errors computed using 100 replications.
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This thesis reports on new research assessing the role of schools in promoting the develop-
ment of human capital. Using modern methods of policy evaluation, I explore the effects
of two key aspects of education: (1) how many years a child spends in secondary school,
and (2) attending a school preferred by parents.
In Chapter 1, I provide new evidence on the causal effects of basic education on later
life outcomes—specifically, cognitive outcomes measured at approximately age 60 years.
Basic education has been identified as a potential candidate in improving cognitive out-
comes: for instance, based on observational evidence, The Lancet’s recent dementia Com-
mission concluded that 8% of dementia cases could be avoided by increased levels of basic
education (Livingston et al. , 2017). As successive governments have sought to address
the problem of young people not in work, education or training (NEETs), the costs and
benefits of different types of education at this crucial juncture in life is a fundamental in-
put into policy analysis. Important parameters for policy design include the size of the
causal effects of basic education, and the nature of the causal mechanisms through which
such effects operate.
The findings in Chapter 1 suggest that an additional year of schooling have important
causal effects on working memory, an important component of cognitive function. The
analyses fail to detect evidence for causal effects on basic levels on numeracy, and verbal
fluency. Staying on at school also reduces the probability of entering a manual or routine
occupation, and results from a causal mediation analysis show that, in line with other
studies, the occupation channel can explain up to about one-fifth of schooling’s effects on
memory. However, these figures are very imprecisely estimated.
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While remaining agnostic about the role of occupation, I conclude that basic education
causally improves an important component of cognitive function in older ages. These
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that increased population levels of education
could reduce the growth in burden of cognition-related disease, and support economic
adjustment to a changing demographic structure.
Chapter 2 and 3 contribute to the area of school choice, tracing the effects of failing
to gain a place at a preferred school. Chapter 2 assesses the long run effects of failing to
gain a place at the secondary school most preferred by parents. The findings fail to detect
consistent evidence that missing out on a place at a preferred school has deleterious effects
on academic outcomes—holding socio-economic status, prior ability and residential local
choice fixed. Schools are important in shaping more than just test scores, and the results
reveal consistent evidence for increased engagement in risky behaviours and increasing
rates of high school and university drop out, and reduced mental health among those who
miss out on their preferred school.
The findings have a number of suggestive policy implications. Poor mental health
casts a long shadow in life: mental health and well-being could prove a fruitful addition
to the traditional measures of school quality in school league tables. Second, the nature of
the assignment mechanism (how preferences are mapped to school allocations), and how
parents understand and engage with this process, is important for ensuring equal access to
schools. Finally, getting into a preferred school matters for important child outcomes. In
this light, the oversubscription criteria which act as the gatekeeper to popular schools—
determiningwho gets in andwhomisses out—is an opportune area for innovation to ensure
fair access to schools.
Chapter 3 assesses the effects of missing out on a place at a preferred primary school,
on cognitive and non-cognitive skill development and parental responses. The results pro-
vide scant evidence of a detrimental effect on skill development, but compared with those
who get into their preferred school, parents do change their behaviours. Parents whose
child misses out on a place are more likely increase their investments in the child through
increasing private tutoring and selective school exam preparations, especially in the run-up
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to applying for secondary school.
This analyses adds important evidence to the nexus of the interaction between public
and private investments in human capital. Behavioural responses are especially important
in education settings, because the production of educational outcomes involves the inter-
action of pupils, parents, school teachers and administrator and the policy context. These
types of interactions could dampen or accelerate policy interventions in unintended ways.
How to use scarce resources effectively to improve children and young people’s life
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